Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 2003, pages 8-10

Three Views

 

Whither the Road Map?

 

An Historic Breakthrough?

 

By Paul Findley

Is the world witnessing at long last an historic breakthrough that promises a truly independent Palestinian state and an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict? No one, like myself, who has followed closely the abysmal intensification of this conflict over more than 30 years can jump immediately to an affirmative answer, but the developments of the past few weeks provide a glimmer of hope.

Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the blood-stained warrior who earned the name "Butcher of Beirut" for his complicity in the massacre of hundreds of defenseless Palestinians in 1982 and who just a year ago ordered the brutal rampage of Israeli forces throughout the occupied territories, has now outraged much of his Likud Party faithful by stating that the time has come to accept Palestinian statehood. He has agreed to move forward on President George W. Bush's "road map to peace" in the Middle East.

Sharon is a tough, cagey leader. All of this may be just a sham, a way to buy more time for Israel's steady encroachment on Palestinian territory. Time alone will tell.

At the same time, several factors may have led Sharon to a fundamental change. His world looks a lot different than it did a year ago. So does President Bush's world.

First and foremost, Israel no longer is the military superpower of the Middle East, nor is it apt to resume that pre-eminence in the future. It no longer can claim that it is an indispensable U.S. strategic asset, manning over-the-horizon frontiers for the United States. U.S. forces are now dominant throughout the region, a massive presence that will continue for years. The United States has four military bases within Iraq, and as many in the Caspian Sea region—all close to massive oil reserves.

Second, Sharon is up against a tough, self-confident U.S. president. Bush believes he is destined to rule the world—the first president since Dwight D. Eisenhower to act as if he is undaunted by Israel and its U.S. lobby. The president, if nothing else, has earned a reputation for persistence and success in uphill battles. He has effected regime changes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. Sharon surely wants to avoid one in Israel.

He must know that Bush has Congress firmly in his pocket. He proceeded with the war in Iraq despite strong opposition worldwide, at the United Nations, and at home. In ignoring longstanding principles of international law and in establishing the radical doctrine of pre-emptive war, Bush encountered little opposition from any domestic quarter. In fashioning his "road map" for peace in the Middle East, he triumphed over heavy opposition from U.S. Jewish leaders. Riding high in the opinion polls, the president prepares for almost certain re-election to a second term.

Is Palestinian statehood a goal Bush will pursue with sustained vigor? No other president has done so. In fact, Bush is the first president publicly to state his support for statehood. All others have either publicly opposed it or ducked the question. His father, George H.W. Bush, publicly said on at least one occasion while president that he opposed statehood, but he recently confided to a former congressional colleague that his son "is serious" about bringing about an independent Palestine. If Bush the younger is indeed serious, his leadership will, among other positive developments, dramatically reduce anti-American fervor throughout the worldwide Muslim community.

Perhaps I am dreaming, but I believe it is possible that Sharon sees statehood as inevitable and wants to turn it to his advantage. If so, it makes sense for him to be Bush's partner in that historic achievement. By helping the president follow the roadmap, the prime minister—despite his ugly past—is certain to be honored in the history books as Israel's greatest peacemaker.

Paul Findley is a former Republican congressman from Illinois and author of the recently updated They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront the Israel Lobby; Deliberate Deceptions: Facing the Facts About the U.S.-Israeli Relationship; and Silent No More: Confronting America's False Images of Islam, all available from the AET Book Club.

 

George W. Bush Has Great Expectations, But It May Take a While

 

By Richard H. Curtiss

George W. Bush called his 2000 presidential campaign plane "Great Expectations." He told his passengers, "Please store your expectations securely in your overhead bin, as they may shift during the trip and may fall and hurt someone—especially me." His campaign had a low-key start, Bush said, but he had no intention of turning back.

Three years later President Bush has weathered a recession that just won't quit, the Sept. 11 terrorist attack, and has fought a war with only one serious ally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair. Now he seems prepared to take on the oldest and most puzzling conundrum of all—the Middle East peace process.

One could say that when Bush learned there were probably no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, he had to find a new issue to keep interest piqued. That might not be totally true, however. Tony Blair promised to stick with Bush to the bitter end—so long as he then started to unscramble the real Middle East dilemma.

After three European stops, Bush turned his attention to the Arab-Israeli dispute. He began June 3 with a visit to Sharm el- Sheikh, Egypt, where he conferred with five Arab heads of state: Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Jordan's King Abdullah, King Hamid bin Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain, Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas of the Palestinian Authority, and the host, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

Bush spoke privately, very frankly, and off the record with the five Arab leaders. Not even Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice were in the room. It is noteworthy that the microphones at the frank talks were on, so much of the conversation was heard by everyone. Bush spoke with religious fervor about the necessity of halting the territorial dispute, and the heads of state seemed to share the earnestness of his conclusions.

