Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October 2003, pages 24-25, 57

United Nations Report

 

Oil Under Troubled Waters

 

By Ian Williams

The murderers who set off the truck bomb outside the U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad, whether they were vengeful Ba'athists or Islamic fundamentalists, were not fighting for freedom of a kind any of us would recognize. Their biggest victim, Sergio Vieira de Mella, the head of U.N. operations in Iraq, had been trying to enlarge the U.N. presence incrementally, without provoking blowback from the Neanderthal wing of the Pentagon.

Had he lived to see his plan successful, the future Iraqi government would not have the quisling stigmata of being a regime installed by the invaders. In fact, the U.N. presence could help ensure an independent, secular, rights-based government in Baghdad.

Although no one can be sure, it is possible that the trigger for the bombing was Security Council Resolution 1500 of the previous week, which U.S. Ambassador John Negroponte saw as the Council making it clear that "it shared the [Iraqi] Governing Council's message and would work with it as a broadly representative partner." The resolution, he added, "sent a clearsignal to those who opposed the transition under way in Iraq that they were out of step with the international community." This provoked some wry grins from those who had watched Washington marching to a different drummer from the rest of the world for the past year.

In fact, 1500 was a classic U.N. resolution. It is like a diplomatic inkblot, in that each country can read into it what it wants. It is outstanding in one other respect—it is extremely short, more a haiku than a traditional U.N. epic resolution on Iraq.

Its two main components were the establishment of a U.N. operation, UNAMI, and the "welcome" for the Iraqi Governing Council. The "welcome" was negotiated down from an "endorsement," but was, of course, greeted by the U.S. as a major step forward. Washington was all set to wave it to the Indians, Turks and other waverers as a blue fig leaf to cover any inhibitions their governments may have about sending troops to join the occupation.

And the rest of the world was all set to shake its collective head at the administration's folly in thinking that this slender cover was enough to tempt governments to put their troops in Iraq to guard a hornet's nest while the occupiers stirred up its residents.

In reality, Ambassador Negroponte was certainly singing from a different hymn sheet from most members, who were very clear on the point: Resolution 1500 did not amount to recognition for the Iraqi Governing Council in any legal sense, let alone to legalization of the war, which most of them still considered in breach of the U.N. Charter.

What it did signal was recognition from other members, even those who had opposed the war, that the IGC, despite being an American creation, had the potential to move toward an end to the occupation. The U.N. Assistance Mission in Iraq, which consolidates the world body's diverse operations in the country, also offers a hope, if not exactly a promise, of U.N. involvement in its government. This could only diminish the American role, and so, of course, was welcomed by the French.

So what does it all mean? One cannot help suspecting that Resolution 1500 was the projection into the rest of the world of the internecine battles in Washington, where, although some in the Pentagon want nothing to do with the U.N., they are being leaned upon by the pragmatists who see political, financial and military dangers in a long unilateral occupation, leaking lives, dollars and votes with each passing day. While these pragmatists want troop contributions, however, they do not want any significant multilateral hand on the trigger.

On the U.N. side, Kofi Annan and the Secretariat wanted to rationalize operations in Iraq, and to sort out its financing. If the latter came from the regular budget, then, thanks to American zero growth rules, other programs would have to be reduced to pay for the Iraq operations. Now, thanks to Resolution 1500, UNAMI's financing can transition from oil-for-food funds to peacekeeping funds, which are not subject to such close restrictions.

As the occupation's cost in lives and money continues to grow, it is possible that the impending presidential elections and the Baghdad bombing may persuade the White House to offer more to the U.N. and the international community. Indeed, as this issue went to press, there were strong signs that the U.S. would be making some concessions. Sadly, there were also strong signs that the concessions would be as inadequate as Resolution 1500. Few countries will hazard their troops to maintain an American occupation without a much clearer exit strategy and much more shedding of the occupation's authority to local and international players. Who wants to die for Halliburton?

