Washington Report, November 2005, pages 22, 41

Special Report

A High-Ranking Assassination in Gaza

By Samah Jabr

	Palestinian police stand in front of the Gaza City house of former military intelligence chief Moussa Arafat following his Sept. 7 assassination (AFP photo/Mahmud Hams).

THE POPULAR Resistance Committees, a Fatah-derived group operating in the central and southern Gaza Strip, was quick to claim responsibility for the Sept. 7 assassination of former Palestinian security chief Moussa Arafat. One of the few surviving relatives of the late President Yasser Arafat, who was his uncle, Moussa was a former commander of the Palestinian Military Intelligence, an important member of the Fatah revolutionary council, and a security adviser to the current president, Mahmoud Abbas, holding the title of minister.

Committees commander Jamal Abu-Samhadana, who initially had said that the killing of Moussa Arafat was designed to “clean out the PA’s stables of corruption,” and promised soon to provide proof of those claims in the form of documents and tapes, subsequently returned to declare that Arafat’s killing was committed by certain committee members who had acted on their own, not under the direction of committee leaders.

Because the committees are suspected lately of having become a “cover organization” that undertakes selected “missions” for outside individuals and factions in exchange for payment or political favors, it is not enough to say that the committees or some of its members assassinated Arafat, who was not the only or the most corrupt official in Gaza. Nevertheless, a hundred armed men dragged Arafat from his home and abducted his son, Manhal, virtually in front of the security forces stationed near their home. Not only did these security troops fail to respond to the attack, which lasted 45 minutes, but the shoot-out in which Arafat lost his life took place only a few hundred meters from the offices of the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) counter-terror agency and the well-guarded offices of  the Palestinian Interior Ministry, which is responsible for the security services.

We need to know for whose interest Arafat was killed. It is commonly understood that the well-planned and coordinated attack could not have occurred without the tacit approval of high-ranking officials in the security apparatus. It certainly did not come as a surprise, since there have been at least three previous attempts to kill Arafat, whose men have been involved in numerous confrontations and street battles in Gaza since the death of Yasser Arafat. Nevertheless, none of the official commentators on Arafat’s assassination have indicated any intention of investigating the conduct of the security apparatus.

In fact, Arafat’s killers are known to the Authority, especially since the latter negotiated with them through the Egyptian security delegation then visiting Gaza. The attackers and their Egyptian intermediaries reached an accord with Ahmad Halas, a Fatah trustee, and Sameer Mashharawi, a member of Fatah’s supreme committee. It was agreed that, in exchange for the release of Arafat’s son, his abductors would not face a juridical hearing. Manhal thus was liberated 48 hours after his father’s murder.

Following a modest military funeral, his flag-draped coffin borne by Palestinian soldiers, Moussa Arafat was buried in Gaza City, rather than in the family plot in Khan Younis, where popular chaos was feared. By contrast, the lack of popular participation in Arafat’s Gaza City funeral was indicative of the street reaction to his death—neither surprise nor protest was apparent. Moreover, in another departure from traditional social custom following the death of an important personage, there were virtually no formal or popular announcements of condolence in the local newspapers. Arafat’s extrajudicial killing was the 101st since the beginning of the year. What people are really worried about is the spread of crime, rather than the identity of the victim.

The scandalous accusations against Arafat, whether factual or fabricated, are nothing new. In addition to the killers themselves, however, the Palestinian Authority bears responsibility for Arafat’s murder because it failed to try him on charges of corruption and determine whether or not there was a basis to the allegations. Instead, the PA deals with popular complaints of corruption by sweeping them under the rug—rotating positions, hiding the accused from the public or, in worst-case scenarios, helping suspects flee the country.

Given the PA’s willful ignorance, it is not surprising—but it is unacceptable—that crimes such as the killing of Arafat occur. Where the law sleeps, after all, bullying takes over. This latest crime occurred despite all the authority’s declarations and claims of reforming the security apparatus. Here we saw the fruits of such reform. Following the assassination, the Interior Ministry even declared it had been aware of political assassination plots. As usual, however, the ministry declined to reveal its plans to counteract this threat, instead leaving the populace in a terrifying vacuum which gangs and bullies are only too happy to fill.

Also sharing blame is the Palestinian media, for its very poor performance and deliberate ambiguity in covering such crises. Far from upholding rigorous standards of thorough reporting, neutrality and objectivity, the media display political partisanship and rely on anonymous sources. For example, Al Quds newspaper attributed to an unnamed source in the Ministry of Interior the declaration that Hamas was behind Arafat’s assassination—this after Hamas had formally condemned and denied responsibility for the killing. Nor can this be seen as an innocent mistake, given the context of the heated debate about legitimate weapons of resistance. It is understood, in fact, as an attempt to dishonor armed Palestinian freedom fighters.

Previous kidnapping victims have included lawyers, foreigners, and officials such as Ghazi Jabali, the Gaza Strip police chief who was abducted and subsequently deported from the country. In most cases, the law and governing authority actually interfered with the victims’ release, or at best managed to eke out a compromise between victims and perpetrators. Serious crimes like murder are resolved through “word of honor” and the “parole of men,”  often used to protect the stronger party. This, of course, is not reassuring to ordinary Palestinians who have nothing to offer in exchange for these understandings. It often seems, in fact, that the long arm of the law is brought to bear only on the weak and poor in my country.

The resulting crisis of trust between ordinary citizens and the Palestinian institution serves to strengthen loyalty to one’s political party or family at the expense of adherence to one’s civic responsibilities—especially when the authority is seen more as a party to the conflict than an impartial refuge for seeking justice.

Following the short-term celebrations of the Israeli pull out from Gaza—which have the psychological benefit of releasing decades of feelings of oppression—the lack of true planning for the future of Gazans will become apparent. This will play into the hands of those interested in making the Palestinians look unfit for independence—or at least as if public opinion has no part to play. A chaotic Gaza also serves to send a message to external observers, as well as to those who have invested their efforts and money in this withdrawal in the hope that progress for the Palestinians will help lessen the tension between the West and the Arab and Muslim worlds. The current post-disengagement period presents a critical test of our government, with much more demanded of the PA to protect and advance our dream of freedom and victory.

According to some experts in international law, following its pullout Israel will be “liberated” from its responsibility to the people of Gaza, even though Israel maintains control over Gaza’s air, water and borders, and despite the fact that Israeli hands, eyes and shekels will continue manipulating the people living in Gaza.

As has always been the case, Israel will undoubtedly take advantage of yet another Palestinian political assassination to kill some of its own hard-core enemies and make it look like Palestinians are the perpetrators. Moreover, while a civil war in Gaza is one scenario acceptable to Israel, another is presenting any future confrontation between the people of Gaza and the Israeli military as a war between two equivalent states and armies, thus legitimizing Israel in the eyes of the international community—and perhaps paving the way for an exaggerated Israeli response that may include as well a permanent solution to Israel’s phobia about the perceived “demographic threat.”

Thus the situation in Gaza has never been more critical. It is more urgent than ever for the Palestinian Authority to accept full responsibility for its citizens and to reenforce the concept of citizenship among its people.

Samah Jabr is a Jerusalem-born physician currently studying in France.