Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, October 2003, page 30

Talking Turkey

 

Turkey's Generals Confront Restrictions at Home and Abroad

 

By Jon Gorvett

These have not been good times for Turkey's generals. Faced with a series of climb downs over the war on Iraq and its aftermath, at home they also face a government in Ankara composed entirely of their long-declared political enemies. Meanwhile, despite—as they see it—having for decades defended European values and pushed for Turkey to join the West, it is now that very Europe which wants to see the military completely out of Turkey's political picture. Perhaps worst of all, however, their most important international ally, the U.S., now may also have turned its back on them.

That, at least, seems to be the perception of many Turkish commentators. There now is open talk of how the Turkish military—instigator of three coups in 40 years, while also behind the 1997 "soft coup" that propelled the current government's previous Islamist incarnation from power—no longer is "getting the green light from Washington."

So says Cengiz Candar, a leading columnist and TV pundit. "In the past," he adds, "the military were always dependent on the U.S. looking the other way. But one of the most interesting things recently has been a definite chilling in relations between the Pentagon and the Turkish military."

This coolness seems to owe its first shiver to the Turkish parliament's failure to ratify on March 1 a resolution that would have allowed U.S. troops to use Turkey as a springboard for the assault on Iraq. Despite the backing of Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan, the motion was unexpectedly voted down by the assembly. Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) faced a major revolt among back benchers against the resolution, which reflected in part the Turkish general public's virtual unanimous hostility toward the war.

At the time, Erdogan's government had been widely blamed for failing to get the resolution through. Yet, while its inexperience and lack of effective lobbying clearly were significant factors, also of major importance was the fact that the military had made no advance statement of support for the resolution. Most commentators agree that, had the General Staff spoken out, the backbench rebellion would have faded out.

Why they didn't speak remains a matter of some debate. Some blame General Staff chief Hilmi Ozkok, who has pursued a more liberal line during his tenure in the military's most senior position. After all, the army can hardly be expected to sort out votes in parliament at a time when the whole country is trying to create the impression to the European Union that it is a civilian, multi-party democracy just like any other.

Clearly, however, that view is not entirely unanimous within the ranks of the General Staff itself. August saw the annual reshuffle among the country's top commanders—a process that follows a set formula, whereby certain commanders automatically move up the ladder while others are pensioned off. The new lineup is then confirmed at a meeting of the Senior Military Council (YAS), which is presided over by the prime minister. This time, though, the usual cordiality between retiring commanders and the government leader was far from evident.

 

There has been "a definite chilling in relations" with the Pentagon.

The leading secularist-nationalist daily umhuriyet reported the following day that at the meeting outgoing 1st Army Commander Gen. Cetin Dogan had accused Erdogan of exploiting the Turkish people's desire to join the EU in order to attack the military. "Those forces that will not permit disruption of Turkey's secular structure will act together," Dogan warned.

The meeting was naturally closed to the press, but Cumhuriyet is well known for its close connections to those within the military who are deeply disturbed by the AKP's pro-Islamist roots, despite the party's avowals that it has long since left these behind. The paper went on to say that Dogan's remarks had met with the approval of the other officers present—except those at command level.

Too, the YAS meeting had come only days after parliament had ratified the seventh EU harmonization package, which had specifically targeted one of the military's most important creations, the National Security Council (MGK). This had been set up following the 1980 coup and, while since reformed, still had the function of a monthly control mechanism for the generals over the government. Both would meet at the MGK under the chair of the president, with the body usually functioning as a de facto council of state.

Under the reforms, it loses all executive functions, plays a purely advisory role, will meet far less frequently and will, after one year, have a civilian secretary.

To what extent Dogan's remarks were his own, or to what extent they represented the real feelings of the officer corps, is open to question. Clearly, the military continues to take a tough line against any hint of Islamist orientation—the YAS meeting also approved the dismissal of 18 officers for alleged pro-Islamist tendencies, despite Erdogan's disapproval. The new generals taking up senior posts around Ozkok are also widely seen to be more hard line—particularly Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, who seems likely to succeed General Ozkok as chief of the General Staff in 2006.

 

Frustration in Iraq

Frustration within the military is also high after recent incidents in northern Iraq, particularly the July 4 incident in Suleymaniye, where 11 Turkish special forces officers were arrested by U.S. troops in a raid on the local headquarters of the Iraqi Turkomen Front (ITF). The incident was widely reported as an insult and affront to Turkish military pride, concealing the fact that the special forces troops had most likely been operating there without the government's knowledge or approval—yet also obscuring the perception among many military watchers that most likely Ozkok, too, had been unaware of what was underway.

Despite the ITF's denial of U.S. allegations that the officers had been helping train and equip its cadres, the suspicion remains. Turkey's military presence in northern Iraq has been slowly receding since the Iraq war, as Washington makes it clear that the U.S. is responsible for security there and sees no role for Turkish forces. If and when the Turkish military finally pulls out, the Turkomens may well be the one remaining avenue for Turkish influence in the region.

That pullout was also made all the more likely by the Turkish parliament passing an amnesty law late July aimed at finally bringing to an end its conflict with the separatist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), now renamed KADEK. A force of PKK/KADEK fighters is in northern Iraq, close to the Iranian border, and the amnesty promises that those not involved in armed attacks will be set free on surrender. Although how this is to be established is not clear, by the end of the first week in August the Turkish authorities were claiming that over 200 former PKK/KADEK fighters had crossed back into Turkey and given themselves up. Most, the authorities reported, had then been set free.

At the same time, however, there has been a sharp increase in armed attacks on military targets in the southeast of the country—the area along the Iraqi border where many of Turkey's Kurds live—with a number of bomb attacks in Istanbul and Ankara also being widely attributed to PKK/KADEK forces opposed to the amnesty, though there have been no official claims of responsibility.

Yet, if the amnesty works as intended, the Turkish military's role in Iraq will be widely curtailed, just as its political role in Turkey also is being restricted. How the generals will react to all this remains the country's biggest question of all.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.

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