Waging Peace, Pages 63-65

NIAC Capitol Hill U.S. & Iran Conference

The National Iranian American Council (NIAC) held its sixth Capitol Hill conference on Nov. 4, marking 30 years since Iranian students took control of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and held American officials hostage for 444 days. For Americans, explained NIAC president Trita Parsi, “This trauma began the idea, the narrative of U.S.-Iran tensions.” For Iranians, however, he clarified, the tensions dated back to 1953’s CIA-backed overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh.

The daylong conference, titled “The U.S. and Iran: Between Human Rights, Sanctions, and Diplomacy,” featured two panels, one on human rights in Iran and the other on nuclear issues. Parsi asked audience members to reflect on U.S. options regarding a relationship with Iran: “where can it lead and can it overcome, not only the first bump in the road, but the many bumps to follow?”

First Panel: Context and Explanation

PARSI INTRODUCED the first panel by noting that the summer of 2009 has been “one of the most interesting summers in Iran since 1979,” adding that there was no question that domestic human rights violations occurred. Dr. Hadi Ghaemi, a coordinator for International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran, stated that the June 2009 “elections provided political context” for protests, but considered it “a broader movement, a civil rights movement, that has found political context…not a movement looking for regime change.” He added that Iranians, still feeling “fresh” from the 1979 Revolution and Iraq-Iran War, “would like to see a change free of violence.”

Dr. Ghaemi explained that presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi became the movement’s political face, but is not its leader. Instead, every citizen is both a leader and media outlet, he said, describing the movement as a horizontal movement driven by the youth and youthful energy.

Despite what could be considered the Iranian government’s military crackdown, Century Foundation fellow Geneive Abdo said she believes that the amorphous nature of the movement, driven by word of mouth, is also its strength. However, the situation should not be subject to hyperbole, she cautioned the audience, since in more recent demonstrations protesters numbered in the hundreds, not thousands.

Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, political science professor at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, asserted that “it is in the national interest of the United States to press the human rights issue in Iran.” He warned the Obama administration against sacrificing human rights, asking at what price Washington was willing to strike a deal with Iran on the nuclear issue. The 1953 coup had two effects, he reminded the audience: success because the shah was reinstated (the U.S. goal at the time), and the “1979 payback.” Iranians have long memories, according to Boroujerdi, and are also prone to emotional reactions.

Ghaemi posited that Iranians expect Obama’s moral support on human rights violations—but instead, Boroujerdi interjected, have been faced with the U.S. administration saying “we want to negotiate [regarding nuclear development] no matter what you do.” Noting that the Obama administration does not have the power to push a nuclear deal with Iran, Ghaemi proposed multinational forums to pressure Iran on human rights in tandem with nuclear talks. Obama has “implicitly agreed to keep human rights off the table,” Ghaemi observed, adding that neither human rights nor nuclear talks are moving forward. From the Iranian governmental perspective, however, Boroujerdi noted, a conclusion on nuclear development would precipitate further U.S. involvement in human rights and other domestic issues.

All three panelists agreed that broad-based, across-the-board sanctions are not an effective solution. Ghaemi cited the example of how crippling sanctions against Iraq for more than 10 years actually enabled Saddam Hussain. Abdo pointed out that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Islamic Republic are able to capitalize on blaming the U.S. for imposed economic and social hardships.

“Iran has put up with sanctions [and] embargoes for the last 30 years,” Boroujerdi noted, “and is very competent at transferring pressures to the public instead of its own apparatuses.” Tehran, he said, requires three assurances from the U.S. before moving forward: no involvement in an overthrow, recognition of the right to enrich uranium and no broad sanctions.

—Nina Hamedani

Second Panel: Nuclear Posturing

“I WOULD NOT have thought that the estrangement would have lasted 30 years,” said Ambassador John Limbert, a former hostage at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and currently a U.S. Naval Academy professor. Moreover, he argued, it is “not in the interest of either side to continue in this pattern of futility.”

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former U.S. undersecretary of state, described Washington’s Iran policy as “dead on arrival” and “fraught with contradiction” for the past several years. Although he agreed that the Obama administration was correct to start without preconditions, Pickering advocated as the only fair way to proceed supporting the elimination of all nuclear weapons in order to emphasize a moral standpoint and work toward the Nonproliferation Treaty Article 6.

Greg Thielmann, senior fellow at the Arms Control Association, supported skirting the deep levels of mutual mistrust by attempting to raise confidence levels on both sides. Iran could enrich for civilian purposes, Pickering proposed, and in return allow international inspection privileges for all facilities. Limbert accused Washington of only dealing with “asymmetric negotiations,” and said an initial step for the U.S. should be “recognizing what the other side is talking about and how to address it.”

“I do not think they want to be a North Korea,” Thielmann stated. “Iran, unlike Pakistan, has always accepted the NPT, even rhetorically, and said nuclear weapons are un-Islamic.”

The panelists concurred that pursuing talks on a strict timeline would not be successful, especially since the two countries have divergent goals. Pickering emphasized the fact that Iran is not on a do-or-die nuclear weapons course. Limbert recalled a conversation with former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who negotiated the release of the 1979 American hostages: “When I asked Secretary Christopher what helped secure a successful negotiation with the Iranians, he said: ‘Patience, patience, and more patience.’” However, Parsi reminded the panel, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has recently said that “our patience is limited.”

When Parsi raised the question of sanctions with the panel, Limbert observed, “You know, it’s easy to talk about smart sanctions—although, you know, I’ve never seen one.” Pickering proposed using China as a paradigm: after the massacre in Tiananmen Square, he noted, China was seen as too important to implement a “single-minded approach.” Instead, he maintained, “the multiplicity of interests” must be addressed.

“No one from Heaven anointed us the world legitimator,” Pickering reminded the audience, arguing that we have to talk on the widest array of issues. “You can’t just talk to the people that you like,” Limbert added: President Ahmadinejad does not equal Iran, and “30 years of chest thumping gives you a sore chest.”

Audience members raised the question of a possible unilateral strike by Israel on Iranian nuclear facilities. Theilmann responded that he wouldn’t count on it, and, if it happened, advised Americans to “think about how the U.S. would be implicated if implicit/complicit in an Israeli attack.” The “we’re just a poor, helpless superpower” act will not be convincing, he contended: “I just don’t buy it, and neither will everyone else” in the region.

—Nina Hamedani