October 1990, Page 10, 11, 81

Special Report

Democracy in Pakistan: Stifled by Bureaucrats, Generals and History

By Masood Ghaznavi

At 5 pm on Aug. 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan of Pakistan announced the dismissal of the democratically elected government of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and dissolution of the National Assembly, in which she enjoyed the support of a clear majority.

In the preceding hour, soldiers in battle gear with gun-mounted vehicles had taken up positions all over the capital, Islamabad, encircling federal government offices, radio and television stations and, of course, the official residence of the prime minister of Pakistan. All international telephone, telex, and fax lines suddenly went out of order for the next several hours, and the telephone lines of the deposed prime minister were disconnected and restored seven times during the evening. After they had served an already cooked dinner to the prime minister's party, the kitchen staff and crockery were removed. The next day lunch boxes had to be ordered from a local hotel for the household of a woman who was the chief executive of the country less than 24 hours earlier.

"The Empire Strikes Back"

Later, a senior Pakistani journalist told the writer: "The Empire, which permitted the Peoples Party of Pakistan (PPP) to take office following its election victory in November 1988, has finally decided to strike back. Twenty months is a long-enough period to tolerate a civilian government which begins to defy the wishes of the armed forces in domestic as well as foreign affairs."

He alleged that U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley played an important role in the events leading to the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto, as he had done in facilitating her installation as prime minister of Pakistan in November 1988. With its deep involvement in the Gulf crisis, he said, the U.S. government needs the cooperation of the Pakistani army more than a democratic government in Pakistan, particularly if this government does not follow the "leadership" of the U.S. in the region.

It would, however, be an exaggeration to blame or credit the U.S. for the constitutional ups and downs in Pakistan. In the 43-year-history of Pakistan, members of the career civil service have ruled the country for seven years with the army's backing. The generals have ruled in their own right for 25 years, trying out various forms of authoritarian constitutions which they have abandoned in favor of martial law or personal rule of some sort whenever they felt their authority challenged. During this period, the bureaucrats and the generals have dissolved elected National Assemblies six times, and dismissed civilian governments, both in the center and in the provinces, a lot more frequently.

The basic problem is with the structure of the state and society as inherited from the British Empire.

The reason for this state of affairs is not that all generals and bureaucrats in Pakistan are evil-minded despots, although some of them have been distinctly so. Nor that all politicians are mindless, spineless, and corrupt, although some of them fit this description nicely. The basic problem is with the structure of state and society as inherited from the British Empire in India, or perhaps as inherited from the Mughal Empire, which was refined, streamlined and modernized during the British century in the areas that now constitute Pakistan.

This area was the northwest of the British Empire in India, and it was kept fortified with garrison towns to ward off the assumed march of the Russian czar to the south. Further, this area, particularly Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province, was the home of what the British called the martial races. It was where they recruited their soldiers in large numbers.

The aim of the Empire in this area, therefore, was the maintenance of law and order, ensuring the loyalty of the people by not disturbing the traditional tribal and feudal structure of society, and by befriending the tribal and feudal chiefs. The introduction of representative institutions was not a priority. Even in Punjab, where representative institutions were introduced, along with their introduction into the rest of India, after World War I, the British government saw to it that some special "pocket-constituencies" were created for its favored feudal chiefs.

All successful empires have had two things in common: a well-trained bureaucracy and a disciplined army, both centrally controlled and directed. When the aim of the empire was defense of its territory, maintenance of law and order and collection of revenue, the two institutions could do the job well, particularly in a society which was primarily agricultural and rural. But a modern state has much more complex responsibilities: education, health, commerce, industry, banking, communications, etc.

The "Steel Frame"

British India had already entered this stage, although slowly. In response to this challenge, the British Empire created a competitive, well-trained, prestigious, well paid, and very powerful service of generalist-administrators. As members of the famed Indian Civil Service (ICS), they were called the "steel frame" of the Empire. They were the visible manifestations of imperial grandeur and power, and they ran the Empire without any political interference. They were subject to their own hierarchy of commissioners, department secretaries and governors, all the way up to the Viceroy-Governor of India.

