Vote on Annan Plan Results in Reversal of Fortune for Turkish, Greek Cypriots
| WRMEA Archives 2000-2005 - 2004 June |
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June 2004, pages 40-41
Talking Turkey
Vote on Annan Plan Results in Reversal of Fortune for Turkish, Greek Cypriots
By Jon Gorvett
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APRIL MAY well have turned out to be the cruelest month for many on the divided island of Cyprus, as Turkish and Greek Cypriots voted in opposite directions on the latest U.N.-brokered reunification plan. To many, the outcome seemed like the final confirmation of what had long been suspected, but never owned up to—that the island’s two ethnic communities simply could never be brought back together again.
Yet such a conclusion glosses over much and, in so doing, conceals many of the real changes that have taken place in recent years both on and off the island. Indeed, these shifts have been responsible for the dramatic change in international sympathies, with the Turkish Cypriots now emerging in a positive light, as the Greek Cypriots suffer angry denunciations from the U.S., the EU and beyond.
On April 24, the two communities voted simultaneously on the U.N.’s Annan Plan, which had evolved through several versions and a great deal of diplomatic posturing over the previous month and a half.
After an extraordinary amount of arm-twisting by the U.S., EU and UK, the plan had ended up on the table earlier this year as a basis for negotiation between Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash and his Greek Cypriot counterpart, President Tassos Papadopolous. The fact that both previously had campaigned against the plan, however, left these negotiations fairly meaningless. When the talks failed, responsibility was passed on to Greece and Turkey. They then joined the negotiations, yet also were unable to agree on a final draft. The buck next was passed to the U.N., which was charged with filling in the not-inconsiderable blanks, and finally stopped with the Cypriots themselves—who had to vote on a plan to which none of the heads of state concerned, except Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan, had wanted to affix their signature.
With high turnouts on both sides, Turkish Cypriots on April 24 voted 64.9 percent to 35.1 percent in favor of accepting the plan, while Greek Cypriots voted 75.8 percent to 24.2 percent against.
The result was greeted with statements of official disappointment, along with anger at the Greek Cypriots, by the U.N., the EU and the U.S. EU Commissioner for Enlargement Gunter Verheugen even went so far as to accuse the Greek Cypriots of lying to him when they earlier had given their commitment to reunification. Indeed, the EU’s strong backing of the U.N. plan led Greek Cypriot “no” campaigners to ban Verheugen from making an address on the subject on Greek Cypriot TV during the run up to the vote.
The Greek Cypriot government also accused the EU of trying to interfere in its domestic affairs, an allegation that an aghast Verheugen then claimed had “never been made before in EU history.”
Following the vote, EU ministers and parliamentarians agreed to open an office in the Turkish Cypriot north of the island, along with providing $260 million in aid. Turkish Cypriot Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat called for the EU to freeze the scheduled May 1 accession of Cyprus to the European body.
The EU’s decision to allow Cyprus to join in its May 1, 2004 round of expansion effectively set a concrete deadline for the U.N. referendum, presenting as it did the final chance for the two sides to come together again before the island took up membership.
Yet the EU agreement to let Cyprus join on May 1 also bolstered the argument of many Greek Cypriot diplomats and politicians that a “no” vote was the sensible one—because, once inside the EU, Greek Cypriots would be in a much stronger position in any negotiations over reunification. As a member, Cyprus would have a powerful weapon in its arsenal: a possible veto over Turkey’s effort to join the EU, which is due to be decided upon by EU leaders at their summit this December.
As a result, no main Greek Cypriot party, except for the liberal DISY of former President Glafkos Clerides, advocated a “yes” vote on the Annan Plan. Instead, every leading figure and grouping—from President Papadopolous to AKEL, the Greek Cypriot Communist party—urged a “no” vote. The politically powerful Orthodox Church also weighed in, with the Bishop of Paphos even claiming that “yes” voters would go to Hell, while his Episcopal colleagues denounced the plan as a U.S.-Zionist plot and its most prominent supporters as British agents.
Under the circumstances, it was hardly surprising that the “oxi” camp won the majority of Greek Cypriot votes. The “nai” campaign was also criticized by many of its members for being badly organized and late—with campaigning for a “yes” vote starting only a week before the referendum itself.
