Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 2003, pages 30, 82

Talking Turkey

 

As EU Membership Beckons, Turkey's Military Faces Difficult Choice

 

By Jon Gorvett

When a respected columnist for Cumhurriyet, one of Turkey's oldest and most established secular papers, announces that "young officers" within the military are increasingly uncomfortable with the actions of the government, this can hardly be taken lightly. When the country's top general then refutes this the following day—but by saying it's not only the "young officers," but everyone else in uniform, who is feeling uncomfortable—it might be time for many actually to start packing.

Yet while May saw both comments being made, and widely publicized, in a country that has experienced three successful military coups since World War II, rumors that the tanks once again might be about to roll seem this time to be largely exaggerated.

Turkey isn't the country it was in 1980, the last time the army left its barracks. Nor is it the country it was in 1997, when the military managed a 'soft coup,' maneuvering the government out of office largely with the threat of what might happen if the then pro-Islamist-led coalition didn't quit.

Nowadays, the extreme violence and instability of 1980—when gunbattles on the streets between right and left were fairly regular occurrences—are long gone. Likewise, not only is the current government of Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan not as pro-Islamist as that of 1997—equally important, it is not a coalition. Elected last November with a landslide vote, it has a huge majority in parliament.

It also is pursuing a reform program that, despite many criticisms, is broadly in line with the one urged on Ankara by both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). And while IMF programs have come and gone with disturbing frequency in Turkey over the past few decades, the EU reform program does seem to indicate something different. Part of an ongoing process, the government is now weighing up its sixth EU harmonization package, with the objective of bringing the country's laws even closer to those in place in Europe.

This process, in fact, has long acted as a kind of anchor for Turkey. The pursuit of EU membership has been one of the few things on which almost every section of Turkish society—from Islamists to nationalists, civilians to military—can agree.

Yet, as the events of May demonstrate, agreeing in principle is one thing, while agreeing on the fine details may be quite another.

The latest harmonization process involves a number of issues on which the military, in particular, is highly sensitive. First, it would widen the scope for Kurdish-language education. For many years, the language of Turkey's 12 million or so ethnic Kurds was officially banned. In many areas, it was even dangerous to speak it in public. These restrictions have gradually waned, however, with many films now being shown in Kurdish and publications tolerated, if not actively promoted.

As part of the harmonization package, however, the Kurdish language will have to be far more than tolerated—it may even have to be allowed as a medium of educational instruction. This makes many Turkish nationalists—and military chiefs—wince. Chief of the General Staff Hilmi Ozkok warned at a May 27 press conference that "separatist" forces—meaning Kurdish nationalists—should not try to use EU harmonization as a smoke screen for breaking up the country. It was at this same event that he also said the military was deeply uneasy about the way in which the government was making new appointments.

This was a reference to allegations that the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) had been giving government jobs to people dismissed from the military for holding pro-Islamist views. Ozkok's remarks also represented a more threatening variation on a theme being pushed since late March by both the military and the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), that the AKP is guilty of cronyism in state appointments.

Prime Minister Erdogan hit back against these allegations June 2, when he told reporters that the charges had arisen "because we have put a stick into the bee hive and threatened other interests."

The dangers of Islamism remained a theme on the military's lips, though, and much of the secular press picked up on another item in the harmonization package—this one concerning places of worship.

The package allows individuals or groups to consecrate churches, mosques, synagogues or other temples within the basements of residential apartment blocks, provided the local authorities grant permission. While this apparently is in line with EU legislation, it is another alarm bell for the secularists. Currently, all Turkey's mosques ultimately are under government control. The Department of Religious Affairs, known as the Diyanet, writes the sermons that are read out at Friday prayers, and hires and fires the imams. The fear is that this decentralization could lead to many "unofficial" mosques being set up to disseminate radical Islamist views.

The EU harmonization package also further undermines the role of the military in Turkey's political life by proposing amendments to the nature of the National Security Council (MGK). This body was introduced by the coup leaders in 1983—after they had handed some powers back to the civilians—as a way of guaranteeing the military's continued involvement at the very highest level of state affairs. Under the chairmanship of the president, the MGK brings military and government leaders together.

At its May 28 meeting, the EU harmonization package was on the agenda. Six hours later, the meeting broke up, with a statement saying there would be no deviation from the package already agreed to by the government.

Later the same day, however, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Sahin announced to the press that the next MGK meeting, scheduled for June, also would be discussing the EU harmonization package.

"It is very natural for the MGK to discuss the EU process on a separate agenda," he insisted. "This shows that all the institutions of the state are supporting the EU process."

Yet few observers were convinced. It was widely pointed out that a discussion of the package at the June MGK meeting would mean missing the end-of-May deadline for agreeing to the package, and would also jeopardize a late June deadline for approving a new Turkey-EU partnership document. It was rumored that the military had put its foot down, and that the EU package would have to be renegotiated between civilians and generals at the June MGK meeting.

All of which would be in line with previous Turkish political practice. Yet, as Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul himself pointed out at the end of May, "One of the most important symbols of the EU is civil government and we shouldn't cast any shadows over Turkey's civil government style…The idea that permission [for the EU harmonization package] will come from the MGK'... is wrong."

Therein lies the rub, as far as the military's efforts, and those who would like to see them act, are concerned. The stakes are much clearer now than they were in 1997. If the country wants EU membership—a goal which currently seems more of a possibility than at any other time—then it will have to abandon, one way or another, previous political—and military—practice. While the generals may grumble, they will have to put up if they truly are serious about Turkey's European future. Many Turks—and not just supporters of the government—are hoping they will do so.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.

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