November 1992, Page 32, 33

What Does the Future Hold for Iraq?- Two Iraqi-American Views

The Iraqi People Will Not Condone Dismemberment of Their Country

By Hasan S. AlKhatib

The cradle of civilization, Mesopotamia, known today as Iraq, has never ceased to be a hot spot. It is a land blessed with water and other natural resources. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers have, over time, quenched the country's thirst, supported its drives for prosperity and, many times, washed away the blood shed in this vibrant nation's wars and civil wars.

Endowed with fertile land, mineral resources, and floating over two seas of black gold (oil), Iraq has a contract with destiny. Civilization after civilization has flourished and perished here, since the dawn of traceable history.

Much like the U.S. today, ancient Iraq attracted the best talents from the rest of the world-seekers of wealth and challenge. It has enjoyed an ethno-linguistic and religious diversity that goes to the root of the unyielding creativity of its people. Today, it is composed of roughly 77 percent Arabs (of which about 65 percent are Shi'i, 30 percent Sunni Muslims, 3 percent Christians, and 2 percent others), 19 percent Kurds (of which some 85 percent are Sunni and 15 percent Shi'i Muslims), 1.5 percent Turkmens (mostly Shi'i), 1 percent Persians (Shi'i Muslims), 1 percent Assyrians (Christians), and 0.5 percent others.

The people of Iraq feel a strong affinity to this rich and varied heritage. This goes to the root of what makes their diverse society so cohesive. Family intermarriages between various ethno-religious communities are commonplace in Iraq today. Despite the popular impression in the West, the Iraqi people would be the last to condone the dismemberment of their country.

Rivalry between Shi'i and Sunni communities of Iraq has been the underlying cause of the political dynamics in Iraq's governments over the past 1,200 years. When Saddam Hussain came to power in 1979, he exploited this rivalry to justify and conceal his brutal usurpation of the will of the people.

Reporting on the popular uprising in southern Iraq following the Gulf war resulted in a misleading impression that the Shi'i live only in the south of the country. The Shi'i comprise 80 percent of the population of the south, but they also are a majority in central Iraq. In Baghdad up to 70 percent of the population may be Shi'i. The Sunni Arab community is concentrated primarily in the north and northwest, where it comprises more than 80 percent of the population. Nevertheless, Sunnis, like the Shi'i, are spread throughout Iraq.

It is inconceivable that the Shi'i Arabs of the south would promote independence from their brethren in the center. This also is true of the Sunni Arabs, who would lose most in the dismemberment of Iraq. The fact that these two communities are intermarried creates an unbreakable bond. This weighs heavily against any support for a schism separating the north and northwest from the center and south.

Kurds in the extreme north and northeast of Iraq are a special case. They live in a mountainous land that is geographically distinct from the Mesopotamian plains. Unlike other minorities that have settled in Iraq over the centuries, the Kurds of Kurdistan have not been assimilated into the Arab culture. They have preserved their heritage and languages. Historically, they participated in the making of current Iraq primarily as partners with the Sunni Arab and Turkish communities.

A breakup of Iraq would have to be imposed by force.

Recent expressions of aspirations for Kurdish independence can be traced to the emergence of nationalism in Europe. They were also fueled by the emergence of Arab nationalism after World War I. The Sunni Arab partners of the Kurds see a threat in Kurdish independence, since it would make the Sunnis a small minority in Iraq.

Current Mideast geopolitical realities, however, militate strongly against the formation of an independent Kurdistan. This could be a serious source of instability, since Kurds live throughout the region. The majority of the region's 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, a NATO member and a staunch ally of the U.S. and the West.

Acknowledging this reality, Iraqi Kurds always have curbed their desire to create an independent Kurdistan and have settled for autonomy, while never denying their long-term aspiration for independence.

A breakup of Iraq is, therefore, unlikely to come from within. For it to happen, the dismemberment would have to be imposed by force from outside. It is true that it might be in the interest of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Israel to see Iraq dismembered. But, the sole power that could dismantle Iraq is the U.S.

The Western economic interest in oil cannot be overestimated. Any instability in the area can interrupt the supply of oil. This would cause dramatic upheavals in the world's economy, a consequence the Western powers and Japan seek at all costs to avoid.

The U.S. and its allies imposed a "non-fly" zone in the south to protect the Shi'i Arabs from slaughter by Saddam's forces. In retaliation, Saddam Hussain and his supporters are raising the fear of dismemberment to unrealistic levels, hoping to weaken Western resolve. By using such propaganda they hope to win Western allies, who have genuine concerns for the stability of the region.

