Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November 2003, pages 40-41

United Nations Report

 

Special General Assembly Session Called After U.S. Uses Veto in Security Council

 

By Ian Williams

After months of Iraq dominating the U.N. agenda it was almost a welcome event for Palestine to return to center stage—even if the occasion was yet another example of inept American diplomacy. Following Israel's threat to exile, or even assassinate, Yasser Arafat, the Palestinians and the Arab group promptly came to the Security Council with a resolution of condemnation. Who could object to a resolution that stated the obvious: that assassinating or deporting elected leaders is wrong?

Washington, of course, vetoed the resolution on Tuesday, Sept. 16—but was trounced that Friday by 133 votes to four in the replay at the General Assembly, where the U.S. has no veto.

In the Security Council there had been 11 votes in favor, with obsequious abstentions by the Germans, the British and the Bulgarians. The latter was no great surprise, since Sofia has a fairly consistent record of backing Washington. But the British claimed that the resolution needed "balance." Nor by that did they mean a pledge from Arafat that he would not assassinate or exile Ariel Sharon. Instead, taking its cue from the U.S., London sought an explicit condemnation of named Palestinian groups.

The Germans have an excuse: their understandable sensitivities on Israeli issues meant that they could not be stronger than the British on the issue. Tony Blair's government seems to have developed a default position of going along with the Americans, and any excuses for it should be seen as just that: excuses. By contrast, Margaret Thatcher, for whom Blair has admitted admiration, had no problems whatsoever in bucking Washington on Middle East issues.

A word of sanity came from Terje Roed-Larsen, Kofi Annan's special representative, who pointed out that no Palestinian leader could put an end to terror without broad popular support for the necessary measures to be taken. That, he noted, could only be achieved by "at least the beginning of an end to occupation"—i.e., halting Israeli settlement activities and construction of the separation wall.

 

That compromise meant the European Union swung behind the resolution.

Nasser El Kidwa, the Palestinian representative, whose contempt for the statements of Israeli Ambassador Danny Gillerman is more and more visible and expressive with each session, told the Washington Report that the U.S., who right up to the last moment was wavering about whether to abstain or veto, showed no interest in negotiating the text of the resolution.

In response to Gillerman's ad hominem attacks on Arafat, only El Kidwa was impolite enough to accuse him of speaking "on behalf of a government whose prime minister was accused of war crimes. Some of its leaders had introduced terrorism to the region in the first place. It had committed many massacres, including downing a Libyan airliner, [attacking] the USS Liberty and the assassination of many leaders."

Not surprisingly, his words did not get much space in the U.S. media.

The real issue, of course, is the power of the Israel lobby in the U.S., whose congressmen already were indignant at administration suggestions that the promised $9 billion in loan guarantees to Israel may be reduced by the amount spent on the "Wall." President George W. Bush is trying to "send signals" subtly to Sharon—who does not do subtlety—while simultaneously trying not to let the Democrats win the right angle on Israel domestically just as the election check-writing season is in full swing.

The Arab response was quick, and satisfying. At their prompting, the new president of the General Assembly, Julian Hunte, reconvened the body's Ninth emergency special "Uniting for Peace" session, during which there was an action replay of the Security Council debate. With some regrets the Arabs accepted a compromise wording which "condemned" Palestinian suicide bombings while only "deploring" Israeli killings. The only real difference between the two, of course, is that the suicide bombers are dead and unaffected by the condemnation, while the deplored Israeli government is still alive and killing.

That compromise, however, meant the European Union swung behind the resolution, which meant that Britain had to support it too, which in turn meant that the Germans, with a sigh of relief, could now do what they wanted as well, and supported it.

The resolution passed easily in the Assembly, 133 votes to 4, with 15 abstentions. The four were, predictably, the U.S., Israel, and two micro states, Marshall Islands and Micronesia, which are totally dependent on the U.S. Congress for financing.

Most of the wire and newspaper reports of the Special General Assembly session used the State Department spin on it, describing it as an "expression of opinion" rather than legally binding the way a Security Council resolution would have been. The U.S., of course, did not think so when it pioneered the "Uniting for Peace Procedure" in order to prosecute the Korean War in the face of a Soviet veto in the Security Council. Its change of view on this matter came only when the Palestinians resurrected the procedure.

