WRMEA Archives 2006-2010 - 2008 January-February

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January-February 2008, pages 36-37

The Subcontinent

Who’s In and Who’s Out in Pakistan Is Still Unclear

By M.M. Ali

  • Minority Pakistani Christians demonstrate Dec. 7 in Islamabad against the banning of the private television channel GEO. (AFP Photo/Shah Marai).

AFTER MONTHS OF controversy, Pervez Musharraf finally removed his military uniform on Nov. 28, passing the baton to Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, his hand-picked successor as Pakistan’s army chief of staff. The following day Musharraf took the oath of office as a civilian president. In his inaugural address, he promised that the state of emergency he imposed on Nov. 3 would be withdrawn on Dec. 15 to ensure “free and fair elections” in January, and invited opposition leaders Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, both recently returned from exile, to participate in them.

Many Pakistanis are not mollified, however, and would like to see Musharraf leave the political scene altogether.

While his decision to impose a state of emergency on the country disappointed many, it did not come as a surprise (see December 2007 Washington Report, p. 31). Claiming he was responding to a “security” crisis, Musharraf’s main target in fact was the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which was rumored to be getting ready to void his Oct. 6 election to another five-year term as president. Under the new state of emergency, he placed the constitution in “abeyance,” sacked the Supreme Court judges known to oppose him, and ordered restrictions on press freedom, closing down several private TV channels viewed as unfriendly to his administration. Under pressure from abroad, however, particularly from Washington, Musharraf later allowed all TV channels except one, Geo TV, to resume normal broadcasting. But as of this writing, orders that reporters questioning the army be tried in military tribunals remain in effect.

Musharraf’s maneuvers appear designed to protect himself and the army from political attacks after the lifting of the state of emergency. Having secured his own position as president with his election by a lame duck National Assembly and state assemblies, he now urges Pakistanis to cast their votes in the Jan. 8 parliamentary elections. Few appreciated his comment that it has taken over 200 years for the West to be where it is, while Pakistan is still a young country—especially since neighboring India, which gained its independence from Britain the same year as Pakistan, is a fairly successful democracy.

Further rubbing salt in the wound, upon the expiration of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz’s government on Nov. 15, Musharraf appointed a caretaker government headed by former Senate chairman Mohamedmian Soomro. Both Bhutto and Sharif have questioned the neutrality of the interim government, however, since it includes no member of an opposition party.

While Musharraf has made some tangible gains on the economic front—foreign exchange reserves have increased considerably, and the country’s annual growth is now at 7 percent—his political performance has been dismal. Not only has his own popularity plummeted, but his party, the Pakistan Muslim League (Q), has been unable to build any public support. His two main rivals continue to be former Prime Ministers Bhutto and Sharif.

(Aziz, by the way, who headed the economic recovery under Musharraf, has announced that he will not run in the coming elections. It’s clear that he considers his chances of being re-elected prime minister to be slim against the U.S.-backed Bhutto.)

After being charged with corruption by then-Prime Minister Sharif, Bhutto left the country in 1998 to live in self-imposed exile in Dubai. Reportedly at the urging of Washington, which sought to put a civilian face on Pakistan’s military government, she struck a deal with Musharraf to support him if charges against her were dropped and she was allowed to return home. At the same time, however, she was negotiating with Sharif.

When Bhutto’s machinations became public, her credibility was seriously compromised. Yet she is rumored even today to be offering to support Musharraf in exchange for his backing her candidacy. Thus, although she demands an end to the state of emergency, she does not insist that the Supreme Court justices removed by Musharraf be reinstated.

Meanwhile, the opposition groups led by Sharif are trying to woo Bhutto back into their fold and join their announced boycott of the coming elections. Despite the fact that her Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is a large secular moderate entity favored by the United States and carrying political weight in the country, however, Bhutto knows that the army still matters in Pakistan politics. Moreover, she views Sharif as allied with weaklings—although she may string him along in order to bolster her support in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where Sharif is well received.

Nor should it come as a surprise if, to further solidify her position, Bhutto also makes an overture to General Kiyani, the new army chief. On Nov. 30 she announced the outline of a party manifesto dealing with social, educational and economic issues, but making no mention of the independence of the judiciary, a neutral caretaker government, or an independent Election Commission—all of which remain contentious issues.

Although as of mid-December it seems a safe bet that Bhutto will participate in the Jan. 8 elections, the former prime minister is content to keep everyone guessing.

For his part, Sharif has shown a tendency over the years to make snap decisions without considering the repercussions. When he tried to dismiss Musharraf as army chief in October of 1999, for example, the generals refused to obey him and he was ousted as prime minister. Sentenced to life in prison on charges of corruption and hijacking Musharraf’s plane, Sharif was bailed out by Saudi King Fahd, who offered him and his family sanctuary in Saudi Arabia. In September 2007 Sharif rushed back home to Islamabad, and was immediately deported back to Saudi Arabia.

Now, with the consent of Musharraf and Saudi King Abdullah, he has again returned to Pakistan—where he immediately cast his lot with the splintered opposition parties and announced a boycott of the January parliamentary elections. In early December, however, having failed to convince others to join the boycott—including, for example, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, leader of the right-wing Jamiat Ulama Islam (JUI), which enjoys support in the NWFP—Sharif reversed his position. His Pakistan Muslim League (N) party will participate in the elections after all, Sharif announced, although the Election Commission has ruled that he and his brother may not run as candidates because of their prior criminal convictions. The brothers are appealing that decision.

So far, the only groups to have openly opposed Musharraf have been the lawyers, journalists and civil rights activists. Pakistanis as a whole have stayed away from the streets, where the subcontinent’s political battles typically are fought. This could change, however, if the crisis continues. Much depends on the conduct and outcome of the January elections.

Prof. M.M. Ali is a specialist on South Asia based in the Washington, DC metropolitan area.