 

Libya

Also as we went to press, it seemed that, Paris permitting and Washington grudging, the U.N. Security Council may lift the residual suspended sanctions imposed 10 years ago against Libyafor the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, Scotland and a French UTA flight over Africa.

The Security Council suspended the sanctions in 1999, after Libya finally extradited two suspects in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, Abdelbasset al-Megrahi and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, to a Scottish court in The Hague. Megrahi is now serving his sentence in Scotland, but Fhimah was acquitted. The French already had settled separately for around $35 million in compensation.

It had been a serious struggle in 1999 for the British Foreign Office to craft a compromise that both the Americans and Libyans could accept. Even before Guantanamo Bay, there was no way the Libyans would trust American courts and prisons, let alone death rows.

This time, when British and American diplomats got together to discuss the details of the final settlement with the Libyans, it looked like a done deal when it was announced. The Libyans, with a sophistication that belies the occasional eccentricities of President Muammar Qaddafi, had crafted a package that offered incentives for delivery by Washington: a Tripolitan version of light at the end of the tunnel.

Without admitting direct state involvement, Libya offered a letter to the U.N. accepting responsibility, a pledge to cooperate against terrorism, and $2.7 billion in compensation for the families of those killed in the Lockerbie explosion. The money has now been paid into an escrow account at the Bank of International Settlements, but the payments are to be in tranches conditional on various contingencies: firstly, the lifting of the residual suspended U.N. sanctions, then the end of bilateral American sanctions, and the removal of Libya from the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Under pressure from the British and others, Washington was reluctantly going to allow the resolution through, albeit with an abstention rather than a positive vote. It would be difficult to vote against, since Libya's end of the deal, met on Friday, Aug. 15, was a letter which, as the British and American ambassadors wrote, "pledged before the Council to cooperate in the international fight against terrorism and to cooperate with any further requests for information in connection with the Pan Am 103 investigation." This discharged its responsibilities under the resolutions that had originally imposed the sanctions.

The British, warmed by Tripoli's previous cooperation regarding the IRA, were more enthusiastic about the deal. The Americans were unhappy—not least because some of the more vociferous of the survivors' families would not be satisfied with anything less than Qaddafi's head on a platter—so Washington was highly reluctant to actually vote for the resolution. Indeed, the U.S. had pledged that it would not lift bilateral sanctions, either.

And then came those wonderfully accommodating French, who had dropped out of the sanctions game in 1999 with a TotalElfFinal and full settlement for the attack on the UTA airliner over Africa. They had written to the U.N. dissociating themselves from the British and Americans, and saying that they had no opposition to lifting sanctions. Faced, however, with domestic outrage at the 10 million dollars per victim that the U.S. and British have now achieved, in contrast to the $200,000 each that Paris had accepted, they now wanted to change their minds.

Some governments would be embarrassed at opposing sanctions for Libya and Iraq for many years and then trying to chisel a better deal by threatening to veto their lifting on such pecuniary grounds. Not Paris, however.Kofi Annan has called for the French to cooperate, but the French may be prepared to veto this resolution by assuming that the U.S. doesn't really want it to go through, anyway. In the strange world of Washington policymaking, the idea of the French thwarting even an American abstention may be more than the Superpower can bear, and there already were clear signs of anger from Colin Powell, and even Britain's Jack Straw, at France's attempt to hitch a ride on the back of Anglo-Saxon obduracy.

Since the sanctions—which have cost Libya an estimated $30 billion—already have been suspended with Qaddafi's handing over of the Lockerbie suspects, it may be surprising that this is a live issue even for Tripoli. Apart from a quick glance at what happened to Iraq, however, Qaddafi seems to feel the isolation. His most recent prot…g…s, Foday Sankoh of Sierra Leone and Liberia's Charles Taylor, have been dealt with. When, under the African group's rotation principle, it was Libya's turn for a seat on the Security Council, his diplomats were bumped because of the residual sanctions.