Meanwhile, the Palestinians and the Arab group are considering a new approach in the credentials committee. They would not challenge Israel's credentials per se, but instead would seek to add a rider that stressed and reiterated that the occupied territories were not included in the Israeli delegation's territorial remit.Of course, there are already clear decisions on this matter from the United Nations, so it is a small thing, but previous experience shows that it is one to which the Israelis are highly sensitive—and which will put the U.S. yet again in the difficult position of choosing between international law and decisions of which they have been part for many decades, or of pandering yet again to the Israel lobby.

 

Sanctions on Libya Lifted

Absolute chutzpah does pay, after all. Four years after signing a full and complete settlement with Libya over the UTA case in return for dropping out of the Anglo-American case over Lockerbie and the sanctions resolution, Paris came back like Oliver Twist and asked for more when it saw the $2.7 billion settlement offered to the U.S. and UK survivor families.

And they got it. On Sept. 12, after several weeks of promises, and a false start two days before, the UK put the resolution lifting Libyan sanctions to the vote, and it was passed. The U.S. abstained because it was worried about the domestic implications, although it had been semi-publicly fulminating against French gall in suggesting that it would vote against. The French, equally mysteriously, also abstained, even though they were walking away with untold millions more than they had unilaterally accepted four years earlier.

The sanctions had been on since 1992, although they were suspended in 1999, when Libya handed over the alleged perpetrators for trial. When the Lockerbie victims won a much larger settlement, Paris returned to the table for a second helping—and, to the chagrin of the British and Americans, actually was successful.An "independent" foundation controlled by Muammar Qaddafi's son agreed to pay families bereaved in the UTA bombing extra compensation of between $500,000 and $1 million per family. Indeed it is possible that the French survivors, not represented by American lawyers with huge contingency fees, and without the conditions on U.S. policy to Libya, may end up substantially better off.

The Lockerbie victims will now get the first tranche of compensation—but not all, since further installments depend on the U.S. dropping its unilateral sanctions and taking Libya off the list of terrorist nations. Despite growing pressure from U.S. oil companies wanting to get back into Libya, U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham warned, "Our decision, however, must not be misconstrued by Libya or by the world community as tacit U.S. acceptance that the government of Libya has rehabilitated itself."

 

Help Wanted in Occupying Iraq

Almost as bogged down as the occupation of Iraq is Washington's attempt to get United Nations blessing—and hence lots of troops from other countries. The Bush administration wants a no-strings resolution asking countries like India and Pakistan to contribute troops, and countries like France and Germany to send cash. Unfortunately for the U.S., however, a resolution with no strings has no visible means of support for most of the world.

Other countries will only join in if the U.N. is given a serious role and there is a clear timetable for a return to sovereignty. For some reason, these countries do not want to lay down their soldiers' lives for Bechtel and Halliburton. The domestic pressures of increasing casualties, falling poll ratings, and growing resistance to the president's $87 billion demands for continuing occupation do not put the administration in a strong negotiating position with other countries.

In addition, both the growing unpopularity of the occupation with the military and the citizenry alike puts Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld in a painful position. He bucked the generals by saying that the invasion could take place with far fewer troops than the military brass sought. Now, both for reasons of personal pride, military over-stretch and public concern, he is trying to underplay the demands of the occupation on the U.S. military and avoid the awkwardness of calling for more GIs even though the existing force is not doing the job.

Washington's original U.N. draft was stunningly one-sided. In return for a U.N. call for troop contributions, the world body would get a reaffirmation of its vital role—which, upon examination, looked more than a little like the essential role of a rubber stamp for America's conscription of Third World troop contingents.

In reality, the French, Germans and Russians are not even asking for an apology from the White House for having invaded despite their opposition, or being wrong about the weapons of mass destruction, nor even a touch of humility for so drastically underestimating the difficulty of the occupation. On both geopolitical and humanitarian grounds, they do not want an Iraq-sized hole in the Middle East.