Bush next met in Aqaba with Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. Sharon and Abbas shook hands for the first and only time. All three leaders offered their versions of the same formulation—"two states living side by side in peace and security." While Bush and Abbas spoke of Israel and Palestine, however, Sharon spoke only of "Israel and a Palestinian state." Sharon also omitted any reference to Israel's "occupation" of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Finally, the president visited King Abdullah in Amman, then went on to Qatar to visit U.S. troops stationed there. Bush had the good sense to skip flying into Iraq, but he did fly over the country.

On the way back to Washington, DC, the president summoned reporters to the front of Air Force One for a 45-minute post-mortem on the talks. "The body language was obvious," he said. "There was not a lot of hostility and opposition." Bush said he was "cautiously optimistic" that he would succeed where other presidents had failed.

On Thursday, June 5—the same day Bush returned to the U.S.—Israeli forces killed two Hamas members. Then a major crisis erupted that Sunday: Palestinians dressed in Israeli army uniforms killed four Israelis and wounded four more. Another Israeli fell in Hebron. Five Palestinians also were lost, and two more were killed in Israel's June 10 assassination attempt against Hamas leader Abdel Aziz Rantisi.

Although Sharon shut down all of Gaza and some of the West Bank, he did not react as intensely and bloodily as usual. Instead, Sharon began dismantling a few minor uninhabited outposts and promised more to come.

The Palestinians, meanwhile, were having a crisis of their own.

Bush unilaterally had decided there would be no dealings with Palestinian President Yasser Arafat. Arafat half-heartedly appointed Abbas Palestinian prime minister. Arafat had differed with the new prime minister, his stalwart supporter, when Abbas said the second intifada was wasting Palestinian youth for no purpose.

Now Mahmoud Abbas ostensibly is in charge, but, wisely, works very closely with his boss, Arafat. However, Palestinians are now saying that Abbas gave up too much when he met with the other leaders at Sharm el-Sheikh.

In an effort to distract attention from their own problems, both the Palestinians and Sharon would like to blame the other for creating dissension—before Bush's initiative can even get under way. Most friends of Palestine, obviously, are hoping things will calm down.

The Palestinians may have made their point by demonstrating that three separate resistance groups—Hamas, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and Fatah—can work together in carrying out a major armed operation. Three other Palestinian groups that may or may not have agreed to work together are Islamic Jihad, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

If the Palestinians decide to work together, but first wait to see what Bush has to offer, then the hard-line Israeli factions, including Sharon's Likud, probably will splinter. In other words, for the next few weeks or even months, everyone will be playing chicken.

Bush, however, has some weapons up his sleeve. Most importantly, the Israelis have run out of money. Bush also realizes that, as long as the Israelis don't get more money, time is on his side. And the Palestinians need money, too. Specifically, they need $75 million—and might succeed in getting it if members of Congress understand the stakes for the peace process. As always, it's a high-stakes game.

Meanwhile, Bush has set up an entire new team of at least 10 people, headed by John S. Wolf, former ambassador to Malaysia and then assistant secretary for non-proliferation. An official credits him as being a "sane voice, very diplomatic, keeps the end goal in mind," and a former Clinton administration official describes Wolf as "a tough guy, a guy who gets things done."

The number of Israeli settlers has increased from 247,000 in 1993 to 380,000 in 2001. Despite the facts on the ground Israel has created, however, Bush and the other road map participants are counting on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict within three years.

Wrote The Washington Post's Glenn Kessler, "The Bush administration's track record on the Middle East for the past 2-1/2 years has been characterized by bold pronouncements followed by retreat."

While the Palestinian press has held out some hope of progress, Israeli commentators have been more enthusiastic. Several hailed the summit meeting as historic for Sharon's endorsement of a Palestinian state.

One Arab leader said he was impressed by Washington's willingness to monitor the actions of Sharon as well as Abbas. "For the first time in a long time Arabs want U.S. policy to succeed," he noted. "You'll find tremendous cooperation from the Arab states on this, because they saw a commitment from President Bush."

Explained Rich Bond, a Republican campaign strategist, "This is a president who loves to be 'misunderestimated'—it is part of his persona." Presidential press spokesman Ari Fleischer, however, injected a note of caution: "The United States cannot do it for them, but the United States can be there to help the various parties come together."

Strangely, the Israelis themselves may realize that time no longer is on their side. But if Sharon or some other like-minded hard-line Israeli wants to keep playing chicken, Bush can make sure there will not be sufficient funds to keep Israel in anything near the style to which it is accustomed.

