October 1990, Page 14

From the Hebrew Press

Translated from the Hebrew by Dr. Israel Shahak

Misunderstandings With Jordan

-Davar, Aug. 26, 1990

By Yoram Peri

The Jordanian army, and in fact the entire kingdom, last week went on military alert. This level [of Jordanian mobilization] has not been witnessed for quite some time. For example: they carried out an air raid drill without prior notice, something which hasn't been done for many years. All the branches of the Jordanian army, and even the civil defense network, are ready for war to break out at any moment. . .

The interesting question is why this is happening. Those who choose to believe that we are always in the right. . . answer the question in terms of the aggressive intentions of King Hussein. After all, he has become an ally of the new Hitler, hasn't he?

Another explanation, which is a bit more rational, is being provided by our official Arab-watchers. Perhaps, they reason, King Hussein himself is not interested in a military confrontation with Israel, but he does know something about the evil intentions of Saddam Hussein, and for that reason he is preparing his army and people for what is likely to come. Perhaps.

But whoever has closely followed the course of Israeli-Jordanian relations over the past three or four years can provide another and better answer. According to this line of reasoning, the explanation of the king's moves over the past few years must be sought in Jerusalem-and not in Amman. . .

King Hussein has known for years that in the final analysis, Jordan could rely on Israel for support. . . All this began to change when the government in Jerusalem became more and more insistent that "Jordan is Palestine." This slogan, adopted by both Ariel Sharon and Yitzhak Shamir, sparked an historic turning point in Israeli-Jordanian relations. This policy now becomes one of the guiding principles of the new Israeli government which holds, for the first time in the history of Israel, that another Palestinian state will not be established between Israel and the desert. The emphasis, needless to say, is on the word "another"; i.e., a Palestinian state already exists-Jordan. . .

These days, the heads of the Likud are putting forward the claim-and I have heard it myself from Defense Minister Arens more than once-that the economic difficulties which Jordan is experiencing, the instability of the monarchy, and the growth of Muslim fundamentalism in Jordan, have forced the king to rely on Iraq. There is some truth in these claims. These factors helped influence Jordan's change of policy. But, first and foremost, it stems from disappointment with the Western camp. Since Peres' failure to realize the London accord, the king has come to see Israel as incapable of being a partner to a settlement. And the U.S. has not responded to his pleas for military and economic aid. When the Western camp failed to supply the goods, he was left with no choice but to fortify his position against the radical wing in the Arab world. He went even further and contracted an alliance with it.

This is exactly what the king did long before the crisis erupted in the Persian Gulf. Now that the crisis erupted in the Persian Gulf. Now that the crisis has erupted. . . it has also brought about the possibility of an Israeli-Iraqi conflagration-which is the last thing the king needs. It can come about if Saddam decides to provoke Israel in order to claim that he is leading a holy war of the Arab world against the Zionist infidels, with whom the U.S. is acting in cahoots.

But it can also erupt if Israel decides to strike first, and it may reach such a decision in either of two circumstances: when it is afraid that the American-Iraqi conflict will end without Iraq being vanquished, leaving Saddam Hussein in power and the Iraqi army intact. . . The second possibility is that Israel will decide to exploit the situation in the Gulf in order to do something on the Jordanian front without any connection with Iraq. For instance, with something concerning the Palestinians and the PLO. Given these threats, the Jordanian decision to go on alert is, in the eyes of its own leaders, one which is rational and balanced. . .

Israel is aware of the possibility that war can break out with Jordan because of misunderstandings. Hence, Jerusalem's repeated attempts to reassure the king that it is interested in the stability of his regime. But this leaves two questions open.

First, what should a nation do to its leaders when it becomes clear-as is the case at present-that they have done great damage to its interests by advancing a flawed concept? Although they are now revising it, only a month ago they were preaching that "Jordan is Palestine". . . Shouldn't those responsible be held politically accountable?

Second, could it be that the prime minister is now only trying to reassure the king? Has Shamir revised his basic outlook? This is exactly what is breeding suspicion in a number of European embassies in Tel Aviv. . . Should it be surprising that the king is not convinced and is therefore preparing himself for developments which threaten him?

Yoram Peri is one of the more important Israeli commentators on strategic and political affairs. He is a member of the Labor Party but is critical of its policies under Peres and Rabin, especially the latter. -Israel Shahak

Strike Now

Yedioth Ahronot, Aug. 30, 1990

By Arieh Egozi

Israel has well-defined objectives to be achieved as a consequence of the present Gulf crisis, but it is afraid to name them explicitly lest it be seen as pursuing these objectives. The paramount interests of Israel are that the Gulf crisis terminate with the downfall of Saddam Hussein, the obliteration of the non-conventional warfare capacities of Iraq, heavy damage to be inflicted on the Iraqi economic infrastructure and the destruction of the Iraqi war machine. .

Jerusalem explains that Iraq can imperil the whole world unless it is totally defeated in the present confrontation. Here and there, reports and commentaries appear in both Israel and the U.S. that echo such sentiments. . . Usually, however, the Israeli government succeeds in making credible its publicly held position that it does not mean to interfere with American considerations.

The Israeli government. . . knows that it cannot prompt the U.S. to actions that Israel would desire. It knows that it cannot engineer a provocation that would ignite fires in the Gulf. It understands that whatever it does would not make Bush abandon what he perceives as either the American national interest, or his own personal one. And Bush's interests and the best interests of Israel are not necessarily the same.

In the Israeli corridors of power, a comparison was gaining currency last week: Just as the Christian Phalangists were resented in Israel in 1982 for wanting to make the IDF fight for their goals, so in the U.S. an adverse public opinion would spread if we show ourselves interested in a Gulf war in which American soldiers would be killed for Israel's sake. Now, however, compared to Saddam Hussein's savagery, the government of Yitzhak Shamir. . . has earned itself a reputation of being a sane leadership in the eyes of the U.S. administration and the American public. It may be that Jerusalem will have to content itself with this achievement alone.

Dr. Israel Shahak, a Holocaust survivor and retired professor of chemistry at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights in Jerusalem. His translations From the Hebrew Press are available to Washington Report subscribers at $25 a year from the American Educational Trust.