Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2004, pages 38-39

Arab Press Review

Provisional Constitution, Attacks on Iraqi Shi’i Seen in Context of U.S. Occupation

By Peter C. Valenti

The Arab press sees events in Iraq not only as newsworthy, but also as exemplifying the new phase of the geostrategies of both militant groups and the United States alike. Both White House officials and those who oppose their foreign ventures—such as al-Qaeda or local Iraqi insurgents—essentially premise their raison d’être on the need to combat the other side. The various sides see Iraq as an ultimate proving ground of the righteousness of their respective ideologies and justifications for interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. Caught in the middle of this ideological tug-of-war are the Iraqi people.

Thus, when reviewing the prominent developments in Iraq, such as the formulation of the constitution, the latest round of bloody bombings and the likelihood of sectarian violence, what is at stake is both the future of Iraq and the future success (or failure) of many vested interests. It still remains to be seen whether al-Qaeda has an appreciable presence inside Iraq and is implicated in the current insurgency. For its part, the White House must be nervously cognizant of events in Spain which indicate that Iraq can at the very least make an indirect impact on elections. This makes the effectiveness of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Authority all the more crucial; post-June 30, 2004 Iraq can retroactively justify or diminish supposed advances made in the country by the U.S. As for Iraqis, they want to emerge from this gloomy period with their independence and stability substantiated, as well as their bodies intact.

A Provisional Constitution

Ratified on March 8, the constitution is provisional and will need to be accepted by the newly elected National Assembly, slated to convene no later than Dec. 31, 2005. Discussion about Iraq’s interim constitution serves as a means to hypothesize about the future of the country and the potential for conflict.

For example, in his March 3 op-ed in the Saudi Asharq al-Awsat, Ahmad al-Ruba‘i saw the federalization of Iraq as a positive development. Most resistance to the idea of a federal Iraq, he argued, came from people who did not understand what a federal structure means, thinking it was a euphemism for partition. Al-Ruba‘i also emphasized that any qualms in the draft about the role of Islam were not an issue of differences between secular and religious representatives, but rather on the extent of Islamic legitimacy in the text. The problem was semantic: was Islam going to be established as a source of legislation or the (only) source? The compromise agreed upon is that the constitution enshrines the principle that any legislation passed will not contradict Islamic shariah.

Writing in the same newspaper on March 5, Amir Tahiri cautioned against ejecting Islam from the political equation in a nation that is 95 percent Muslim. Besides the positive role Islam can play in legitimizing as well as governing, he wrote, its absence from constitutional affairs would leave a void in society that could be filled by groups with an extreme ideological agenda. This, Tahiri argued, is exactly what happened in Turkey and Pakistan, where we saw the rise of extremist madrassas.

In Tahiri’s opinion, the federalization of Iraq was not a good idea, because it only makes sense when two or more pre-existing countries are joined into one. Since its creation, he argued, Iraq has always been one nation, and the federal structure would only weaken the central government in its attempt to unify national sentiment.

Regardless of the structural divisions, wrote Muhammad Unuz in Iraq’s Azzaman on March 15, the constitution will be of no benefit if Iraq’s various groups are not prepared to cooperate and become distracted by secondary issues. The main goal, he pointed out, is creating a stable representative government that works on behalf of the national consensus. Only under these conditions, he concluded, will Iraqis be able to justify complete liberation from U.S. occupation.

In the March 10 edition of the Lebanese An-Nahar, Nabil Bu Mansaf pessimistically noted the similarities between the sectarian-based system enshrined in Iraq’s draft constitution and the political structure in Lebanon. Hinting at the debilitating power struggle inherent in basing power-sharing along sectarian lines—already indicated by Iraqi Shi‘i objections to Kurdish leverage in the draft constitution—Bu Mansaf cautioned that “the greatest eternity in the Middle East is that which originally carried the description ‘provisional’…”

Bloodshed in Iraq

While there have been numerous bombings throughout Iraq, the coordinated attacks of March 2 received the most attention due to their high casualty rate and symbolic value. Targeting Shi‘i pilgrims parading in Karbala and Baghdad on Ashura, their holiest day of the year, more than 200 were killed and many more wounded.

The vast majority of writers in the Arab world already held Washington responsible for the instability in Iraq, and many therefore see the U.S. as directly to blame for the deadly bombings. This argument of U.S. culpability is usually premised on one of two points: the very nature of an occupation—especially the war on Iraq, which held no international legitimacy—has caused a security nightmare inside Iraq that the U.S. is unwilling and incapable of controlling. This is precisely the argument of the lead editorial in the March 3 edition of the Palestinian al-Quds al-Arabi.

