Syria Changes Tactics in Pursuit of the Same Long-Term Goals
| WRMEA Archives 1988-1993 - 1990 October |
October 1990, Page 16
Beirut Bulletin
Syria Changes Tactics in Pursuit of the Same Long-Term Goals
By Marilyn Raschka
Arab diplomats in Beirut see Syrian President Hafez Al-Assad as the first big winner in the current Gulf crisis. It will slake his thirst for Saudi Arabian cash and cheap oil, and may serve his desire to see rival Saddam Hussein of Iraq toppled. For the price of 1,100 Syrian troops now deployed with Egyptian and Moroccan contingents along Saudi Arabia's borders with Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait, Syria has insured itself of being on the "buttered side of the bread" in the Gulf.
Although they might not be shoulder-to-shoulder, Syrian and U.S. troops could find themselves in a joint operation to hold the line on the price of oil.
The new improved Assad's old, dangerous "Mr. No" image will vanish in the dust of U.S. tanks on maneuvers in the Saudi desert. Assad the outsider, the sponsor of revolutionary guerrilla groups, Assad the cynical powerbroker in Lebanon, Assad the ally of hostage-involved Iran will disappear like a desert mirage.
President George Bush's phone call to Assad at the onset of the Gulf crisis and his dispatching of Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly to Damascus for talks contributed to the wily Syrian's decision.
A Dangerous Decision
In spite of his traditional revolutionary stance, however, Assad's decision to ally himself with Saudi Arabia and the United States came easily. He knows that although President Saddam Hussein's energies appear to be directed toward Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states, if Saddam gained the upper hand it would not be long before he would turn the heat on Syria, his only rival for leadership in the Fertile Crescent.
Syria backed Iran in its 8-year conflict with Iraq in hopes that Tehran would topple Saddam Hussein. But Iraq emerged from the conflict a military power bent on establishing its own hegemony over the eastern portion of the Arab world and possibly the Arab states of the Gulf as well.
Iraq and Syria are ruled by rival factions of the Baath Socialist Party. Each has been engaged in attempts to bring down the other for many years. Saddam Hussein seized total power in Iraq 11 years ago, after declaring that a Damascus conspiracy to topple the Iraqi government had been discovered.
Assad does not need to stretch his imagination regarding what Iraq could do to hurt Syria. Last year Baghdad provided heavy weapons, ammunition and funds to Lebanese Christian forces for their "war of liberation" to drive Syrian forces out of Lebanon. Baghdad has continued to supply ammunition to General Michel Aoun's Maronite Christian Lebanese army units, and presently is training helicopter pilots for the rival Christian "Lebanese Forces" militia, which, like Aoun, has been ardently anti-Syrian.
In reality these Iraqi military adventures in Lebanon are more a bother than a threat to Assad's firm hold over 60 percent of Lebanese territory. But they do demonstrate Saddam Hussein's post-Iran war determination to keep the Syrian pot boiling wherever he can turn up the heat.
Many Lebanese, who despise Syria's presence in Lebanon, see Hussein's blitz of Kuwait as proof that he is the long-awaited Arab messiah, not just for Lebanon but for the whole region.
This fervor has even spread among Syrian troops here in Lebanon. One Lebanese commented to a Syrian army captain that Hussein was mad. Quickly the officer replied, "No, not at all. He's a hero."
But the real hero for Arab masses will be the Arab leader with the will and the where-withall to confront Israel. Assad served notice early on in the Gulf crisis that he would not waste his energies defending Iraq against an Israeli attack.
Unidentified members of a Syrian delegation to the Cairo summit held just after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait were quoted as saying that Syria would not interfere with such an Israeli attack. President Hussein "bears full responsibility for exposing Iraq and the rest of the Arabs to grave dangers," one Syrian official was quoted as telling delegates.
These words were highly unusual from a government like Syria's, which has lectured its fellow Arabs for years about joining hands in confronting the Israelis, and show how serious Syria's repositioning in the face of Iraq's split with the Gulf states has become.
Born "An Orphan"
The Syrian position is that the modern state of Syria was born "an orphan." Its historic identity, bilad al-sham (Greater Syria) never achieved political reality after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Instead the Western powers split the area into four separate political entities: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. Syria's already frustrated nationalist ambitions were dealt a second blow when Palestine was further partitioned into a Jewish state, and a stillborn Palestinian state, in 1948.
The modern Syria state's only natural defenses against Israel, the Golan Heights, were occupied by Israel in 1967. Syria's small population of about 10,500,000, and an unstable economic base, put the brakes on the realization of the ruling Baath's Party's dream of turning the country into a model Middle Eastern revolutionary center.
Assad's failure to energize the Syrian state forced him to "feed" at the hands of the rich Arab oil-producing states. Although never comfortable with the close links between Saudi Arabia and Washington that watered down the possibilities of an armed confrontation with Israel over the Palestine issue, Assad knows that, thanks to its oil resources, only Saudi Arabia has the kind of real clout with Washington that could result in U.S. political pressure on behalf of the Palestinians.
Practical and calculating, Assad may claim today that the way to Jerusalem is through Riyadh and is well paved with a minor military commitment on Syria's part. But the Syrian leader sees the route open to two-way traffic and will expect to see cash and cheap oil on the Damascus-bound lane. And should Saddam Hussein end up a "traffic fatality" along the way, so much the better.
Marilyn Raschka is an American faculty member at the American University of Beirut and an editor of the Americans for Justice in the Middle East newsletter, edited in Lebanon and available at $25 per year from AJME, c/o Mrs. Richard Scott, 226 Chambersburg St., Gettysburg, PA 17325.
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