Indeed, while the U.S. hedges on whether to abstain or support the vote, the American oil companies whose concessions in Libya have been standing idle for all these years have been lobbying to end the bilateral sanctions. Some people in Washington have also conveniently noticed that Qaddafi's eccentric philosophies are far from fundamentalist. It will be an interesting test of the power of oil—and reason—in the White House.

 

Western Sahara

France also suffered a resounding diplomatic defeat on July 31, when the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1495 right on the deadline for the rollover of the MINURSO peacekeeping operation in Western Sahara. The resolution "supports strongly" the new version of the Baker plan which provides for a Sahrawi-elected autonomous authority to run the territory before the referendum. It squashed Moroccan pretensions as well.

Declared Rabat's ambassador: "We rejected the Baker plan, and are still rejecting it." This was not clever: small countries should think carefully before rejecting plans formulated by someone close to the White House, especially when they have the support of the rest of the world.

Two weeks earlier, the Polisario Front and Algeria had surprised everyone by supporting the new plan. It may even be that they supported the plan precisely because they knew Rabat would oppose it. For weaker states, it is sound diplomatic strategy to maneuver your opponents into defying the U.S.

During the last weeks of July French diplomats had worked hard to avert the resolution, and King Mohammed VI himself called everyone from Tony Blair to George W. Bush. Even French President Jacques Chirac had hit the telephones on behalf of his client. It did not help much, however. The king was upset at the reference to self-determination as a ballot option—which was, of course, self-evidently absurd to most of those he called After all, the whole half-billion dollar, 10-year peace process has been predicated on a vote for or against independence.

In the run up to the Security Council vote, France also had advanced a novel and disturbing new principle: the Security Council cannot impose its decisions on parties if they disagree. Paris claimed there was a tradition of using consensus on Western Sahara—which was a bit like the apocryphal prisoner who had killed his parents and then asked for the court's sympathy because he was an orphan. Any such "tradition" only developed as a rearguard response to constant French attempts to railroad a pro-Moroccan position past the other members in defiance of all previous resolutions!

Having briefly enlisted Bulgaria on its side, theisolated French delegation eventually compromised and accepted some minor concessions from the Americans. Resolution 1495 "supported strongly," the peace plan put forward by James Baker, rather than "endorsing" it, as the original wording had it. Putting a brave face on its defeat, France welcomed the "consensus." The real consensus, however, was a general exasperation with Paris and Rabat.

Polisario's U.N. representative, Ahmed Boukhari, candidly admitted that the new offer "was not paradise: it's a very risky proposal for us," but it was a pragmatic recognition that the cards were stacked. "We are in the weakest position," he acknowledged, "so, of course, they always want us to compromise, regardless of the law."

In fact, their concession may prove a highly rational counterpoint to Moroccan irrationality. Baker famously dismissed the Balkans because the U.S. did "not have a dog in the fight." Increasingly it appears that it may have a puppy with great expectations off the coast of Western Sahara, as oil companies begin prospecting off the Sahrawi coast and the possible problems over title to it come bubbling to the surface.

The difficulties in selling oil from Iraq may have reminded people in Washington of an eventual need to tidy up legal title to Sahrawi energy in the light of last year's legal opinion from U.N. Under Secretary General for Legal Affairs Hans Corell that any exploitation of the resources would be illegal. Morocco's occupation was in defiance of rulings by both the International Court of Justice in The Hague and the Security Council itself, Corell reminded the latter, since no valid act of self-determination has yet to take place.

Whatever the motivations—after all, Baker may just be concerned about the plight of the 180,000 Sahrawi refugees stuck in the desert—in the longer term, it looks as if Polisario and Algeria have scored a significant diplomatic victory by playing along with James Baker's peace proposals. The issue resurfaces in October, by which time Baker will have done more work, the various parties will do more maneuvering, and more Sahrawis will be born and die in the bleak wastes around their Tindouf headquarters.

Ian Williams is a free-lance journalist based at the United Nations.

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