Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2007, pages 33, 35

Islam and the Near East in the Far East

A Year After Lifting Ban on U.S. Arms Sales, Bush Visits Indonesia

By John Gee

IT IS NOT SURPRISING that the U.S. government wants to cultivate ties with Indonesia, which, with a mainly Muslim population of 220 million people, is the most populous Muslim-majority state in the world. It has a democratically elected government, a free press and wide range of NGOs. Its cooperation against extremist groups in the region, particularly Jemaah Islamiah, is considered to be very important, as is its government’s general opposition to the kind of religious zealotry that leads to violence against others. Washington also regards Indonesia as a vital regional counterweight to China, whose spreading influence and economic expansion are viewed warily by the Bush administration.

So keen has the administration been on forging stronger bonds with Indonesia that President George W. Bush pushed hard to persuade congressional critics of its human rights record (particularly on the issue of military impunity from punishment for past misdeeds in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh) to drop their opposition to the restoration of military ties, and then ran around them when he didn’t succeed. One of the foremost advocates of re-establishing close ties with Indonesia without resolving differences over human rights questions first was former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia Paul Wolfowitz, among the most determined neo-conservative advocates of the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

On Feb. 26, 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice gave the green light for the resumption of the International Military and Educational Training program by declaring that Indonesia had “satisfied legislative conditions” for restarting it. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono returned to Jakarta from a visit to Washington in June 2005 with news of the resumption of this program and of Washington’s agreement to recommence non-lethal military equipment sales.

The six-year ban on U.S. arms sales to Indonesia was lifted on Nov. 22, 2005, while Congress was taking a break for the Thanksgiving holiday. The Bush administration used a “national security waiver” to avoid being frustrated by congressional opposition. Such a procedure would only normally be considered proper if a drastic change in the country’s national security position had taken place and an emergency response was necessary: of course, no such change in any matter concerning U.S.-Indonesia relations had occurred.

Under Yudhoyono’s presidency, a negotiated settlement of the Aceh conflict has been achieved and civil authority over the military has been strengthened, but there remain concerns in human rights organizations that, while military personnel who have been responsible for killing and torturing civilians in the past are allowed impunity, the threat that elements in the army might in the future employ similar methods remains serious. 

The government of President Yudhoyono reciprocates Washington’s interest in improved relations. It shares a number of its political concerns, but also wants to encourage an expansion of trade and investment from the U.S.

The main outstanding political differences are over U.S. policy in the Middle East. As is often the case in the Arab world, this is more at the level of popular sentiment than that of government. Most Indonesians are very sympathetic to the Palestinians and they were strongly opposed to the U.S.-British invasion of Iraq. While this hasn’t stopped Jakarta and Washington from building stronger ties, it does make it difficult to deepen the relationship.

When President Bush visited Indonesia on Nov. 20, there was heavy security around the Bogor Palace, where he met Yudhoyono, and he did not stay overnight in Indonesia, reportedly because of security concerns. A noisy but peaceful demonstration was kept at a distance. The protesters’ placards and slogans were directed against Bush’s policies toward Israel/Palestine and Iraq. The Indonesian press, in its reporting of Bush’s visit, concentrated heavily on the  critical comments on U.S. policy in the Middle East made by President Yudhoyono, to the exclusion of coverage of the regional issues discussed in the international media.

The Democratic victory in November’s congressional elections led some Indonesians to hope for a change in U.S. policy on Iraq—which, as elsewhere, was recognized as the key issue sapping support for the Republicans. There’s a common assumption that there will be no change on Palestine, since both U.S. parties are seen as strongly supportive of the Israeli government, whatever it chooses to do.

Tested on Arabs, Bought by Indonesia

Indonesia is buying Israeli-made aircraft—specifically, four Searcher Mark II drones made by Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI). The Searcher Mark II can remain airborne for 15 hours, has a maximum range of 150 kilometers and can climb to an altitude of 20,000 feet. When news of the sale broke in October, it was reported that Indonesia had chosen the Israeli-made unmanned surveillance craft after receiving 42 offers since February.

No doubt reacting defensively to some Indonesians’ criticisms of the sale, armed forces chief Djoko Suyanto said in comments broadcast on ElShinta radio on Oct. 26th that plans to purchase the aircraft had been made during the Suharto presidency. This must have struck some listeners as a little odd, however, since Suharto was turned out of office in 1998.

The Jakarta Post quoted Defense Ministry spokesman Edy Butar Butar as saying, “We are just buying planes that are licensed by Israel, not dealing directly with them. So I think what we are doing is fine.”

The planes were not bought directly from IAI, but from Bina Putra Sejati, an Indonesian subsidiary of Kital Philippines Corporation.

The military says that the planes are needed for surveillance of Indonesia’s own territory and that the Israeli drone is the most sophisticated in the world, but Indonesia’s current requirements could surely have been met by planes from other sources. The most immediate use for them might be in West Papua, where popular feelings in favor of independence are strong.

Israel developed its drones in conflict with its neighbors, particularly in Lebanon since the beginning of the 1980s. It used drones to pinpoint Syrian radar and other installations prior to its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, giving it a big advantage when it fought against Syrian forces in the first days of its attack.

SE Asian Arabs in High Positions

At the center of the tragic crisis that briefly brought Timor Leste (formerly East Timor) back into the international spotlight in June 2006 was Mari Alkatiri, prime minister since 2002. He had been a founder of Fretilin (Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor) in 1974 and, based in Mozambique during the years of the Indonesian occupation, he lobbied for his country’s independence. Alkatiri lost office after being accused of arming militia members with the aim of liquidating his political rivals.

The former prime minister was of Arab descent. Like a number of other prominent political leaders in Southeast Asia in the recent past, he came from a family of Yemeni origin. Alwi Shihab, foreign minister in the government of former Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid, also was of Arab origin, as was his long-time predecessor under Suharto, Ali Alatas.

John Gee is a free-lance journalist based in Southeast Asia, and the author of Unequal Enemies: The Palestinians and Israel, available from the AET Book Club.

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