The U.N., the West, and primarily the U.S. can go a long way in relieving these fears by imposing a further squeeze on Saddam. The northern security zone could be increased to the 35th parallel, hence protecting two vital Kurdish cities, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The no-fly zone in the south should be turned into a security zone, where Saddam's land forces are banned. The southern zone could be expanded to the 33rd parallel to provide safety for the holy Shi'i city of Karbala. A security zone to connect the two north and south security zones could be established to the east of the 45th longitude, henceforth providing a connected free zone in Iraq.

The Iraqi opposition, both in its June meeting in Vienna and its most recent September meeting in Irbil, has called for the formation of a democratic state in a united Iraq and shunned any encouragement of the Iraqi dismemberment theory. For Iraqis, the realities are well understood. The prospects of dismemberment, therefore, are only figments of the creative imagination of Saddam's propaganda machine.

Dr. Hasan S. AlKhatib is director of the Parallel and Distributed Computing Research Laboratory at the School of Engineering, Santa Clara University. Born in Baghdad, he emigrated to the U.S. in 1976.

Iraqis Face Three Different Scenarios

By Ayad Al-Qazzaz

Six major forces that shaped the Middle East in the 20th century include the First World War and the ensuing establishment of numerous mini-states in the area, the discovery of oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the recent Gulf war of 1991. Each one of these forces had a lasting impact that transcends national borders.

Consequences of the most recent event, the Gulf war, still are unfolding. It was an earthquake that measured 10 on the Richter scale. Among the aftershocks are the strengthening of the U.S. role in the area, and increasing uncertainty concerning Iraq's future. The U.S. role in the area today resembles the role of Britain and France at the beginning of the century. In fact, the current map of the area basically reflects the results of British and French manipulation and rivalries.

Today, as a result of the Gulf war, which, in my opinion, had as its goal not only the liberation of Kuwait, but also the destruction of Iraq as a regional power, the U.S. has emerged for at least the short run as the mover and shaker in the area. If the U.S. builds on the influence it has acquired by its role in the Gulf and, more recently, in the Arab-Israeli "peace process," it will play a dominant role in the world market for petroleum, the lifeblood of 20th century economic activity. However, Iraq, which has the second largest proven reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia, also can play a key role in determining petroleum prices, and thus the economic life of the industrialized world.

The future of Iraq as a result of the Gulf war is totally uncertain. If the status quo is altered, most guesses seem to revolve around three scenarios: (1) Iraq will be dismembered into three mini-states: the "Kurdish North," the "Sunni Center," and the "Shi'i South." (2) Iraq will disintegrate into two states, the Kurdish state in the north and the Arab state in the south. (3) Iraq will remain formally as one country, but it will have a de facto Kurdish state and perhaps an autonomous Shi'i enclave in the south.

The first scenario of dividing Iraq into three mini-states is favored at this time by Kuwait, because it would reduce the size of the Iraqi army on Kuwait's border. It is argued that having mini-states in the north and in the south would provide two buffer zones against Saddam, and would invalidate Iraq's claim on Kuwait, as the new southern state would be preoccupied with its problems with its northern neighbor.

While Israel, Kuwait and possibly some other Gulf countries might favor this scenario, it is not in the best interests of either the U.S. or Iraq's neighbors to encourage such a division, for the following reasons:

1. The labeling of the Kurdish North, Sunni Center and Shi'i South is misleading. Baghdad, in the central area, has a population of more than five million, half of whom are Shi'i. Basra, in the south, has a sizable Sunni community. And although most Kurds live in the north, there are sizable Kurdish communities in Baghdad and in areas of the south. So creating separate states would unleash endless problems and further destabilize the country and the region.

2. Chopping Iraq into three mini-states along ethnic and sectarian lines would establish a dangerous precedent for all countries in the region. Many of these countries also have ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages. Any division of Iraq would encourage ethnic and religious conflicts elsewhere.

3. Having a Shi'i Arab mini-state in the south would dramatically strengthen Iran's influence not only with the new state, but in all of the Gulf countries with sizable Shi'i communities, which Iran considers fertile ground for agitation.

4. Having a Kurdish state in the north might destabilize Turkey, a valuable ally of the West. Turkey has the largest Kurdish community in the Middle East, estimated at more than 10 million, out of a Turkish population of 58 million. Turkey presently is contending with a Kurdish rebellion within its borders. Having an independent Kurdish state on its southern border would add fuel to the fire.

Chopping Iraq into three mini-states would establish a dangerous precedent for all countries in the region.

