Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 2003, pages 18-19

United Nations Report

 

While Not Legitimizing Invasion of Iraq, Security Council OKs the Results

 

By Ian Williams

In the end, U.N. Resolution 1483 arrived with amazingly little sound and fury—but signifying a lot, nevertheless. In effect, the Security Council legalized the results of an invasion that most of its members considered illegal—without legalizing the invasion itself. The resolution lifts sanctions and allows Washington to spend the oil revenue, which is what the White House wanted. Although recent events have demonstrated little U.S. concern for actual legality, it did come as a shock to President George W. Bush—unaccustomed as he is to treating the U.N. seriously—that no one would buy Iraq's oil until the Security Council said it was legal to do so.

By lifting the sanctions and allowing the oil revenues to be spent by the occupying forces, the Security Council has, in practice, recognized that the U.S. has stolen Iraq fair and square, and can do with it what it wants. All it took was a bit of stroking for the French and Russians to roll over like poodles being tickled on the belly—as, in fact, did most of the other Council members.

Only Syria absented itself from the vote, leaving the usual puzzlement about whether it was moral clarity or confused thinking behind the decision. The later announcement, following a cabinet meeting in Damascus, that Syria wanted retroactively to add its positive vote made the latter appear the more likely.

As Kofi Annan commented some years ago on dealing with Iraq, diplomacy backed by the credible threat of force goes a long way. And, as Teddy Roosevelt said, speaking softly and carrying a big stick can help as well. Washington's diplomatic victory with Resolution 1483 showed the applicability of both principles.

In looking at developments preceding decisions such as these, the sound of silence can be tremendously significant. And for unprecedented weeks, there was a noticeable lack of the habitual rabid barking at the French, Germans, Russians and the U.N. from the usual vitriolic suspects around the Pentagon. In fact, if Bush had had the good sense to keep them muzzled all along, he would have had his war resolutions as well. This time, however, there was a clear practical aim: the oil money.

The very amiability of the American approach should have alerted the Security Council members that they were buying snake oil by the gallon even before they all put their hands up for the resolution on Thursday, May 22.

This time, armed with the tactful and presumably tactical silence of their administration colleagues, all that Secretary of State Colin Powell and U.N. Ambassador John Negroponte had to do was listen carefully to the concerns of a somewhat chastened France and Russia and add to the original draft some 90 verbal euphemistic reformulations of the same hard-line content they had presented in the first place. Instead of the overtly unswerving approach that was threatened, the resolution went through many drafts, and words and clauses were added and subtracted to keep the parties happy.

Ironically, one of the last of the many absolutely cosmetic concessions the French wrung from the Americans was the change of the word "collaborating," to "working together" to describe the relationship of the United Nations special representative with the occupiers. Collaboration, the French ambassador pointed out, has some pretty nasty connotations in French. But so it does in English, as well, and even though the title had been upgraded from special coordinator, wags around the U.N. wondered whether "special collaborator" was not in fact the more accurate job description.

Secretary-General Annan has in fact appointed to the position Sergio Vieira de Mello, the U.N.'s High Commissioner for Human Rights, who will undertake the task for four months. The good news is that Vieira de Mellois an unusually strong minded individual, by U.N. standards, and achieved some success in East Timor under unpromising circumstances. The bad news is that Washington lobbied hard for him. It remains to be seen how big a U.N. role he can stretch out of the toe-hold the resolution gives him.

There were other concessions—all on the decorative rather than the substantive side. The French had asked for a sunset clause ending the resolution in a year. Instead the U.S. conceded that the Security Council would review it in 12 months. The resolution stands, however, unless amended or rescinded by a subsequent one—which, of course, the Americans can always veto.

The Russians had insisted that the U.N. weapons inspectors declare Iraq disarmed before the lifting of sanctions, as all previous resolutions had provided—at American insistence—during the inspections era. But Moscow was satisfied with a promise in the resolution to review the functions of UNMOVIC and the IAEA. The fact that the latter was mentioned at all was, in the category of small victories—the only size on offer—something of a straw to grasp at.

The byplay over the inspectors is highly revealing of the motivations and the powers involved. The British very much would like to see the U.N. inspectors back. London realizes that the refusal to admit them makes nonsense of its entire legal case for the war—and, in the decreasingly likely case that any WMD will be found, no one will believe it unless the U.N. is involved.

Sadly, on a personal grudge level, the Pentagon has never forgiven Hans Blix for being right about the weapons in Iraq, and so it seems that the U.S. will not consider allowing UNMOVIC in until after Blix's retirement in June. On the other hand, the Americans are prepared to let the IAEA in immediately, because they are worried about what might have gone missing from the Iraqi nuclear plants, and only the IAEA can tell them.

However, the message not only is that the Pentagon is petty, but that it is powerful: enough to override Washington's British allies, not to mention to ignore common sense.

One area in which common sense did prevail was the extension of the U.N.'s oil-for-food program by six months rather than the proposed four. There is considerable doubt about whether the Occupation Authority is in a position to feed the vast majority of Iraqis dependent on the U.N. for food supply. Even there, the resolution sponsors—the U.S., UK and, for the record, Spain—did not make allowances for the semi-autonomous deal the Kurdish provinces had with the U.N.

