WRMEA Archives 2000-2005 - 2004 January-February

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2004, page 34

The Subcontinent

 

Pakistan Takes First Small Step Toward Resumption of Peace With India

 

By M.M. Ali

During most of Ramadan (i.e., a good part of November), the Middle East and South Asia witnessed increased violence. Pakistan, however—at least temporarily—reduced tensions with India by announcing a unilateral cease-fire across the U.N.-chartered Line of Control (LOC) in the disputed Kashmir territory. After some initial hesitation, New Delhi responded positively. Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf then expressed optimism that air links between the two countries would be resumed after the second round of India-Pakistani talks starting Dec 1. Once again India welcomed Musharraf’s overture, and the two countries agreed to reopen air travel between them starting Jan. 1, 2004.

To India’s earlier suggestion that bus service be established in Kashmir between (Indian-held) Srinagar and (Pakistani-administered) Muzzafarabad, Islamabad reiterated its earlier response that this must be done under U.N. supervision. India disagrees.

Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, receiving a delegation in late November led by Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rasheed, expressed his willingness to meet with Pakistan’s prime minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, when Vajpayee is scheduled to visit Pakistan for a regional conference in January. These Indo-Pak gestures, while small, have created a less tense environment on the subcontinent.

It must be kept in mind, however, that as long as India is unwilling to resolve the Kashmir dispute, a lasting peace in the subcontinent cannot be expected. Most recently, the European Community has asked India and Pakistan to continue the cease-fire and enter into a dialogue aimed at normalizing relations and finding ways to end the Kashmir dispute. Unfortunately, the one country that can bring peace to South Asia—the U.S.—has not used its influence to make the two countries end the Kashmir dispute peacefully. Washington’s intervention alone likely would do the trick. Until then, however, the nuclear-armed region remains vulnerable.

Especially under the evolving political developments following the 9/11 shock, the U.S. administration finds little reason to antagonize India. Forcing a solution down India’s throat, therefore, is not likely to happen in the foreseeable future. From the West’s point of view, the best that can be achieved is to help New Delhi and Islamabad normalize their socio-economic and diplomatic relations and cool down the Kashmir dispute for the time being—at least averting a shooting war. As long as India’s 700,000-strong military and paramilitary forces remain stationed in and around the Kashmir capital of Srinagar, Pakistan will continue to extend its support to the Kashmiri mujahideen (freedom fighters). Thus a cease-fire along the LOC can be seen as at best a temporary goodwill gesture.

In order to extend the cease-fire, Delhi would have to agree to open a dialogue with Pakistan, as well as negotiate with the leadership of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, which spearheads the Kashmiri freedom movement. Domestically, Vajpayee would have to rein in his right-wing Hindu coalition partners even to initiate such a three-way meaningful dialogue. Meanwhile, although the guns are silent across the LOC, there are reports of serious violent incidents inside Indian-held Kashmir, and Indian forces have come down heavily on the Kashmiri Muslims.

 

The one country that can bring peace to South Asia—the U.S.—has not used its influence

India may be scoring big with the U.S. and the British Commonwealth of Nations these days, but its internal policies and practices are a different story. Not a day passes without blatant human rights violations and injustices heaped upon the country’s minorities by the BJP-led government. The Indian state of Assam recently has witnessed large-scale killings of Beharis (a local euphemism for Muslims living in the area). The carnage continues, with hundreds reported dead and thousands rendered homeless. With the Muslim holy month of Ramadan over and the Christmas season nearing, Hindu extremists are turning their attention toward Indian Christians. According to the Nov. 30 Deccan Herald, “B. K. Muduli, General Secretary of the All Orissa United Christian Forum, has urged the government to protect the churches in the state and not let the incidents of last year (when Christian worshippers were attacked and churches were burnt) repeat.”

According to Muduli, there were more than 200 such incidents in 2002.

 

Still-Unstable Afghan Border

What is known as the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA), separating Pakistan from Afghanistan, is a very difficult terrain of rugged mountains and treacherous valleys. Local tribes have controlled the belt and ruled over it at will for the last 150 years. Changing governments in Kabul or Islamabad have had no effect on the situation.

FATA has caused considerable concern for Pakistan’s internal peace and security, especially since the U.S.-assisted ouster of the Soviet occupiers in the late 1980s—in which effort Islamabad collaborated with Washington. The Taliban, in fact, are a product of that period—as are the area’s Kalashnikov and drug cultures (poppy cultivation remains the major cash crop in Afghanistan). And, not least, religious extremism was exported into Pakistan.

Given this history, one can understand that Musharraf’s willingness to stand solidly with the U.S. in its fight against terrorism is fraught with extraordinary peril to his own regime. The establishment of an elected right-wing Islamic government in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and of a coalition government in Baluchistan—both areas bordering Afghanistan—poses problems for Islamabad in pursuing balanced policies.

According to the new U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, a naturalized American and a born Afghan (see April 2003 Washington Report, p. 12): “There are Taliban leaders and people who are using the Pakistani territory to come across and carry out attacks in Afghanistan.” He even speculated that Osama bin Laden may be hiding somewhere in the FATA belt.

The envoy’s complaint notwithstanding, Pakistan has continued to clamp down heavily on religious groups and organizations suspected of aiding terrorists. Islamabad also had to deny Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s Nov. 30 statement that Taliban leader Mullah Omar had been seen in Baluchistan.

Ironically, despite the 11,000 allied troops operating in Afghanistan, there have been reports of increased random attacks in and around Kabul. Clearly, Karzai’s regime still has little or no control over the many tribal leaders who run their own personal fiefdoms at will.

Nor are Karzai’s problems confined only to his country’s southern borders. Under Uzbek leader Abdul Rasheed Dostam and his Tajik counterpart, Attah Mohammed, remnants of the Northern Alliance, which once sided with the Soviet Union and later opposed the Taliban, now are at each other’s throats, as well as in defiance of the Kabul government. President Karzai lacks the stature to intervene and impose peace there. Instead, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had to meet personally with the two leaders and convince them to surrender their tanks and guns. Only time will tell if this latest U.S. intervention is successful.

Prof. M. M. Ali, a specialist on South Asia based in the Washington, DC area, is a consultant with the U.N. Development Program.