October 1990, Page 19, 20

Congress

Iraqi Invasion Reverses the Pecking Order in Bilateral U.S. Relations

By Dennis J. Wamsted

Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait on Aug. 2, in what he termed a bid to redraw the imperialist-era geographic borders of the Gulf region, is unlikely to succeed. Ironically, however, the invasion has led to dramatic revisions in U.S. relations with such key Middle Eastern states as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

Perhaps most important, the invasion has prompted many on Capitol Hill to rethink their reflexive support for Israel. This support has often prompted Congress to oppose arms sales to America's Arab allies, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, even when those sales posed no threat to Israel, and to balk at administration attempts to forge a compromise settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

But now, all this is changing.

For example, within weeks of the invasion, the Bush administration had drafted and proposed multi-billion-dollar arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with barely a whisper of dissent from Israel or its supporters in Congress. In years past, indeed only months ago, either proposal would likely have provoked howls of protest from Israeli and touched off a bruising political fight with Congress. In addition, the administration almost immediately launched a review of its foreign aid program, with an eye toward rewarding the Egyptian government for its support of U.S. policy by easing its crushing $7 billion military debt to the United States.

These initiatives, as well as a host of others, portend changes in U.S. regional policies that will not be completely understood for months or even years to come. Specifically, the diplomatic language that the U.S. has used against Iraq and its attempt to acquire territory by force is likely to compel the U.S.-at some point in the future-to play a more aggressive role in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. In fact, Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), the influential chairman of the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, observed the parallels int he two situations almost immediately. The Wall Street Journal quoted Hamilton in mid-August as saying: "If the U.S. opposes the acquisition of territory by Iraq, it may very well be pushed over time to do more about Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza."

Beyond this, the wholehearted support of the Egyptian and Saudi governments for the U.S. measures against Iraq, particularly their open military cooperation, is likely to enhance U.S. relations with both countries. This cooperation is also likely to lay to rest past criticism from the pro-Israel lobby and its congressional backers that these two Arab countries are unwilling to be too closely identified with U.S. regional policy.

While the complete ramifications of the Iraqi invasion remain uncertain, developments over the past six weeks demonstrate a dramatic shift in U.S. policy, and in congressional attitudes, particularly regarding U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Saudi Sales

Less than four weeks after the Iraqi invasion, the Bush administration announced its plans to sell a weapons package worth at least $2.2 billion to the Saudis. Beyond the speed with which it was proposed, the package is notable for two reasons: 1) it has elicited virtually no opposition from the pro-Israel lobby, led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, or its congressional supporters and 2) it breaks a number of congressional prohibitions that have long governed sales to the Kingdom.

As announced, the package includes: 24 F-15 jet fighters; 150 M-60 tanks; 50 Stinger antiaircraft missile launchers and 200 missiles; and thousands of rounds of armorpiercing, depleted uranium artillery shells for the M-60s, which will give the Saudis the capability to challenge the best tanks in the Iraqi armed forces, the Soviet-made T-72.

The inclusion of the 24 F-15 fighters, the top-of-the-line U.S. combat jet, shatters a longstanding congressional prohibition barring the Saudis from taking possession of more than 62 of the fighters at any one time. Once the planes are delivered, the Saudis will own 86 of the high-performance jets. The prohibition was waived by the administration when it announced the sale.

Similarly, Congress has in years past barred the administration from selling Stinger missiles and their launchers, as well as the depleted uranium tank shells, to countries in the Gulf. These prohibitions have also been waived by the administration.

Lobby Leanings

Despite all this, along with sales announced prior to the invasion that there worth an estimated $7 billion, Israel's congressional supporters have been eerily quiet. Indeed, one of the most vocal opponents of past sales, Sen. Alan Cranston (D-CA), has already said he will support the planned weapons transfers.

"I was the leader of the opposition, but not anymore," said Cranston in the middle of a trip to Saudi Arabia during the August congressional recess. "Now they are allied with us and they are sitting on the front lines." Sen. Daniel Moynihan (D-NY), another past critic of sales to the Kingdom, has also said that he would be "more receptive" to administration sales proposals.

It is worth remembering that it was Cranston, along with Reps. Mel Levine (D-CA) and Larry Smith (D-FL), two other vocal opponents of arms sales to the Saudis, who wrote President-elect Bush just before he assumed office to oppose a rumored sale to Saudi Arabia of the M1 tank. These tanks are part of the $7 billion in arms already transferred to Saudi Arabia this summer. We view with alarm. . . the prospect of a new, divisive proposal to add our most offensive weapons systems to the already teeming Saudi arsenal," the three wrote in late 1988.

