Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2007, pages 10-12

Two Views

James Baker, Israel, and the Iraq Study Group Report

Baker’s Cake

By Uri Avnery

NO ONE LIKES to admit a mistake. Me neither. But honesty leaves me no choice.

A few days after the collapse of the Twin Towers on Sept. 11, 2001, I happened to go on a lecture tour in the U.S.

My message was optimistic. I expected some good to come out of the tragedy. I reasoned that the atrocity had exposed the intensity of the hatred for the U.S. that is spreading throughout the world, and especially the Muslim world. It would be logical not only to fight against the mosquitoes, but to drain the swamp. Since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was one of the breeding grounds of the hatred—if not the main one—the U.S. would make a major effort to achieve peace between the two peoples.

That was what cold logic indicated. But this is not what happened. What happened was the very opposite.

American policy was not led by cold logic. Instead of drying one swamp, it created a second swamp. Instead of pushing the Israelis and Palestinians toward peace, it invaded Iraq. Not only did the hatred against America not die down, it flared up even higher. I hoped that this danger would override even the oil interests and the desire to station an American garrison in the center of the Middle East.

Thus I committed the very mistake that I have warned others against many times: to assume that what is logical will actually happen. A rational person should not ignore the irrational in politics. In other words, it is irrational to exclude the irrational.

George W. Bush is an irrational person, perhaps the very personification of irrationality. Instead of drawing the logical conclusion from what had happened and acting accordingly, he set off in the opposite direction. Since then he has just insisted on “staying the course.”

Enter James Baker.

Since I am already in a confessional mood, I have to admit that I like James Baker.

I know that this will shock some of my good friends. “Baker?!” they will cry out, “The consigliere of the Bush family? The man who helped George W. steal the 2000 elections? The Rightist?”

Yes, yes, the very same Baker. I like him for his cold logic, his forthright and blunt style, his habit of saying what he thinks without embellishment, his courage. I prefer this style to the sanctimonious hypocrisy of other leaders, who try to hide their real intentions. I would be happy any time to swap Olmert for Baker, and throw in Amir Peretz for free.

But that is a matter of taste. More important is the fact that in all the last 40 years, James Baker was the only leader in America who had the guts to stand up and act against Israel’s malignant disease: the settlements. When he was the secretary of state, he simply informed the Israeli government that he would deduct the sums expended on the settlements from the money Israel was getting from the U.S. Threatened and made good on his threat.

Baker thus confronted the “pro-Israel” lobby in the U.S., both the Jewish and the Christian. Such courage is rare in the United States, as it is rare in Israel.

On Dec. 6 the Iraq Study Group, led by Baker, published its report.

It confirms all the bleak forecasts voiced by many throughout the world—myself included—before Bush & Co. launched the bloody Iraqi adventure. In his dry and incisive style, Baker says that the U.S. cannot win there. In so many words he tells the American public: Let’s get out of there, before the last American soldier has to scramble into the last helicopter from the roof of the American Embassy, as happened in Vietnam.

Baker calls for the end of the Bush approach and offers a new and thought-out strategy of his own. Actually, it is an elegant way of extricating America from Iraq, without it looking like a complete rout. The main proposals: an American dialogue with Iran and Syria, an international conference, the withdrawal of the American combat brigades, leaving behind only instructors. The committee that he headed was bipartisan, composed half and half of Republicans and Democrats.

For Israelis, the most interesting part of the report is, of course, the one that concerns us directly. It interests me especially—how could it be otherwise?—because it repeats, almost word for word, the things I said immediately after Sept. 11, both in my articles at home and in my lectures in the U.S.

True, Baker is saying them four years later. In these four years, thousands of American soldiers and tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians have died for nothing. But, to use the image again, when a giant ship like the United States turns around, it makes a very big circle, and it takes a lot of time. We, in the small speed-boat called Israel, could do it much quicker—if we had the good sense to do it.

Baker says simply: In order to stop the war in Iraq and start a reconciliation with the Arab world, the U.S. must bring about the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He does not say explicitly that peace must be imposed on Israel, but that is the obvious implication.