The second scenario is to have a Kurdish state in the north and an Arab state in the south. There is some support for this idea in Europe and the United States. Historically, the West promised the Kurds an independent state after World War I in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. This was later nullified by Kamal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne ignored the issue of an independent Kurdistan, and Iraqi Kurds reluctantly agreed to be part of the new state of Iraq.

The Kurds speak an Indo-European language, while Arabic is a Semitic language. Because Kurds live in mountainous regions that are difficult to control, Iraqi governments have been trying to suppress recurrent Kurdish rebellions since 1958. The Kurds already have the skeleton administration from the autonomous regime that Iraq granted them. They also have parties that have organized their political life. In addition, the Kurds of Iraq are physically surrounded by other Kurds in Turkey and Iran who ultimately want to unite with them under one flag.

In short, the Kurds of Iraq already have some elements of a separate and independent state. If Turkey were not on the scene, the Kurds of Iraq might already have declared their independence and been recognized by some Western powers, including the U.S. Turkish leaders, however, would undoubtedly fear that in the long run a new Kurdish state in Iraq would kindle the desire of Kurds in Turkey for independence. Thus it is doubtful that Turkey would tolerate an independent Kurdish state.

The third scenario is to keep the status quo, but with a de facto partition in the Kurdish area and a Shi'i enclave in the south with minimum outside control over its territory. This alternative probably is most preferable to the Western powers, particularly the U.S. American actions, in any case, are moving events in this direction. The United States has imposed "no-fly" zones on Iraqi aircraft in both the north and the south. The U.S. allocated 40 million dollars or more to finance the various opposition groups and is in the process of establishing what might be called an Iraqi Contra army to keep the central government in continuous turmoil and eventually replace it with a regime acceptable to the U.S.

In short, whatever may happen in Iraq, the future is not a pleasant one, either for the Iraqis or the other Arab countries. The people of Iraq have suffered considerably, and paid dearly for the mistakes of their leader and at the hands of the U.S. and the West, whose goal is to control and keep available to themselves Iraqi and Arab energy resources.

Dr. Ayad Al-Qazzaz is a professor of sociology at California State University in Sacramento. Born in 1941, he emigrated to the U.S. in 1963.

What Does the Future Hold for Iraq?- Two Iraqi-American Views

WRMEA Archives 1988-1993 - 1992 November

November 1992, Page 32, 33

What Does the Future Hold for Iraq?- Two Iraqi-American Views

The Iraqi People Will Not Condone Dismemberment of Their Country

By Hasan S. AlKhatib

The cradle of civilization, Mesopotamia, known today as Iraq, has never ceased to be a hot spot. It is a land blessed with water and other natural resources. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers have, over time, quenched the country's thirst, supported its drives for prosperity and, many times, washed away the blood shed in this vibrant nation's wars and civil wars.

Endowed with fertile land, mineral resources, and floating over two seas of black gold (oil), Iraq has a contract with destiny. Civilization after civilization has flourished and perished here, since the dawn of traceable history.

Much like the U.S. today, ancient Iraq attracted the best talents from the rest of the world-seekers of wealth and challenge. It has enjoyed an ethno-linguistic and religious diversity that goes to the root of the unyielding creativity of its people. Today, it is composed of roughly 77 percent Arabs (of which about 65 percent are Shi'i, 30 percent Sunni Muslims, 3 percent Christians, and 2 percent others), 19 percent Kurds (of which some 85 percent are Sunni and 15 percent Shi'i Muslims), 1.5 percent Turkmens (mostly Shi'i), 1 percent Persians (Shi'i Muslims), 1 percent Assyrians (Christians), and 0.5 percent others.

The people of Iraq feel a strong affinity to this rich and varied heritage. This goes to the root of what makes their diverse society so cohesive. Family intermarriages between various ethno-religious communities are commonplace in Iraq today. Despite the popular impression in the West, the Iraqi people would be the last to condone the dismemberment of their country.

Rivalry between Shi'i and Sunni communities of Iraq has been the underlying cause of the political dynamics in Iraq's governments over the past 1,200 years. When Saddam Hussain came to power in 1979, he exploited this rivalry to justify and conceal his brutal usurpation of the will of the people.

Reporting on the popular uprising in southern Iraq following the Gulf war resulted in a misleading impression that the Shi'i live only in the south of the country. The Shi'i comprise 80 percent of the population of the south, but they also are a majority in central Iraq. In Baghdad up to 70 percent of the population may be Shi'i. The Sunni Arab community is concentrated primarily in the north and northwest, where it comprises more than 80 percent of the population. Nevertheless, Sunnis, like the Shi'i, are spread throughout Iraq.