Future Sales

Plans are also in the works for another huge sale to the Saudis worth up to $8 billion, according to published reports. This sale, unannounced as of this writing, which the administration hopes to push this year, would include: 24 more F-15 jet fighters; 385 or so M1A2 tanks; 400 Bradley fighting vehicles; an unknown number of armored personnel carriers; and thousands of trucks and support equipment.

That this sale is even under consideration, coming so close on the heels of the already announced proposals, is a clear indication of the change in U.S. policy over the past few weeks. That the pro-Israel lobby has said virtually nothing regarding any of these proposals also speaks volumes about the changing political climate.

Egyptian Expectations

The planned sales to Saudi Arabia are far larger in dollar terms, but the proposed sale to Egypt is of similar importance, particularly as Egypt would have to finance the purchases with U.S. aid monies, while the Saudis will almost certainly pay cash for their weapons. According to published reports, the administration is planning to transfer at least 40 F-16 jet fighters, Maverick air-to-ground antitank missiles, cluster bombs, and associated other weaponry to the Egyptian government. All told, the deal is worth an estimated $1 billion.

But of even greater importance is the administration's publicly announced desire to forgive Egypt's roughly $7 billion military debt to the U.S. The Egyptian government currently owes the U.S. a total of about $12 billion in civilian and defense debts, and is up to $1.5 billion in arrears on its payments. This indebtedness dwarfs Egypt's current aid levels from the U.S., which have remained stable at just over $2.1 billion in economic and military aid, along with about $200 million in yearly food aid. As with the various arms sales, this initiative, officially proposed by the White House in early September, requires congressional approval.

Unlike the arms sales, which are not likely to generate any significant opposition in Congress, the administration's debt forgiveness plan is likely to spark some protest, if for no other reason than the proposal's budgetary impact. According to White House figures, Egypt is scheduled to repay $750 million in debt this year. These funds would be sorely missed in the tight budgetary climate that prevails in Washington today.

Beyond this, any special treatment for Egypt would, almost inevitably, have to be extended to other major indebted aid recipients, particularly Israel and Turkey. Concerns about this eventually were raised by Rep. David Obey (D-WI), the powerful chairman of the House Appropriations foreign operations subcommittee that controls the U.S. foreign aid program, immediately after the plan was released by the White House. "I don't think it makes a hell of a lot of sense to consider the Egyptian situation in a vacuum," Obey was quoted as saying by The Wall Street Journal. "I want to know what the next shoe is going to be, and the next one."

Israeli Incentives

In the short run, Israel will also inevitably benefit from the current Gulf crisis, since the administration is unlikely to stray from past U.S. policy to maintain that country's qualitative military edge, particularly regarding its highly treasured air superiority. It is uncertain how this edge will be maintained, but one much-discussed option would involve allowing Israel to purchase one of the newest U.S. weapons systems-the Patriot ground-to-air antiaircraft missile. The U.S. may also sell additional F-15 and F-16 jet fighters to Israel as a means of offsetting the planned sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Beyond this, there will almost certainly be changes in the amount and composition of the foreign aid the U.S. earmarks for Israel, which has remained steady at roughly $3 billion for the past several years. The administration may propose an outright increase in aid to Israel, although the budget situation may preclude such a proposal. More likely, particularly in the short term, are proposals to boost aid to Israel at the margins.

For example, the U.S. currently provides Israel with $1.2 billion in economic aid each year. Unlike other aid recipients, Israel receives these funds in a lump sum at the beginning of each fiscal year (October 1). This action allows Israel to invest the money as it sees fit, earning interest for the Jewish state while depriving the U.S. Treasury of these funds. The cost to the Treasury of this largely unseen benefit is estimated at $50 million a year. Now, there is talk of restructuring Israel's military aid account so that it would receive the entire sum, now $1.8 billion, at the beginning of the fiscal year. Such a switch would save Israel millions of dollars in financing charges, while similarly forcing the Treasury to forego millions of dollars in lost interest.

Further, if the administration wins approval from Congress to forgive all, or even part, of Egypt's military debt to the U.S., Israel will likely receive similar benefits. Israel's military debts with the U.S. total about $4.6 billion from previous arms sales.

Dennis J. Wamsted is a free-lance writer specializing in Middle East affairs and the U.S. Congress.