In his own clear words: ‘The United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless the United States deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

His committee proposes the immediate start of negotiations between Israel and “President Mahmoud Abbas,” in order to implement the two-state solution. The “sustainable negotiations” must address the “key final status issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, the right of return, and the end of conflict.”

The use of the title “President” for Abu Mazen and, even more so, the use of the term “right of return” has alarmed the whole political class in Israel. Even in the Oslo agreement, the section dealing with the “final status” issues mentions only “refugees.” Baker, as is his wont, called the spade a spade.

At the same time, he proposes a stick-and-carrot approach to achieve peace between Israel and Syria. The U.S. needs this peace in order to draw Syria into its camp. The stick, from the Israeli point of view, would be the return of the Golan Heights. The carrot would be the stationing of American soldiers on the border, so that Israel’s security would be guaranteed by the U.S. In return, he demands that Syria stop, inter alia, its aid to Hezbollah.

After Gulf War I, Baker—the same Baker—got all the parties to the conflict to come to an international conference in Madrid. For that purpose, he twisted the arm of then Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir, whose entire philosophy consisted of two letters and one exclamation mark: “No!” and whose slogan was: “The Arabs are the same Arabs, and the sea is the same sea”—alluding to the popular Israeli conviction that the Arabs all want to throw Israel into the sea.

Baker brought Shamir to Madrid, his arms and legs in irons, and made sure he did not escape. Shamir was compelled to sit at the table with representatives of the Palestinian people, who had never been allowed to attend an international conference before. The conference itself had no tangible results, but there is no doubt that it was a vital step in the process that brought about the Oslo agreement and, more difficult than anything else, the mutual recognition of the State of Israel and the Palestinian people.

Now Baker is suggesting something similar. He proposes an international conference, and cites Madrid as a model. The conclusion is clear.

However, this baker can only offer a recipe for the cake. The question is whether President Bush will use the recipe and bake the cake.

Since 1967 and the beginning of the occupation, several American secretaries of state have submitted plans to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All these plans met the same fate: they were torn up and thrown in the trash.

The same sequence of events has been repeated time after time: In Jerusalem, hysteria sets in. The Foreign Office stands up on its hind legs and swears to defeat the evil design. The media unanimously condemns the wicked plot. The secretary of state of the day is pilloried as an anti-Semite. The Israeli lobby in Washington mobilizes for total war.

For example: the Rogers Plan of Richard Nixon’s first secretary of state, William Rogers. In the early 1970s he submitted a detailed peace plan, the principal point of which was the withdrawal of Israel to the 1967 borders, with, at most, “insubstantial alterations.”

What happened to the plan?

In face of the onslaught of “the Friends of Israel” in Washington, Nixon buckled under, as have all presidents since Dwight D. Eisenhower, a man of principle who did not need the Jewish votes. No president will quarrel with the government of Israel if he wants to be re-elected, or—like Bush now—to end his term in office with dignity and pass the presidency to another member of his party. Any senator or congressman who takes a stand that the Israeli embassy does not like, is committing Harakiri, Washington-style.

The fate of the peace plans of successive secretaries of state confirms, on the face of it, the thesis of the two professors, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, that caused a great stir early last year. According to them, whenever there is a clash in Washington between the national interests of the United States and the national interests of Israel, it is the Israeli interests which win.

Will this happen this time, too?

Baker has presented his plan at a time when the U.S. is facing disaster in Iraq. President Bush is bankrupt, his party has lost control of Congress and may soon lose the White House. The neoconservatives, most of them Jews and all of them supporters of the Israeli extreme Right, who were in control of American foreign policy, are being removed one by one, and in early December yet another, the American ambassador to the United Nations, was kicked out. Therefore, it is possible that this time the president may listen to expert advice.

But that is in serious doubt. The Democratic Party is subject to the “pro-Israel” lobby no less than the Republican Party, and perhaps even more. The new Congress was indeed elected under the banner of opposition to the continuation of the war in Iraq, but its members are not jihadi suicide bombers. They depend on the “pro-Israel” lobby. To paraphrase Shamir: “The plan is the same plan, and the trash bin is the same trash bin.”