But they will not support a resolution that lends U.N. support to a continuing occupation, not least since it would make things on the ground worse, not better.It is perhaps a measure of how sharply the reality on the ground in Iraq, and soon in U.S. polling booths, is affecting the White House that none of the opponents in the Security Council have been badmouthed as they were earlier in the year.

Opinion poll responses indicate that the president's request to increase the deficit by $87 billion has not won over the voters, any more than have the continuing casualties incurred by American troops. It would be the clever thing to do, of course, to pass the problem onto the U.N. But clever does not describe the civilians in the Pentagon.

Ian Williams is a free-lance journalist based at the United Nations.

 

SIDEBAR

A Tribute to Dr. Sergio Vieira de Mello

The loss of the indefatigable servant of peace Dr. SŽrgio Vieira de Mello, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, is a terrible blow to the process of dialogue, conciliation, and leadership on the world stage. Like many around the world who were impressed by his dedication, awed by his achievements, and touched by his compassion, I was deeply distressed by his shocking murder in Baghdad Aug. 19.

It is a bitter irony that the Bush administration is now seeking precisely the kind of U.N. assistance on the ground, and consensus in the Security Council, that Vieira de Mello strongly advocated in his discussions with L. Paul Bremer and others. During East Timor's transition to independence (1999-2002), Vieira de Mello's position as head of UNTAET was essentially that of vice-regal, delivering him unprecedented powers and responsibilities for a U.N. operative. From this experience, he knew it was imperative that the Iraqi people feel—and be—empowered, included, and involved in the reconstruction process, through the governing council, and in the eventual transition of power. Vieira de Mello made it clear that no appearance of altruism or moral superiority is achieved in "liberating" a people when their interests are not first and foremost on the agenda. In his sensitive and deft handling of the Timor crisis, Vieira de Mello led the U.N. to one of its greatest triumphs. In his conduct and self-possession he was utterly compelling, garnering him lasting respect in the region.

In his extraordinary career, Vieira de Mello exemplified all the qualities we claim to value most as a society: honesty, selflessness, integrity, conviction, bravery. Yet I think we have largely forgotten what they look like, so seldom are they shown by those in public life. To that he brought a rare intellectual rigor, a commanding gravity, immense charisma, and his own ineffable grace. He stood for the individual making a profound difference, serving in some of the world's most piteous and unrelenting conflict zones like a moral and spiritual barometer.

The displaced, traumatized, and oppressed peoples have lost an eloquent and tireless champion. Vieira de Mello understood all the treasured aspirations of humanity: he offered people hope that they could re-build and achieve a better life out of the rubble and chaos of war, he gave them back their shattered dignity. Were it not for an act of unspeakable barbarism, the people of Iraq may have come to honor him the way they do in East Timor, and other places in which he served.

Vieira de Mello seemed to have great misgivings about the role he was expected to fulfil in Iraq, but he put the suffering of others first, put himself in harm's way for their relief. Such a devastatingly unjust end, at the height of his skills and prodigious talent, reminds us of how vulnerable we are all rendered by the heinous and destructive forces Vieira de Mello fought against all his career. A free and democratic Iraq should have been the legacy bought at such a brutal price, but those who remain don't appear able to secure it. As the situation deteriorates at a terrifying pace, it is clear how critically needed Vieira de Mello's unique abilities were, and the vacuum of experience and knowledge left in his wake. With his elegant presence, Vieira de Mello could convey all the possibilities and potential of a more civilized time, one the world seems in no danger of achieving.

SŽrgio Vieira de Mello was a diplomat without borders, a nation builder, and a true hero of humanity. He combined pragmatism with a rare breadth of vision, free of the self-aggrandizement, pontification, and mediocrity that so dominate international politics. Vieira de Mello wore his amazing capacity for joy, optimism, and faith in people like protective armor, impenetrable to doubt. It did not save him, however: now that is our sorrow to bear.

"There is no virtue in much of their counsel: only in his who enjoins charity, kindness, and peace among men. He that does this to please God, on him we shall bestow a rich recompense." (Qur'an, 4:114-116)

—Inga Walton is a free-lance writer and Ph.D. candidate in History at La Trobe University in Victoria, Australia

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