The price for these concessions was heavy, however: U.S. control of Iraqi oil revenues. The program immediately hands over a billion dollars in walking around money to the Iraq Development Fund, whose spending is at the complete discretion of the occupiers, known as "The Authority." The money, of course, must be spent on the welfare of the Iraqi people—but, in practice, that will be determined by the U.S.

While the fund will be monitored by an allegedly independent board to include representatives from the U.N., the IMF, the World Bank and the Arab Fund for Development, Resolution 1483 does not specify how many additional representatives the Authority can appoint.In any case, the fund—and any subsequent Iraqi government—still will have to pay 5 percent of oil revenues for reparations to Kuwaiti and other claimants from the first Gulf war.

The resolution welcomes the willingness of other states to provide troops, thus giving a U.N. fig leaf to coalition members who want to ingratiate themselves further with the White House by sending troops, without becoming occupying powers themselves. It also gives a green light for the host of U.N. agencies to work with the occupiers, thus relieving them of some of their burden of responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions.

And, once again, there is the deafening sound of silence. While the resolution calls for the apprehension of all Iraqi leaders against whom crimes are alleged, it does not mention any international involvement in any judicial process for any Iraqi leaders accused of crimes.

So is there any up side? Up to a point. The U.S. was forced to come back to the U.N. because it could not sell Iraqi oil, and because even alleged coalition countries wanted a U.N. resolution before they would join in the occupation. Washington had to admit that it was, in fact, an occupying power.For many apprehensive Council members, the fact that the U.S. returned to the U.N. at all was at least a partial repair in the fabric of international law rent asunder by the unilateral invasion. By ignoring the illegality of the invasion, Council members hope that it at least will not be a precedent for anyone else.

 

Western Sahara Facing Sell Out—Again

The growing Franco-American rapprochement is likely to become an overheated lovefest over the next few months. Whatever their views on the Iraq war, last summer the two countries, along with the U.K., united in trying to force James Baker's pro-Moroccan peace plan on the Western Sahara.

Ironically, the Security Council's half-hearted wranglings over Resolution 1483 allowed it to delay the scheduled May 19 presentation of the secretary-general's Western Sahara report, which should have contained Baker's report. As it was, on May 30 the Council passed Resolution 1485, which renews for another two months the mandate of MINURSO, the U.N. mission in the territory, while giving Council members time to wrestle with the details of Baker's new, "fifth" alternative plan.

Coincidentally, the week before was the 30th anniversary of the establishment of Polisario, marking the beginning of the Western Saharan struggle for the rights to which the U.N. says they are entitled.

Adding to the flurry of activity, Kofi Annan has appointed the U.N.'s special representative for theWestern Sahara, American diplomat William Lacy Swing, as head of the U.N. mission in the Congo. At the same time, a Norwegian shareholder has divested itself of American oil company Kerr-McGee because of the latter's exploration contracts with the Moroccan government in the occupied territory. Last year, the U.N. undersecretary-general for legal affairs, Hans Corell, ruled that any exploitation of oil or gas without the consent of the people of Western Sahara would be illegal.

Although presented as a "fifth option," Baker's latest plan seems to be a warmed-up version of the old one—five years of alleged autonomy, followed by a referendum in which all the Moroccan settlers will be entitled to vote. Rabat objected because the new plan includes some tougher monitoring of its behavior under autonomy, which it worries may be real, and because the referendum question will include the option of independence.

Indeed, Baker is suggesting three questions for the ballot—annexation, autonomy or independence—with a run-off process if none achieves an absolute majority. Possibly the biggest problem for the Moroccans is that, while the final referendum will allow the settlers to vote, the interim autonomous authority will be elected from and by the Saharwis themselves, in ballots conducted by the United Nations. Although MINURSO often collaborated with the Moroccans, this prospect nevertheless worries Rabat.

For its part, Polisario worries that, despite previous U.N. and World Court decisions, the proposed autonomy would entail recognition of Rabat's authority, and that the Moroccans will abuse the powers they are granted. It is an entirely reasonable fear. And letting the settlers vote, of course, is more than a little like asking burglars to help determine the disposition of the property they have stolen.

Instead, Polisario has offered to let the U.N. decide on its own the 130,000 appeals from the Moroccan settlers Rabat has put forward as voters, in return for a Chapter VII enforcement by the Security Council of the referendum and its results.

Annan's report rejects this on the somewhat disingenuous grounds that, last time, the Security Council declined to choose any of the four options proposed by Baker "because both parties would not consent or agree to one of them." In fact, the pro-Moroccan countries on the Security Council very likely would agree to a Chapter VII enforcement of their proposal against Polisario, but other members so far have fought it off—even though they themselves do not have the strength to propose or deliver enforcement against a Morocco backed by three permanent members, even if, under international law, they would be entitled to.

Annan is quite right, however, in concluding that, "After more than 11 years and an amount of assessed contributions close to 500 million dollars, it should be acknowledged that the Security Council is not going to solve the problem of Western Sahara without asking that one or the other, or both, of the parties do something they are not otherwise prepared to do."

The question, as Humpty Dumpty put it, is "who is to be master?" And if the French and Americans do indeed unite, the Security Council is much more likely to force Baker's solution on the Saharwis than to enforce its own decisions for a referendum on Morocco.

Ian Williams is a free-lance journalist based at the United Nations.

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