Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, August 2006, pages 19-20

Special Report

The Referendum Game—Gambling With The Palestinian Future

By Samah Jabr

ALTHOUGH THE document drawn up by members of five separate Palestinian factions jailed in Israel’s Hadarem prison was an attempt to “preserve Palestinian unity”—indeed, its full title is “The Palestinian National Accord Document”—it nevertheless has become the center of a national dispute.

Two weeks after it was issued on May 11, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas launched a national dialogue in Ramallah as a way to resolve the growing differences between his Fatah party and other Palestinian factions, including the ruling Hamas. In a clear attempt to influence its outcome, however, Abbas opened the “dialogue” by unilaterally setting a deadline for an agreement on seeking a settlement with Israel and, wagging his finger, vowed to call a referendum if one was not reached in 10 days. Nor did his insistance that the PLO is the only representative of Palestinians serve to promote the free exchange of ideas.

Two of the original signers of the “prisoners’ document,” Abdul Khaleq al-Natsheh (Hamas) and Bassam al Sa’di (Islamic Jihad) later withdrew their signatures to protest the way the document was used by President Abbas. It was meant to form the basis of a dialogue, they clarified, not a referendum.

The document calls for a unity government and for Jerusalem to be the capital of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. It calls for resistance to Israel’s continuing occupation to be confined to the territories occupied in 1967, but allows for a negotiated settlement if Israel withdraws fully from West Bank land it has occupied for nearly four decades. The right of return also is established and confirmed.

The document implicitly recognizes Israel—a card the Hamas government appears to be holding for a later stage in our battle for liberation. At the very least, it does not want people deciding on this matter when they are hungry and penniless. It also believes that any referendum on the essential questions of the Palestinian issue should include all Palestinians: refugees and those in the Diaspora, as well as those living under occupation.

The referendum so desired by some PLO and Fatah officials who have no political weight in the street, but who nevertheless continue to call on the elected government to step down for failing to run the Palestinian Authority effectively, is in fact intended as a vote of no-confidence in the Hamas government. In other words, it is a maneuver to hijack the results of January’s parliamentary elections. That was the true, free and fair referendum, in which a majority of Palestinians voted for Hamas and its platform. To hold a referendum now would be to sidestep the people’s choice and the new government’s political program, along with the good-faith initiative of the five prisoners.

While their document indeed contains many positive aspects, it is too vast and sophisticated, and contains too many strategic questions, to be answered with a simple “yes” or “no.” Those who are pushing hard for a referendum are counting on the attractiveness of some of the document’s main points, and the popularity and respectability of its signers, to guarantee its success and—if people don’t pay close attention—do away with the government.

The very likely and tragic aftermath is that the prisoners’ document will be discarded as soon as it is adopted. The referendum will be interpreted as a vote for the two-state solution, with the document’s other demands consigned to oblivion.

Last year, Palestinian political factions met in Cairo in response to an invitation from Abbas, who made an enormous effort to arrive at an agreement on a truce with Israel. In addition, it was agreed to reform the PLO to include Islamic Jihad and Hamas, which have greater influence on the Palestinian street than does Fatah. As we can see, however, 16 months later the most popular political factions still are excluded.

Suddenly, however, Abbas and his friends in the previous government so admire and honor the prisoners that their proposal should be adopted as is, without even the slightest amendment. One wonders why Abbas did not advocate that the Oslo accords, of which he was the principal architect, be put to a public referendum. Similarly, while imposing a truce on Palestinian factions may be the most important achievement of his presidency, Abbas has not put half that effort into trying to end Israeli violence against Palestinian civilians.

On Saturday, June 10, the day after Israel’s heinous and inflamatory killing of Palestinian family members picnicking on a Gaza beach, Abbas made a public statement—not to condemn the crime, but to decree that the referendum will be held July 26. 

The referendum game is a dangerous one, not least because it gambles with the Palestinian future. It is not a given that Hamas’ acceptance of the prisoners’ document would end the present stand-off in the occupied territories and cause the U.S., Israel and EU to reconsider their economic blockade, which is inflicting hardship on millions of Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who has called the proposal meaningless, has said that Israel intends to keep large Jewish settlement blocs in the West Bank. Nor could it ever accept the proposed return of millions of Palestinian refugees and their descendants to homes in territory Israel claims as its own. Israel, in short, already has nullified the referendum—while simultaneously authorizing the delivery of light weapons and ammunition to security forces loyal to Abbas.

To hold a referendum under existing conditions is to expose our national project to severe danger in order to tackle the power struggle between the Fatah presidency and Hamas governmental institutions. While there is little doubt that one of them, perhaps both, will suffer a defeat, there is little hope for any political breakthrough for the Palestinian people. Most likely it will only serve to strategically damage the Palestinian cause.

If we start with a public referendum recognizing Israel, what will be left to negotiate? In exchange for what will Israel give back our land? Any Palestinian initiatives should be made only in the context of a just and comprehensive settlement.

In an effort to develop a consensus favoring adoption of the document, Hamas has called for more time to discuss the proposal and has suggested changes in its language. Questioning the legality and constitutionality of the president’s authority to call for referendums, the government might, as a last resort, use legal means to prevent him from doing so. This, too, however, might undermine the spirit of national unity and dialogue—because the real, scandalous problem of Palestinian national unity is that a few people, who have received arms, money, and U.S. and Israeli support, are willing to do anything to curb Hamas’ authority. Should the referendum fail as a tactic, future criminal acts are predictable.

Samah Jabr is a Jerusalem-born physician currently studying in France.

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