Washington Report, November 2005, pages 39-40

Talking Turkey

Bumps in Road to EU Accession Expose Cyprus, Kurdish Potholes

By Jon Gorvett

	Holding placards reading, “Welcome to Diyarbakir,” Kurdish women listen and applaud Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan during his Aug. 12 speech in the southeastern Turkish city. Erdogan pledged to resolve the Kurdish conflict with “more democracy.” (AFP Photo).

WITH TURKEY’S European Union accession strategy hitting some difficult rapids in early September, two key issues have returned to haunt the government in Ankara. Both have been smoldering for decades, and either might have the power to seriously derail the country’s hopes of EU membership. While the Cyprus issue attracted more international attention, the Kurdish question simultaneously sprang back into the domestic limelight.

Concerning the former, Turkish officials often bemoan the fact that the lack of progress towards reunification of the island is hardly their fault. After all, Ankara threw its full support behind the last United Nations proposal to stitch the divisions up—the Annan Plan—which, back in May 2004, aimed to create a single state ahead of Cyprus joining the EU. Turkish Cypriots voted by a large majority in favor of the plan, and ditched their long-standing leadership, represented in the rotund shape of Rauf Denktash, who perhaps unfairly had often been labeled by international negotiators as “Mr. No.”

Now, however, with the Greek Cypriot-dominated Republic of Cyprus a full member of the organization Ankara wants so much to join, membership negotiations look likely to exact a heavy price from the Turks.

This was made clear last December, when, in return for securing a date to begin membership talks, Turkey was obliged to agree to extend its customs union with the EU to include all new members—including Cyprus. Under a deal worked out by the British, however, this was not to mean recognition of the Greek Cypriot government, a move anathema to Ankara, which only recognizes the breakaway Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Any recognition, Turkey has long argued, can come only following a settlement and reunification.

This was always something of a shaky compromise, of course. Dependent as it was on some healthy sign of progress on Cyprus itself, it largely defied the whole gist of the Cypriot government’s strategy—that of using its position in the EU to wring concessions from the Turks, bypassing the U.N. and the Turkish Cypriots (many of whom, it argues, are settlers from the mainland, rather than indigenous Cypriots).

Just how shaky the deal was became apparent this August, when, after finally extending the customs union, Ankara also issued a statement saying it was not recognizing Cyprus and that it wouldn’t be opening its ports to Greek Cypriot vessels. This prompted into action the French, previously not widely known for their deep interest in the Cyprus problem. A statement from Paris said it was out of the question for Turkey to start accession talks without recognizing Cyprus.

The news from Paris was naturally seen by many in Turkey as an unpleasant piece of political opportunism, given the internal difficulties faced by the current French government. However, the bandwagon against the Turks had been picking up speed since the referenda on the EU constitution placed a major question mark over further enlargement. The apparent inevitability of a Christian Democrat win in the German elections, which would see a fairly explicitly anti-Turkish membership government in Berlin, also added to the feeling that Turkey’s accession was in trouble. Austria, too, had been becoming increasingly strident in its opposition, leaving the early September meeting in Wales of EU foreign ministers unable to work out a response to Turkey’s non-recognition declaration due to heavy disagreement. The job eventually was dumped on a meeting of EU ambassadors a few days later—though they, too, had great difficulty hammering out a response to which they all could agree.

Meanwhile, that other long-term bugbear of Turkey’s EU drive also was making headlines—the Kurdish problem. Yet with this, there did appear at least to be some glimmer of hope in August, after Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan made a major speech in the capital of Turkey’s mainly ethnic Kurdish southeast, Diyarbakir.

Promising that the problems faced by Turkey’s Kurds would be addressed using more democracy, Erdogan even acknowledged that, in the past, mistakes had been made. He also used the phrase “Kurdish problem,” a move that in itself broke with decades of official denial.

The speech was warmly welcomed by municipal authorities—members of the pro-Kurdish People’s Democracy Party (DEHAP)—and by a list of some 70 local unions, chambers of commerce and other NGOs. A few days later, DEHAP merged with another pro-Kurdish party, the Democratic Society Movement (DTH), led by Leyla Zana, the formerly imprisoned Kurdish politician. The merged entity then called for the armed Kurdish guerrillas, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), to call a halt to its activities. The PKK responded the next day with the announcement that it was resuming until Sept. 20 a unilateral cease-fire it had ended in September 2004.

The pace of developments made many wonder if Ankara was not making a serious move to end the 20 years of fighting in the southeast—a conflict that has left more than 30,000 people killed and many thousands more internally displaced.

Many Turkish commentators also saw in this a potential opening for a wider discussion on the nature of the relationship between the Turkish state and society, posing a “Turkish problem” as much as a Kurdish one. Yet most remained highly cautious. Certainly the Turkish military, which has long run things in the southeast, did not observe the cease-fire and continued military operations, killing six suspected PKK militants in the following week. Attempts to hold a funeral for these six resulted in further clashes, with one civilian killed. As September started, PKK sympathizers demonstrated and rioted in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara.

Part of the discussion among Turkish commentators—those, at least, who did not outright reject the idea of there being any “Kurdish problem”—concerned whether the government should now move quickly to open channels with Kurdish civil society and political leaders who were not associated with the PKK.

For many liberal Turks, however, this meant that no discussion could be held with DEHAP/DTH, which most see as largely PKK front groups. The demonstrations by PKK sympathizers were thus attributed to a weakness among the guerrillas, who allegedly fear being outflanked by any political process. Yet the question for some did remain as to with whom any government initiative might meet, given the large body of support for DEHAP/DTH and, indeed, for the PKK, that undoubtedly exists among Turkey’s Kurds.

Another question mark remains over how effectively the Turkish government can move on this issue. Critics argued that, rather than marking any real initiative in the southeast, Erdogan’s speech was designed for EU consumption, with Ankara well aware of the strength of vested interests opposing any settlement. Yet the other worry increasingly is that, without EU backing, even this overture may be too much. If Turkey’s accession is finally blocked, then few expect any progress on either the Kurdish question or on Cyprus.

This makes for a delicate balancing act, both by Ankara and in EU capitals—including Nicosia, where the Greek Cypriots may risk losing any chance of settlement if Turkey one day simply walks out. There is perhaps much for everyone to lose if this particular game is suddenly called off.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Ankara.