It is inconceivable that the Shi'i Arabs of the south would promote independence from their brethren in the center. This also is true of the Sunni Arabs, who would lose most in the dismemberment of Iraq. The fact that these two communities are intermarried creates an unbreakable bond. This weighs heavily against any support for a schism separating the north and northwest from the center and south.

Kurds in the extreme north and northeast of Iraq are a special case. They live in a mountainous land that is geographically distinct from the Mesopotamian plains. Unlike other minorities that have settled in Iraq over the centuries, the Kurds of Kurdistan have not been assimilated into the Arab culture. They have preserved their heritage and languages. Historically, they participated in the making of current Iraq primarily as partners with the Sunni Arab and Turkish communities.

A breakup of Iraq would have to be imposed by force.

Recent expressions of aspirations for Kurdish independence can be traced to the emergence of nationalism in Europe. They were also fueled by the emergence of Arab nationalism after World War I. The Sunni Arab partners of the Kurds see a threat in Kurdish independence, since it would make the Sunnis a small minority in Iraq.

Current Mideast geopolitical realities, however, militate strongly against the formation of an independent Kurdistan. This could be a serious source of instability, since Kurds live throughout the region. The majority of the region's 15 million Kurds live in Turkey, a NATO member and a staunch ally of the U.S. and the West.

Acknowledging this reality, Iraqi Kurds always have curbed their desire to create an independent Kurdistan and have settled for autonomy, while never denying their long-term aspiration for independence.

A breakup of Iraq is, therefore, unlikely to come from within. For it to happen, the dismemberment would have to be imposed by force from outside. It is true that it might be in the interest of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or Israel to see Iraq dismembered. But, the sole power that could dismantle Iraq is the U.S.

The Western economic interest in oil cannot be overestimated. Any instability in the area can interrupt the supply of oil. This would cause dramatic upheavals in the world's economy, a consequence the Western powers and Japan seek at all costs to avoid.

The U.S. and its allies imposed a "non-fly" zone in the south to protect the Shi'i Arabs from slaughter by Saddam's forces. In retaliation, Saddam Hussain and his supporters are raising the fear of dismemberment to unrealistic levels, hoping to weaken Western resolve. By using such propaganda they hope to win Western allies, who have genuine concerns for the stability of the region.

The U.N., the West, and primarily the U.S. can go a long way in relieving these fears by imposing a further squeeze on Saddam. The northern security zone could be increased to the 35th parallel, hence protecting two vital Kurdish cities, Kirkuk and Suleimaniya. The no-fly zone in the south should be turned into a security zone, where Saddam's land forces are banned. The southern zone could be expanded to the 33rd parallel to provide safety for the holy Shi'i city of Karbala. A security zone to connect the two north and south security zones could be established to the east of the 45th longitude, henceforth providing a connected free zone in Iraq.

The Iraqi opposition, both in its June meeting in Vienna and its most recent September meeting in Irbil, has called for the formation of a democratic state in a united Iraq and shunned any encouragement of the Iraqi dismemberment theory. For Iraqis, the realities are well understood. The prospects of dismemberment, therefore, are only figments of the creative imagination of Saddam's propaganda machine.

Dr. Hasan S. AlKhatib is director of the Parallel and Distributed Computing Research Laboratory at the School of Engineering, Santa Clara University. Born in Baghdad, he emigrated to the U.S. in 1976.

Iraqis Face Three Different Scenarios

By Ayad Al-Qazzaz

Six major forces that shaped the Middle East in the 20th century include the First World War and the ensuing establishment of numerous mini-states in the area, the discovery of oil, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Egyptian revolution of 1952, the Iranian revolution of 1979, and the recent Gulf war of 1991. Each one of these forces had a lasting impact that transcends national borders.

Consequences of the most recent event, the Gulf war, still are unfolding. It was an earthquake that measured 10 on the Richter scale. Among the aftershocks are the strengthening of the U.S. role in the area, and increasing uncertainty concerning Iraq's future. The U.S. role in the area today resembles the role of Britain and France at the beginning of the century. In fact, the current map of the area basically reflects the results of British and French manipulation and rivalries.

Today, as a result of the Gulf war, which, in my opinion, had as its goal not only the liberation of Kuwait, but also the destruction of Iraq as a regional power, the U.S. has emerged for at least the short run as the mover and shaker in the area. If the U.S. builds on the influence it has acquired by its role in the Gulf and, more recently, in the Arab-Israeli "peace process," it will play a dominant role in the world market for petroleum, the lifeblood of 20th century economic activity. However, Iraq, which has the second largest proven reserves in the world after Saudi Arabia, also can play a key role in determining petroleum prices, and thus the economic life of the industrialized world.