Secondly, there are those writers who do believe al-Qaeda is linked to these latest attacks—but, they point out, the only reason al-Qaeda is present in Iraq to create mayhem is the U.S. war and occupation. In other words, the U.S.-led war on Iraq attracted al-Qaeda elements to Iraq, whereas prior to the war there had been no such al-Qaeda presence inside the country.

Masoud Aku’s March 6 op-ed in Azzaman tried to emphasize that these bombings, like so many others, should not be seen as targeting only one group or another. They are indiscriminate, killing Arabs, Kurds, Shi‘i and Sunnis alike.

In his op-ed of the same day in Asharq al-Awsat, Ahmad al-Ruba‘i bemoaned the fact that the U.S. -led war on Iraq and subsequent occupation has created an opportunity, and another front, in which international terrorists can face off against the U.S. The result, he wrote, is that regular Iraqis are caught in the crossfire of a conflict in which they want no part.

This interpretation was enunciated by Aisha Sultan in the United Arab Emirates’ March 4 al-Bayan. So many groups are working out of Iraq now, she wrote—all of whom hope to sow chaos—that Iraq has become an “ideal battleground.” This situation was engendered by the U.S. occupation that has indeed brought democracy and justice, Sultan pointed out: “since falling under occupation, [we have] democratic participation in being killed and the allotment of terrorist justice for all Iraqis.”

It is important, however, to note that not a few Arab writers are suspicious of U.S. claims that al-Qaeda is the ultimate mastermind behind the attacks in Iraq. The lynchpin of these claims is based on a captured letter written by a Jordanian agent of al-Qaeda, Abu Mus‘ab al-Zarqawi, in which he details the overall strategy in Iraq.

In an article in the March 6 edition of the pan-Arab al-Hayat that pores over the possibilities of the al-Zarqawi connection, Salim Nasar iterated that, prior to the capture of Saddam Hussain, the U.S. occupation authorities considered the Iraqi president the prime instigator of attacks. Once Saddam was captured, they needed to revise their theory.

Al-Zarqawi is a very convenient suspect, Bashir Musa Nafi‘ explained in the March 3 al-Quds al-Arabi, because he not only allows the U.S. to tie al-Qaeda to Iraq but also symbolizes potential sectarian violence, because al-Qaeda promotes a radical Sunni ideology. Nafi‘ reminded readers that al-Qaeda, which has proudly claimed responsibility for a variety of controversial bombings throughout the Islamic world, denied any responsibility for the March 2 attacks. Furthermore, Nafi‘ wondered, why is it that, despite the arrest of thousands of suspects in Iraq by U.S. occupation authorities, they still have not been able to offer any clear evidence of al-Qaeda operatives or activities?

Regarding the debate over al-Qaeda’s involvement, Rashad Abu Shawar made an incisive observation in his March 6 op-ed in al-Quds al-Arabi. He suggested that accusations made by many members of Iraq’s Governing Authority that al-Qaeda was to blame cannot be taken at face value. In blaming al-Qaeda, Abu Shawar explained, “they hold the occupation innocent of responsibility, since they are not able to blame the very occupation that appointed them ministers and members of the Governing Authority.”

Abu Shawar further expressed amazement—to the point of incredulity—that al-Zarqawi, despite being a foreigner without intimate knowledge of Iraqi terrain, and presumably dependent on only a few small terrorist cells, has eluded capture, whereas Saddam Hussain, a man with vast resources and connections inside Iraq, was so easily located.

In the March 16 and 17 edition of Kuwait’s al-Watan, Khalil Ali Haydar dissected the language and rationale of al-Zarqawi’s letter, concluding that its logic dictates an extreme disdain for human life, whether civilian or military, Muslim or non-Muslim. Thus, Haydar argued, it is very likely that most of the latest attacks were perpetrated by militants loyal to or influenced by al-Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda masters.

Haydar reminded his readers that al-Zarqawi’s letter lays out his plan precisely: “the only solution is to attack the Apostates—the Shi‘i—whether their religious or military ranks or any others among them…until they become hostile toward Sunnis.” The end result will be an internecine struggle that, according to al-Zarqawi, will force “the Americans [to] enter into a secondary conflict with the Apostates; that is what we need.”

There are some Arab writers who believe that the bombings are homegrown Iraqi resistance. According to Said al-Shihabi in his March 10 op-ed in al-Quds al-Arabi, the majority of the groups struggling against the occupation comprise elements from the former Iraqi government but are labeled as foreign insurgents linked to al-Qaeda.

In a March 17 interview with ABC news anchor Peter Jennings, Paul Bremer alluded to fears of a possible eruption of violence between Shi‘i and Sunni Iraqis. Without the presence of U.S. occupation forces “sticking it out,” Bremer intimated, sectarian conflict might not be staved off. Some Arab writers have tackled this assumption by U.S. officials—which they promote as incontrovertible—that these attacks are indicative of a home-grown violent antipathy between Iraq’s Sunnis and Shi‘i.