Many “yes” advocates also complained that the “no” campaign had received a massive amount of funding from the church and Greek Cypriot businesses likely to lose out in any reunified island. Meanwhile, the latter group were also held by “no” campaigners to be behind the “yes” campaign—only this time, the businesses were those likely to profit from reunification.
Whatever the case, however—and both allegations might easily be true—what was obvious in Greek Cyprus on the day of the referendum was that hardly anyone was voting on the Annan Plan itself. Instead, there was an emotional venting over just about every case of injustice perpetrated by Turks against Greek Cypriots—and Greeks—that anyone could remember; and many Greek Cypriots’ memories are long, if highly selective. This reporter found voters casting a “no” because they were against Turkey’s 1974 invasion of the island, or against the 1923 expulsion of the Greeks from Smyrna (now Izmir), or because they were against the potential looting of their shops by Turkish paratroopers. Few remarked that they were against the plan because of its actual provisions, which generally remained obscure.
“I don’t feel Greek Cypriots were ready for this,” said Jean Christou, of the Nicosia-based Cyprus Mail. “It all came too fast and they couldn’t handle it. People had become comfortable with the status quo and needed more time.”
In contrast, Turkish Cypriots appear to have made up their minds about the plan a long time ago—perhaps even before it was written. The “yes” majority in the north of the island reflected a long process of political change that began to break the surface in 2000. Back then, a financial crisis, coupled with what was widely seen as government intransigence at the economic plight of many Turkish Cypriots, led to the first-ever mass protests against the Denktash administration.
Since then, Turkish Cypriot separatism has grown increasingly stronger, with clear identity-based politics developing. In 2002 municipal elections, this showed itself in victory for Talat’s opposition Republican Turkish Party (CTP)—which then went on to win last December’s Turkish Cypriot general elections. The CTP has always favored reunification and opposed Denktash’s Turkish nationalism.
Most Turkish Cypriots see themselves as Europeans, with a future firmly locked into a reunited island and the economic and social opportunities that would provide. For many, these benefits are also tantalizingly close, as, if they were born on Cyprus, they are entitled to Cypriot passports—and, after May 1, to EU ones. Many already work in the Greek Cypriot south, or live abroad. Indeed, with more Turkish Cypriots living in Britain than on the island itself, a long-standing Turkish Cypriot joke finds a family listening to Denktash talking about the “mother country”—and concluding he must be talking about Hackney.
Meanwhile, a major political shift also has occurred in mainland Turkey. Prime Minister Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has made major efforts to move the country toward EU accession, and has succeeded in undermining support for the military and nationalist circles that traditionally backed Denktash.
Yet no parallel process has occurred south of the Green Line. While the Greek mainland also has shifted away from a confrontational stance toward Turkey, Greek Cypriots still seem largely stuck with a history that begins and ends in the summer of 1974. While over the years there has been much longing for a reunified country, few will acknowledge the suffering of Turkish Cypriots on the island before the Turkish invasion, or the changes in the region that have occurred since.
Now, however, the Greek Cypriots are in the doghouse. Papadopolous also is in a tricky position, as his strategy of renegotiating from strength within the EU may easily backfire—particularly if Washington, Brussels and London keep up the pressure for Greek Cypriots to vote again—and again and again, until they get it right. Any “new” plan that the Cypriot president might offer would need to have something substantially new in it if he is to avoid allegations of a U-turn. At the same time, there seems little reason for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to agree to anything more than they have already.
Turkish Cyprus even may begin unilaterally implementing the Annan Plan. The European Court also will be under pressure to refer Greek Cypriot property claims—one of the main sources of pressure on the Turkish Cypriots—to a special commission. Meanwhile, the north’s campaign for recognition as a separate state seems unlikely to succeed, but an end to punishing economic sanctions against the north is widely forecast.
The result may well be the de facto partition of the island, as Turkish Cypriots give up on reunification and start to enjoy more normal conditions, while Greek Cypriots remain fixed against anything short of a return to the pre-1974 status quo. This would be an ironic turn of events, especially considering that neither community thought that was what it was voting for on April 24.
Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.
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