In Jerusalem, the first reaction to the report was total rejection, expressing a complete confidence in the ability of the lobby to choke it at birth. “Nothing has changed,” Olmert declared. “There is no one to talk with,”—immediately echoed by the mouth and pen brigade in the media. “We cannot talk with them as long as the terrorism goes on,” a famous expert declared on TV. That’s like saying: “One cannot talk about ending the war as long as the enemy is shooting at our troops.”

On the Mearsheimer-Walt thesis I wrote that “the dog is wagging the tail and the tail is wagging the dog.” It will be interesting to see which will wag which this time: the dog its tail or the tail its dog.

Uri Avnery, a former member of the Knesset, is a founder of the Israeli peace organization Gush Shalom.

Say “Mission Accomplished” And Go Home

By John V. Whitbeck

While almost the entire world other than President George W. Bush now views the American invasion and occupation of Iraq as a catastrophic failure, there is one notable exception.

During a November visit to Washington, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, while affirming his categorical support for Mr. Bush’s Iraq war policy and his confrontational strategy toward Iran, said, according to the Nov. 14 Haaretz, that “the Iraq war had a dramatic positive effect on security and stability in the Middle East as well as strategic importance from Israel’s perspective.” (Ominously for the future, Mr. Olmert added with respect to his meeting with Mr. Bush, “Iran’s role in the conversation was quite clear, very serious and very significant, and I left the meeting with an outstanding feeling.”)

No one should be surprised by “Israel’s perspective.” In their now famous “Clean Break” policy paper, written in 1996 for incoming Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israel-First neocons who were to be the principal advocates and masterminds of Mr. Bush’s Iraq war cited the destruction of Iraq as a major Israeli strategic objective. In its geostrategic position, Israel would understandably view as undesirable the existence in its region of any Arab or Muslim state which was strong and independent, rather than intimidated by and subservient to Israel/America. From an Israeli security perspective, it would clearly be highly desirable for any such state to be neutered (like Egypt) and, if possible, fragmented into mutually hostile pieces.

Even before the invasion, it was widely understood that the principal motivation for the invasion was not oil—there is no evidence of behind-the-scenes agitation or pressure from international oil companies in favor of war—but, rather, Israel. In pre-war polls, Israel was the only country in the world (other than the United States) where a majority of the population favored the war.

Iraq has now been effectively destroyed and may be fragmenting into pieces. It is therefore no wonder that Mr. Olmert should be delighted with how the war has turned out and should wish to confirm publicly how “thankful” Israel is to the United States and Mr. Bush. His wisdom and good taste in doing so on American soil when most Americans are less delighted with how the war has turned out might be questioned. However, his genuine appreciation for what the United States has accomplished for Israel’s benefit may suggest a better “way forward” than the 79 recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group.

Imagine this Recommendation No. 80: The president should explain honestly what the principal objective in invading Iraq really was, point out that, in terms of this objective, the political, economic and social collapse and chaos which the war and occupation have achieved in Iraq already constitute an outstanding “success,” unfurl a huge “MISSION ACCOMPLISHED” banner on the White House and bring the troops home in triumph as rapidly as the necessary transport can be arranged.

This recommendation might well appeal to Mr. Bush, since it would offer him the only realistic chance to claim “success” before he leaves office—presumably preferable in his eyes to his apparent current strategy of stalling (at enormous human cost to others) for the next two years so as to leave the recognition of (and, he must hope, blame for) “failure” or “defeat” to his successor. He could also be confident that no one in either American political party or in the American mainstream media would criticize him for having lied to the American people and the world as to his true motivation for invading Iraq if he made clear that he did so for the benefit of Israel.

The only potential drawback if this recommendation were to be implemented would be that it would free up the American military to give Mr. Olmert another “outstanding feeling” by attacking for Israel’s benefit one or more other states on Israel’s hit list, starting with Iran and Syria. Perhaps, next time, the American military, who don’t have to stand for election and can therefore afford to put America first, will “just say no.”

John V. Whitbeck, an international lawyer, is author of The World According to Whitbeck, available from the AET Book Club. This opinion piece first appeared in the Dec. 9/10 issue of CounterPunch, <www.counterpunch.com>. Reprinted with permission.

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