Asked an exasperated Muhammad Sadiq al-Husayni in the March 11 al-Hayat: “Why don’t we hear [in the news] about the myriad visits that Sunni religious leaders made to Najaf, Karbala and the holy sites of Shi‘i? Why don’t we hear about Shi‘i leaders who raise their voices in the face of occupation, loudly saying ‘we are with the people of Faluja’?”

The attacks on Shi’i Iraqis have only solidified communal bonding across the sectarian divide.

Ironically, the attacks on Shi‘i Iraqis have only solidified communal bonding across the sectarian divide, argued Sa‘d bin Tiflah in the March 6 Asharq al-Awsat. This, he explained, is because Iraqi history has been characterized by relatively stable relations between the two religious communities, which do not want to see this record of cooperation sullied. Both Shi‘i and Sunnis realize that the attacks are intended to cause fitna, or civil strife, which Islam specifically encourages believers to prevent.

“Those forces of oppression [perpetrating the attacks] who see religion as their exclusive domain,” Bin Tiflah declared, “are unable to remain and thrive in Iraq…except in circumstances of an outbreak of fitna.”

The ultimate reason for Shi‘i restraint in the face of these provocative attacks, opined Ala Muhammad al-Muttarid in the March 18 Azzaman, is the sagacious leadership of religious leaders and the very nature of Iraqi society. Al-Muttarid pointed out that tribal affiliation still holds a very important place in Iraqi identity, and sectarian diversity exists within the tribes themselves, with some containing both Shi‘i and Sunni members. According to al-Muttarid, even families themselves contain Shi‘i and Sunni members. In al-Muttarid’s opinion, if there were an outbreak of civil strife, despite all the sectarian media hype to the contrary, allegiance would be drawn up along tribal and familial affiliation much more than on sectarian lines.

The title of al-Quds al-Arabi‘s March 3 editorial spoke for itself: “Fitna to Justify the American Occupation.” It is the nature and intent of the occupation to stir up sectarian sentiment, the editorial argued, along the lines of the classic colonial formulation of “divide and conquer.”

Abd al-Rahman al-Na‘imi posited in his March 17 op-ed in Bahrain’s Akhbar al-Khaleej that, no matter who perpetrated the March 2 attacks, they serve U.S. interests in perpetuating a “repugnant image of our nature which serves as a justification for the continuation of occupying Iraq.” In concert with Bush’s “Greater Middle East” plan and supposed encouragement of democracy in the region, al-Na‘imi cautioned that instability only further engenders the argument that the Middle East is in need of an ever-present American “Big Brother.”

The fact that most Arab rulers do not have the word “democracy” in their dictionaries, argued Sa‘d al-Hadithi in the March 10 Azzaman, led to an opening for the U.S. to attack and occupy a fellow Arab nation. And, despite their promises otherwise, al-Hadithi suspects that U.S. forces will try to remain in Iraq for years to come, under one pretext or another. From this semi-permanent location, he warned, the U.S. will implement the next stages of its strategy for the region.

It is because of these kinds of suspicions that the lead editorial of al-Bayan on March 14 explained that the moral authority of the U.S. has been so debased by its own actions, and its motives in becoming involved in the internal affairs of any Arab country are under so much suspicion, that any plan proffered by Washington automatically will be rejected based solely on its American source.

Despite the ideal sound of Bush’s “Greater Middle East,” then, or the sincere desire among Arabs for democratization, the latter will not look to the U.S. for help so as to not lend justification for prolonging an American presence in the region. Lastly, wrote Layla al-Humud March 3 in Jordan’s al-Ra’i, it was Israel’s fears of a supposed WMD-armed Iraq that encouraged the U.S. to attack Iraq. Therefore, she concluded, there should be no doubt that the occupation of Iraq serves some greater Israeli purpose.

Indeed, the most sensationalistic claims about the intended results of the latest bombings revolve around Israeli involvement in Iraq. Intertwined with theories about White House plans to justify continual troop placement in the Middle East supposedly in order to stem sectarian violence, some writers opine that Israeli geostrategic interests cannot be discounted.

Al-Bayan’s March 4 editorial explored the idea that Israel prefers an insecure and debilitated Iraq, which would force the U.S. to keep troops in the region longer as well as limit the future political and economic strength of Iraq, potentially the greatest regional powerhouse. Writing in the March 10 al-Quds al-Arabi, Said al-Shihabi was convinced that Israeli agents have been operating in Iraq for some time. It is both in their experience and interest, he argued, to keep resistance to the occupation fractured and weak. This will better allow the U.S. to implement its vision for a new Iraq—which in turn serves Israeli desires for greater regional supremacy.

Peter C. Valenti works as a translator and contributing editor for the World Press Review.

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