One perceptible change may be that the Israelis no longer will look to Bush as their salvation and instead will revert to their allegiance to the Democrats. Another possibility is that, with Bush's backing, presidential guru Karl Rove will start his miracle-making. Or, as has happened before, Bush or Rove—or both—may decide the course is too risky.

Let us hope that the president does take the bold step and try to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict now. And let us hope that, despite their perpetual misgivings, the Palestinians decide to gamble once again.

As Bush himself has said: "I am a master of low expectations."

Richard H. Curtiss is executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.

 

A Heretical Thought for Peace

 

By John V. Whitbeck

In early June, the respected Pew Research Center in the United States released the latest of its global opinion surveys, which polled more than 15,000 people in 21 countries in the wake of the invasion and conquest of Iraq. The results attracted considerable attention in the American press.

A primary focus of press reports was the surge of anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world. In traditionally pro-American Jordan, 97 percent of those polled opposed America's "war on terror," while, in NATO member Turkey, 83 percent expressed an unfavorable opinion of the United States. The selection of Osama bin Laden by the publics of five of theeight Muslim countries surveyed (Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan and Palestine) as one of the three political leaders they would most trust to "do the right thing" in world affairs did not go unnoticed.

Less noticed, but no less significant, were the responses to another question.Those polled were asked whether the United States is too supportive of Israel. In 20 of the 21 countries surveyed (notably including Israel),most of those polled said "yes." There is no prize for guessing the one country wheremost said "no."

Israeli support for this proposition, while extremely encouraging, should not come as a complete surprise. Israelis have to live in Israel/Palestine. While their existence since Ariel Sharon provoked the current intifada in September 2000 has not been the living hell experienced by Palestinians, their lives have still become unpleasant, insecure and stressful. Increasingly, the essential realization that occupation and security are mutually exclusive is sinking in.

American supporters of the occupation tend to be Christian fundamentalists concerned about being personally raptured up to heaven after the much-to-be-hoped-for Battle of Armageddon, Jews who feel personally guilty to be living prosperously and comfortably in America rather than having emigrated to Israel/Palestine,or politicians interested only in preserving or furthering their personal careers by not offending the other two groups.

Americans in these three groups, which are fundamental to the formulation of American Middle East policy, do not have to suffer the consequences of the occupation or the resistance to it, and their support forthe occupation rarely reflects any genuine concern for the best interests of Israelis (let alone Palestininians). Their militant "pro-Israel" activism is purely self-centered and selfish in its motivation. It is also the primary obstacle to peace.

Those Israelis who feel that America is too supportive of Israel presumably can see that America's involvementsince 1967 has not advanced the cause of peace but, rather, has blocked it, with Washington's periodic pretenses of peacemaking simply providing an "only game in town" cover behind which the occupation could be perpetuated, deepened and made more nearly irreversible. They presumably wish, for their own sakes, that America would "reform." (Perhaps the U.S. needs a prime minister.)

Now—a heretical thought. Virtually all governments and commentators agree, at least in their public pronouncements, that deeper engagement by the United States is essential if Israeli-Palestinian peace is ever to be achieved. Wrong. The best hope for peace would be total American disengagement—and the sooner the better.

Imagine that the U.S. government were to announce that it was washing its hands of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—that it would no longer give any military, economic or diplomatic aid or support to either side, and that it would not use its veto to block any U.N. Security Council resolution with respect to Israel/Palestine, even one imposing sanctions on either or both of the parties to the conflict. Having never been an "honest broker," the United States would at least become an honest bystander.

Israeli politicians and American Christian fundamentalists would, of course, be appalled. However, if the Pew poll is to be believed, many Israelis would be relieved—and finally see light at the end of the tunnel. With the the U.S. out of the picture, the occupation would become, and be recognized to be, unsustainable. The great boulder blocking the road to peace would have rolled itself out of the way, and the road to peace (not to be confused with the "road map") could finally be open for travel.

As a hugely beneficial side-effect, U.S. disengagement would vastly—and quickly—diminish anti-American rage throughout the Muslim world and the consequent threat of further "terrorist" attacks on Americans and American interests. There no longer would be any need to continue the series of wars against Israel's (hence America's) enemies. American civil liberties could be restored, and hundreds of billions of dollars could be redirected in constructive ways that would actually enhance the quality of life of Americans. America might even become respected out of admiration, as it once was, rather than simply out of fear, as is now the case.

A dream?When, perhaps quite soon, the "road map" reaches the dead-end which its own terms appear designed to ensure (hopefully without first producing the Palestinian civil war which appears to be its primary, if undeclared, objective), what will be the better alternative?

John V. Whitbeck is an international lawyer who writes frequently on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

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