Uncertainty and Crisis in India, Afghanistan and Pakistan
| WRMEA Archives 2006-2010 - 2006 September-October |
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, September/October 2006, pages 36-37
The Subcontinent
Uncertainty and Crisis in India, Afghanistan and Pakistan
By M.M. Ali
ON THE EVENING of July 11, seven bomb blasts on five separate commuter trains killed more than 200 people and injured more than 700 in Bombay, India. The government accused the banned organization Lashkar-e-Taiba, reportedly based in Pakistan and the disputed Kashmir territory, of having placed the bombs. Bombay police took into custody over 300 young Indian Muslims belonging to the banned youth organization SIMI (Student Islamic Movement of India).
Islamabad immediately denied any role in the blasts and demanded that Delhi produce “any evidence” it may have. The government of President Pervez Musharraf also promised to go after the terrorists who may have caused the trouble. In a rather harsh assessment of the situation, the London Economist of July 15, 2006 observed: “India, despite all the hype, is not a country wholly at peace. Until it is fully reconciled to Pakistan and until Pakistan has wrestled its own particular demons to the ground, India will never achieve its full potential, either economically or geopolitically. And, neither of those two things can happen without a durable solution in Kashmir.”
Mir Waiz Omar Farooq, leader of the moderate Kashmiri group the All Kashmir Hurriyat Conference, described India’s linking of the train blasts to the Kashmiris as “an attempt to malign the Kashmir liberation movement.”
Nevertheless, New Delhi went ahead and suspended upcoming peace talks with Pakistan, saying the “climate was not conducive” for such talks at this time. Pakistan expressed regret at India’s decision. Despite Islamabad’s denial of responsibility, the July 11 incident has caused renewed tension between the nuclear neighbors.
The India-U.S. Nuclear Agreement
With the endorsement of both the Senate and House foreign affairs committees, it now appears that the nuclear agreement signed by President George W. Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology and the sale of materials to India is likely to be approved by the end of September—or, at the latest, by the end of the year. This will represent a major policy departure for Washington, undercutting as it does years of work on safeguarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India has refused to sign. Not only is the timing unfortunate—coming as Washington demands that North Korea and Iran abandon their nuclear weapons programs—but there also is concern that China may make a similar exception with regard to Pakistan.
But Singh’s only concern appears to be that because the agreement opens up the civil component of India’s nuclear reactors to IAEA inspections, it may compromise the secrecy of its nuclear weapons program as well. Following his July 18 meeting with Bush in St. Petersburg, Russia, Singh said he is worried about Indian parliamentarians who may raise questions about the deal. Energy-hungry India obviously is not going to turn down Washington’s offer. For its part, by working to build an Asian giant to counterbalance China, the U.S. certainly is looking to the future. The agreement also serves the purposes of American corporations that deal in nuclear technology and materials.
The international scientific community, on the other hand, is genuinely concerned with the risks inherent in undermining the NPT—especially in view of the current world situation, which finds almost every continent on the planet rent with serious fissures.
Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan
According to reports coming from Afghanistan, the Taliban appear to have resurfaced in the southern part of the country, occupying the Helmand and Kandahar districts. The U.S.-led coalition had to fight to reoccupy the former. After being in hiding for the past five years, Taliban leader Mullah Omar also has reappeared, and has been issuing pronouncements.
This development can be attributed to several factors—the principal one being the weakness of the Hamid Karzai government, which exercises no control outside Kabul and is replete with corrupt warlords who flourish on the opium trade.
Another reason may be that the Taliban, who have remained underground since their ouster in 2001, are taking advantage of the change in command from U.S.-U.K.-led coalition forces to NATO control, scheduled to take place by the end of July. NATO has announced it will double its military strength in south Afghanistan, from 9,000 to 18,000.
Recent evidence of the Taliban’s resurgence includes the appearance for the first time of suicide bombers, who have been targeting Western troops. This represents yet a further unraveling of Aghanistan’s fragile civil tapestry.
The rugged mountainous terrain dividing Afghanistan from Pakistan provides a hiding place for Taliban terrorists, who, because they cross the border at will, are an equal headache for Pakistan. And while coalition and Pakistani troops appear to have succeeded in eliminating al-Qaeda forces there, it may be too soon to announce a final end to combat operations.
Washington has reassured Kabul that its involvement in Iraq will not divert its attention from Afghanistan. At the moment, however, the people of the region appear to be at a loss, not knowing where to look for peace.
Troubles Persist in Pakistan
In a 90-minute televised speech to the nation July 20, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf addressed the issues confronting his government. He categorically denied that Pakistan had “anything to do” with the bomb blasts in Bombay, India; insisted the country was doing “all it can” to fight the terrorists in the border area with Afghanistan; reported that the army was engaged in battling the Taliban “menace” in north Waziristan, and that Pakistan’s “constabulary” was in action in the tribal area of Baluchistan to root out tribal chiefs “bent on causing trouble.”
Reiterating that his government has increased spending for development in the area, Musharraf cited the construction, with Chinese assistance, of the Gawadar port, and added that he plans to set up “three military cantonments” in Baluchistan to keep an eye on law and order in the province. Saying he regretted that royalties received by sardars (tribal chiefs) were being used to buy arms and ammunition to challenge the government’s authority, Musharraf vowed, “We will not allow this to continue.”
The president also discussed the general law-and-order situation in the country, appealing to Pakistanis to “stay away” from causing sectarian hatreds (e.g., between Sunnis and Shi’i) by attacking each other. He took time to specify the economic and social development programs launched by his government over the past five years, saying, “With time these efforts will start showing positive results.”
Conspicuously absent from his speech, however, was any mention of the dispute with India over Kashmir.
Although opposition parties described Musharraf’s speech as “timid and a repetition of old stories,” it nevertheless identified the problems facing Pakistan and indicated that the president plans to remain in power in order to see his projects completed.
Prof. M.M. Ali is a specialist on South Asia based in the Washington, DC metropolitan area.
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