The future of Iraq as a result of the Gulf war is totally uncertain. If the status quo is altered, most guesses seem to revolve around three scenarios: (1) Iraq will be dismembered into three mini-states: the "Kurdish North," the "Sunni Center," and the "Shi'i South." (2) Iraq will disintegrate into two states, the Kurdish state in the north and the Arab state in the south. (3) Iraq will remain formally as one country, but it will have a de facto Kurdish state and perhaps an autonomous Shi'i enclave in the south.

The first scenario of dividing Iraq into three mini-states is favored at this time by Kuwait, because it would reduce the size of the Iraqi army on Kuwait's border. It is argued that having mini-states in the north and in the south would provide two buffer zones against Saddam, and would invalidate Iraq's claim on Kuwait, as the new southern state would be preoccupied with its problems with its northern neighbor.

While Israel, Kuwait and possibly some other Gulf countries might favor this scenario, it is not in the best interests of either the U.S. or Iraq's neighbors to encourage such a division, for the following reasons:

1. The labeling of the Kurdish North, Sunni Center and Shi'i South is misleading. Baghdad, in the central area, has a population of more than five million, half of whom are Shi'i. Basra, in the south, has a sizable Sunni community. And although most Kurds live in the north, there are sizable Kurdish communities in Baghdad and in areas of the south. So creating separate states would unleash endless problems and further destabilize the country and the region.

2. Chopping Iraq into three mini-states along ethnic and sectarian lines would establish a dangerous precedent for all countries in the region. Many of these countries also have ethnic, religious or linguistic cleavages. Any division of Iraq would encourage ethnic and religious conflicts elsewhere.

3. Having a Shi'i Arab mini-state in the south would dramatically strengthen Iran's influence not only with the new state, but in all of the Gulf countries with sizable Shi'i communities, which Iran considers fertile ground for agitation.

4. Having a Kurdish state in the north might destabilize Turkey, a valuable ally of the West. Turkey has the largest Kurdish community in the Middle East, estimated at more than 10 million, out of a Turkish population of 58 million. Turkey presently is contending with a Kurdish rebellion within its borders. Having an independent Kurdish state on its southern border would add fuel to the fire.

Chopping Iraq into three mini-states would establish a dangerous precedent for all countries in the region.

The second scenario is to have a Kurdish state in the north and an Arab state in the south. There is some support for this idea in Europe and the United States. Historically, the West promised the Kurds an independent state after World War I in the 1920 Treaty of Sevres. This was later nullified by Kamal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey. The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne ignored the issue of an independent Kurdistan, and Iraqi Kurds reluctantly agreed to be part of the new state of Iraq.

The Kurds speak an Indo-European language, while Arabic is a Semitic language. Because Kurds live in mountainous regions that are difficult to control, Iraqi governments have been trying to suppress recurrent Kurdish rebellions since 1958. The Kurds already have the skeleton administration from the autonomous regime that Iraq granted them. They also have parties that have organized their political life. In addition, the Kurds of Iraq are physically surrounded by other Kurds in Turkey and Iran who ultimately want to unite with them under one flag.

In short, the Kurds of Iraq already have some elements of a separate and independent state. If Turkey were not on the scene, the Kurds of Iraq might already have declared their independence and been recognized by some Western powers, including the U.S. Turkish leaders, however, would undoubtedly fear that in the long run a new Kurdish state in Iraq would kindle the desire of Kurds in Turkey for independence. Thus it is doubtful that Turkey would tolerate an independent Kurdish state.

The third scenario is to keep the status quo, but with a de facto partition in the Kurdish area and a Shi'i enclave in the south with minimum outside control over its territory. This alternative probably is most preferable to the Western powers, particularly the U.S. American actions, in any case, are moving events in this direction. The United States has imposed "no-fly" zones on Iraqi aircraft in both the north and the south. The U.S. allocated 40 million dollars or more to finance the various opposition groups and is in the process of establishing what might be called an Iraqi Contra army to keep the central government in continuous turmoil and eventually replace it with a regime acceptable to the U.S.

In short, whatever may happen in Iraq, the future is not a pleasant one, either for the Iraqis or the other Arab countries. The people of Iraq have suffered considerably, and paid dearly for the mistakes of their leader and at the hands of the U.S. and the West, whose goal is to control and keep available to themselves Iraqi and Arab energy resources.

Dr. Ayad Al-Qazzaz is a professor of sociology at California State University in Sacramento. Born in 1941, he emigrated to the U.S. in 1963.

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