Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, December 2004, pages 32, 66

Talking Turkey

As EU Decision on Turkey’s Application Nears, Both Sides Get the Jitters

By Jon Gorvett

With the clock ticking down fast to the crucial December day when European Union leaders are set to decide whether or not Turkey can start membership talks, there has been little else exercising minds in Ankara and Istanbul lately. Major diplomatic initiatives have been underway to try and sway the doubters in France, Austria and Germany, while the arguments in favor have been aired daily on Turkish TV and in the newspapers.

Nevertheless, many Turks remain convinced that the EU will never admit Muslim Turkey to its affluent “Christian Club.” It is a perception based on seemingly sound historical precedent, too, as it is now over 40 years since Turkey began knocking on Europe’s door, demanding admission. Each time, however, it has been met with a resounding “non” from within.

Without a doubt, though, Turkey now is closer than ever to achieving this historic goal. In October, the European Commission released its progress report on Turkey and recommended that accession talks begin—despite several important reservations, and despite the fact that it gave no date as to when this should happen. Yet, on the latter point, the EU already has committed itself to starting such negotiations as soon as possible after a positive decision is taken. This has been taken by Ankara to mean sometime in 2005.

The imminence of such an event certainly has had a dynamic effect on the debate in Europe, as well. For an organization founded on the principle of its members putting past conflicts behind them, there has been an unusually historical aspect to the discussion. As an extreme example—of at least the public rhetoric of EU politicians—the Dutch European Commissioner Frits Bolkenstein said in early September that admitting Turkey into the EU meant that “the liberation of Vienna in 1683 would have been in vain.”

His reference was to that year’s decisive siege of Vienna, in which a combined Austrian, Polish and Hungarian army defeated the Ottomans, beginning the latter’s long retreat from their European dominions. Rarely in past EU enlargement discussions have the events of the 17th century been such a hot topic of discussion.

Later, however, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was slightly more up to date with his historical references when he said in mid-October that Turkey joining the EU would be “D-Day in the war on terrorism.” Although he was trying to be positive, the ironies of such a comment were not lost on the Turks, many of whom have clearly had more than enough of history.

It is now over 40 years since Turkey began knocking on Europe’s door.

Of course, the use of the past in ill-advised ways has not been a European monopoly. Previous Turkish leaders have often tried to back up their claims toward an EU place by pointing out that Turkey has been in Europe for centuries. Many of the inhabitants of the Balkan states, which have often largely defined their national identity in terms of violent liberation from Turkish rule, hardly need reminding.

Of course, the historical memory revealed in the debate—whether accurate or not—is widely understood as a mask for the real issue: Turkey’s Islamic identity. This has emerged as a far more crucial element than the usual economic factors dominating EU discussions, although it has colored this debate, as well. With Turkey set to have the largest population of any EU member state by 2010—if it joins—the Islamic identity of this population has widely led to its characterization as a threatening giant, set to overwhelm declining and aging Europe. Bernard Lewis’ recent contention that Europe will in the future have a Muslim majority thus has found a ready audience.

Unlike ingrained views about the Islamic otherness of Turkey, however, its economic and demographic aspects at least are arguable on statistical grounds. The country has been urbanizing rapidly over the last few decades, with birth rates dropping accordingly. Meanwhile, there is also the argument that Europe will need Turkish workers in the years to come, as the employment gap widens and sustaining tax and social security bases becomes more difficult. At the same time, Turkey itself represents an enormous market for European goods and services, with the experience of other recent joiners demonstrating that new states always turn out to be net capital exporters to the old states, despite the much anticipated EU development grants. Certainly, most large EU businesses have long been in favor of Turkey’s accession.

The present government in Ankara also can point to an impressive record of legislative change aimed at bringing the country into line with the EU’s political and judicial norms. While many of these changes are yet to be fully tested in court, the European Commission has conceded that the progress so far is good enough to form the basis for the start of negotiations. During these—as with all candidate countries—many further changes will also be expected.

A Possible Snag

Herein, perhaps, lies one snag for Turkey. Just prior to the European Commission report, a bitter tussle had broken out over a proposed amendment to Turkey’s criminal code that would have outlawed adultery. With the government of Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan first backing the amendment, which would have sent straying husbands and wives to jail for up to three years, Ankara seemed to be on a collision course with Europe. Erdogan responded to Brussels’ demand that the amendment be withdrawn by slamming EU interference in domestic affairs. For a while it looked as if the entire EU-Turkish marriage might be off.

If Turkey begins accession talks, it is likely that further disputes of this kind will emerge, since the EU will be “interfering” a great deal more during the negotiation process. This is likely to offend many Turkish nationalists and pro-Islamists, particularly when the issue in dispute has a cultural or religious aspect to it.

Yet, in the end, the adultery amendment was withdrawn. A rebellion among Erdogan’s back-benchers—many of whom have conservative, Islamist beliefs—was defeated, and without any split emerging. For now, it seems, Erdogan is still fully master of his own party.

The big question remains, however, as to what might happen here if Turkey does not get a date to start talks in December. Most Turkish analysts see this as being quite disastrous. Given the effort the current government has expended on EU accession, a refusal now would, many fear, lead to an implosion in Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). The more radical Islamists would take this as proof positive that Turkey’s attentions should shift to the Muslim world, while nationalists—and some in the military—would look to alliances with Russia and the Central Asian countries as the way forward.

It might also, of course, change the way the EU perceives itself and is perceived by others. There would be, many in Turkey feel, a sense of closure to the great European project, with a clear line placed against Islam. The effects of that, both on Turkey and on the region, might be extremely damaging.

Meanwhile, the debate in Europe has become centered on France, with most other EU states declaring in favor of Turkey joining. In Paris in October, President Jacques Chirac—who supports accession talks with Turkey—was obliged to concede a referendum on Turkish membership, which would take place once Turkey had completed its accession talks, perhaps 10 years from now. Chirac also has been most insistent that any talks should not begin until after France’s referendum on the new European constitution, set for next summer. While both moves appear to be tactical efforts to simply take Turkey off the agenda, they also show the jittery feelings of many in France over Muslim Turkey joining the EU. As the date approaches, such jitters may well become more widespread.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.