At first exclusively British, the civil service increasingly opened its doors to the people it ruled after World War I. The best native talent, in fact, went into the ranks of the ICS rather than into the army, which stayed in its cantonments to back the government if needed. Even when British India was being politicized and was on its way to self-government, the politician earned little more than contempt from the Empire's permanent service personnel.

When the British departed in 1947, they left in Pakistan a well-entrenched feudal class still superior to the large numbers of peasants and farmers, and two highly trained and powerful institutions of the Empire, the bureaucracy and the army. Those who comprised this first-class imperial structure in Pakistan saw neither the need nor the desirability of political parties, elections or representative government which could wield the executive authority of the state. This imperial contempt for the notion of popular sovereignty has manifested itself throughout Pakistan's short history.

Pakistan, unfortunately, did not have the benefit of trained political leadership comparable to that produced in India by the Indian National Congress. The Muslim League, which demanded a state for the Muslims of British India, became a mass organization only a few years before the establishment of Pakistan. The founding fathers of Pakistan, therefore, had to depend a great deal on the elitist ICS-renamed the civil service of Pakistan (CSP)-for the administration of the new country beset by a host of problems. It did not take long for the civil servants to move from administrative ascendancy to political ascendancy with the backing of the army.

In less than five years of Pakistan's existence, Ghulam Muhammad, a member of the Audit and Accounts Service, rose from the position of finance minister to head of state, as governor general of Pakistan in 1951. Within two years of taking office, he dismissed the elected prime minister and a year later dissolved the first Constituent Assemly (see accompanying box). The constitutional process thus derailed is still struggling to get back on track.

Major General Iskander Mirza, also from the civil service, replaced Ghulam Muhammad in 1955 and was sworn in as first president of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 1956, after a new and democratic constitution was adopted by the second Constituent Assembly. The drafting and passage of the constitution was the work of another civil servant, Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, a man of integrity, who had now become the prime minister of Pakistan. Elections under the new constitution were due in 1957, but were postponed in 1958 and then 1959. President Iskander Mirza and the commander-in-chief of Pakistan's army, Ayub Khan, did not want them. President Mirza, holding a copy of the constitution in his hand, asked his secretary, a senior civil servent, "Have you read this trash?" That was on Sept. 22, 1958. On Oct. 7, 1958, he dissolved the National Assembly, dismissed the government and proclaimed martial law.

Thereafter the army came to the forefront, and all political activities were declared illegal (see box for details).

The Real Danger

Why the dismissal of Benazir Bhutto's government and dissolution of the National Assembly at this time? The stated reasons of corruption, nepotism and inefficiency have yet to be proven. These are typical charges leveled against all Pakistani governments dismissed so far. The real point of danger for the military-bureaucracy establishment comes when the political process seems to be getting established.

There is no doubt that democratically established governments make mistakes. Votes in the National Assembly are bought, and supporters are given financial rewards. It is corruption and graft, but all regimes-and most of them have been military-have indulged in it freely. In fact, the whole process of awarding such favors as bank loans, permits to establish industrial projects, land grants and write-offs of bank loans has been made legal. The government controls all the above and much more, and makes laws to give itself the power it needs to do whatever it wishes.

Ms. Bhutto alleges her dismissal is the work of Military Intelligence (MI), which subverted her authority as she was trying to consolidate the political process in the country. She says they actively fed false stories to the press implicating her family members in financial scandals.

Whether the charges against Bhutto are genuine or fabricated, there is no doubt that she has suffered a decline in popularity. Now, her opponents appear to have decided, is a good time to defeat her in the elections scheduled for Oct. 24, and put an end to the challenge posed by her populist party, the PPP.

If successful, the strategy will please the establishment. Such strategies, however, even if successful in the short run, have proven disastrous for the long-range interests of self-government, freedom, law and order, and the national security of Pakistan.

Masood Ghaznavi is associate professor of history and political science at Rosemont College, Rosemont, PA.