Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 2007, pages 40-41

Talking Turkey

A Variety of Scenarios for Turkey’s Upcoming Presidential, Parliamentary Elections

By Jon Gorvett

BALLOT WATCHERS and vote counters are set for a busy year in Turkey, as the country sees its parliament vote for a new president, while its citizens later vote for a new parliament. Already the theories are out in earnest over what may happen in both elections, with the predictions ranging across a wide horizon. The prospect of an Islamist president—or, more specifically, a headscarfed first lady—has sent many old secularists into meltdown, while the prospect of electoral manipulation by military and state officials has drawn dark warnings from Islamist stalwarts.

The first test of these theories will come in May, with the presidential election. The first since 2000—Turkey’s head of state is elected for a single, non-renewable seven-year term—the election likely will be accompanied by considerable contention, if current argument is anything to go by.

The current president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, will step down and hand over a post of intermittent importance. Under Sezer’s predecessor, Suleyman Demirel, the position—which constitutionally only gives the incumbent blocking power to parliamentary legislation—was much more significant. Demirel’s seven years in office saw a series of very weak parliaments and governments, which invariably were coalitions of ideologically opposed groups united largely by the conveniences of power. As a result, Demirel—an old party and parliamentary warhorse who had himself repeatedly been prime minister—often was able to exercise influence far beyond the doors of the presidency.

Sezer, whose background was that of a Supreme Court judge rather than a political wheeler-dealer, offered a quite different prospect. While he, too, initially presided over weak and divided governments, that all changed with Turkey’s 2002 general election. That saw victory go to the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which, thanks to the nature of the country’s electoral system, achieved a two-thirds majority in parliament with only 34 percent of the vote. For the first time anyone could remember, Turkey had a single-party government able to pass whatever legislation it liked and also, given its massive majority, to effectively overrule the president’s veto power.

Meanwhile, much else had changed as well. President Demirel also was head of the National Security Council (NSC), the body set up by the victorious generals after the 1980 coup to oversee the country’s political processes. Sezer chaired the NSC too, but after 2002, when the AKP pushed full ahead for Turkey’s accession to the European Union, the NSC’s powers were limited as part of the drive to democratize and meet EU criteria.

Indeed, the whole EU drive had a major impact on the relative strengths of the various, usually warring, components of the Turkish state. There was a general move toward strengthening the government’s hand while weakening those of other players, such as the military, the bureaucracy and the presidency—which, under the staunchly secular Sezer, was largely identified with the anti-AKP, anti-Islamist and conservative forces in Ankara.

So, imagine the horror among such forces at the prospect that this year might see the presidency fall into the hands of the AKP. With the president elected by parliament, and parliament still having a massive AKP majority, this seems a highly likely outcome. Yet many question marks still remain.

First of all, there is the question of whether or not the current prime minister, Recip Tayyip Erdogan, will run for president. The most popular scenario is that he will, leaving the prime ministership to an AKP colleague, with the current deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, a likely choice. This would have a number of advantages for Erdogan, not the least of which, cynics might say, is that it would leave a lot of untidy issues for Gul to settle. Principal among these is the Cyprus issue, with Turkey’s EU accession now partly suspended until Ankara makes some concessions on this. No Turkish political leader would want to be associated too strongly with any such Cyprus deal.

A second advantage might be that the ensuing parliamentary elections, scheduled for November, likely will see the AKP’s majority reduced, and perhaps even a return to coalition government, particularly if the AKP begins to split up without Erdogan’s parliamentary presence. Erdogan could then be in a stronger position, à la Demirel, to exert his authority over a weakened parliament.

How likely all this may be is hard to say. Certainly, while Gul would be a popular choice among many of the more liberal members of the AKP, there is a question over whether he could mobilize enough of the party’s grass roots supporters, who often are far more traditionalist.

The current speaker of parliament, Bulent Arinc, is seen as another possible successor, as he represents the party’s more Islamist wing. His prime ministership might also be divisive, however, losing its more middle-of-the-road supporters.

Meanwhile, there is also outrage among many secularists at the very idea of Erdogan becoming president. His wife wears a headscarf, an important symbol of Muslim belief for many Turkish women, yet a much derided and feared symbol of Islamism for many others. Indeed, women are prohibited from wearing the hijab in state buildings, raising the question of just how Mrs. Erdogan might get to see her husband. At the same time, Erdogan himself has never been trusted by the military or by much of the state—having even been jailed once for reciting what a secular court ruled was anti-state poetry. Many in Ankara would thus be loath to see him as the titular head of Ataturk’s republic.

At the same time, the opposition in parliament does not wish to see an AKP presidency either. While the AKP’s majority is still crushing—354 seats out of 550—it is no longer two-thirds, a fact which gives the opposition an unprecedented opportunity. Under the constitution, the voting for the president must see two-thirds—or 367—deputies take part in the first two rounds, after which, if no victor has been declared, a simple majority suffices.

Yet, some analysts wonder, what if the opposition boycotts the vote? No two-thirds majority, so no election. Another rule then stipulates that if no president has been elected after 30 days, parliament must be dissolved and a general election called.

Since the opposition parties—along with many of their media supporters—have been clamoring for early elections almost since the last vote was counted in the 2002 ballot, many think this will come to pass, resulting in November’s scheduled elections being held sometime in late summer or early autumn. It is questionable, however, whether the opposition really would gain any great advantage from this. An AKP party in office yet riven with dispute might be a much more beneficial backdrop for the November elections, added to the likely pressure over Cyprus throughout the year, and over the EU more generally. Just across the border, the future course of the Iraq war may also have an influence, as Turkey’s stated goals of preventing a Kurdish state—even if one already exists de facto—is another key electoral point.

Whatever the case, the rest of this year promises to be one of electoral jostling, with few expecting the country to move anywhere on issues that might court unpopularity at the ballot box. Normal business, many Turks seem to be saying, will be resumed—but not until early 2008.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.

< Prev		Next >