Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, July/August 2003, pages 31, 53

The Subcontinent

 

After Pressure From Washington, Clouds of War Recede Over South Asia

 

By M.M. Ali

Thanks to Washington's repeated counsel and advice, the prospect of another war that had hung over India-Pakistan relations in recent months apparently has receded. This followed Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's May 2 public announcement that he would like to normalize relations with Pakistan. Islamabad responded favorably to India's gesture. These goodwill statements by the two neighboring nuclear rivals almost coincided with U.S. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage's visit to the subcontinent.

Based on what has emerged publicly and on speculations about behind-the-scene developments, it is obvious that Washington does enjoy considerable leverage both in New Delhi and Islamabad. In fact, it appears that the Bush administration has a "road map" for South Asia as well as for Israel and Palestine. At any rate, a blueprint is being examined.

The second truth that has emerged is that peace in the subcontinent largely depends on India. Recent events, including the massing of troops on Pakistan's borders and the near-severance of diplomatic relations, coupled with bellicose utterances from Indian leaders, testify to the fact that India can turn the switch on and off at will. Taking full advantage of America's post-9/11 priorities, India misses no opportunity to describe Pakistan as "the epicenter" of international terrorism.

Post-Taliban and post-Saddam developments are redrawing political lines in the entire area. Although Islamabad has joined the effort to combat terrorism, it finds itself in a peculiar dilemma. With its predominantly Muslim population, the country is part of the Islamic bloc. Religious extremism is widespread: until recently many Pakistanis adorned their living room walls with photographs of Osama bin Laden and even of Saddam Hussain, and in the last election Islamic groups for the first time scored very well, especially in the areas bordering Afghanistan. Unused to opposition, let alone defiance, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf now must deal with the NWFP state, which recently passed shariah law, in contradiction to the secular law governing the rest of the country.

Pakistan inherited much of this belligerency and religious militancy from its 1980s alliance with the United States in driving the Soviet Union from Afghanistan—after which Washington walked away, leaving a devastated and strife-torn Afghanistan to fend for itself. The demise of the Taliban regime also has had an impact on Pakistan.

In addition to these internal and external difficulties, Musharraf also must contend with a much larger, and unfriendly, neighbor, India. Kashmir, a Muslim majority state, remains the primary bone of contention.

Despite the fact that Washington—having forgiven India for siding with the U.S.S.R. during the Cold War years—has now opened up its military and economic assistance programs and encouraged corporate America to invest in India; that France is selling it Mirage fighter jets; that Japan is providing economic deals; and that the U.K is willing to support its candidacy for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, New Delhi continues to reject third-party mediation on the Kashmir dispute. This refusal of such third-party involvement—or of anything other than behind-the-scenes facilitation—attests to India's unjustified occupation of over half of Kashmiri territory.

The Vajpayee government is well aware that, given its size and geopolitical location vis-š-vis China, the United States—and, indeed, the entire Western bloc—can ill afford to antagonize it. Moreover, it is playing its cards very well by cozying up to Israel. New Delhi and Tel Aviv have been collaborating on several trade and military fronts—a relationship which has received Washington's public endorsement. The May 23 Washington Post quoted State Department spokesperson Julie Resides as saying: "I can confirm that the U.S. government did inform the governments of Israel and India that we have no objection to the Israeli transfer of the Phalcon airborne early warning system to India."

The spokesperson further disclosed that Israel's proposed sale to India of another advanced military system—the largely U.S.-funded Arrow anti-ballistic missile system—remains under review.

Seizing on current American susceptibilities and fears, India has tried to portray the militancy in Kashmir as no more than an insurgency exported from Pakistan. Delhi not only rejects third-party negotiations with Pakistan, it insists that any talks must be preceded by an end to "infiltration" from across the Line of Control (LoC) into Kashmir.

Apparently at U.S. insistence, however, diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan are being normalized, and air travel and bus service restrictions have been lifted. This is to be followed by bilateral talks on weightier issues. Significantly, during a visit to Germany, Prime Minister Vajpayee stated on May 28 that he would attempt to resolve the Kashmir dispute "for the last time." This is the first time an Indian prime minister has acknowledged on European soil that Kashmir remains a disputed land in need of resolution. By "last time," he may have been referring to his own advanced age and poor health, and acknowledging that Hindu hard-liners like L.K. Advani are likely to succeed him. Perhaps he foresees as well a weaker coalition government unable to make bold decisions. On the other hand, he may envision an army-backed successor, like Pakistan's Musharraf, who will be able to reach a compromise. Returning home from his European tour, however, Vajpayee finds himself back to square one on Kashmir.

 

Kashmir Scenarios

Several alternatives to holding a U.N.-prescribed plebiscite have been discussed in the past. These include allowing India to retain Jammu and Ladakh, with Azad Kashmir remaining part of Pakistan and the Valley made independent. Another proposal is for India to grant greater autonomy to the area it now holds, so that Kashmiri Muslims can run their own affairs in a loose federation arrangement, with the LoC becoming an easily accessed, internationally monitored boundary. It is quite possible that the blueprint of a road map currently being considered in Washington may follow such lines. Whatever the configurations may be, however, the thinking of the concerned parties will have to be in line with that of the reformulated New World Order.

½nfortunately, as Sri Lankan writer Arundhati Roy has observed, "India under the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] is heading to be a Hindu fascist state," victimizing the Muslim minority along the way. Thus, while India and Pakistan may achieve a short-term peace on orders from Washington, a lasting solution will have to await a sustained external political nudging and be backed by internal willingness on both sides. Religious extremism on either side will not help. As it is, current Indian peace efforts are being attributed to one individual alone—aging Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

Peace in the subcontinent no longer is merely a South Asian imperative. It must be achieved within the context of the recent, radical political changes that have occurred in the larger region. In this evolving and confusing scenario, Pakistan's nuclear capability, as well as India's, have become very vulnerable. Any attempt to apply the doctrine of pre-emption to disturb the status quo could result in devastating consequences reaching far beyond the subcontinent.

Musharraf undoubedly will discuss his domestic and regional concerns at the June 24 Camp David meeting with President George W. Bush. The results of the recent visit of the U.S. and UK by India's powerful Deputy Prime Minister Lal Krishna Advani also will be instructive. As history has shown, however, the luxury of almost unchallenged power ultimately depends on the dictates of domestic politics. In today's fast-shrinking world, U.S policy on the subcontinent will be driven largely by its impact on the 2004 presidential elections.

 

Afghanistan

The Taliban have been wiped out and al- Qaeda destroyed—or at least whatever remains of it is in disarray. Peace, however, has not returned to Afghanistan. For all intents and purposes, interim President Hamid Karzai's authority is limited to Kabul. Tribal lords large and small alike continue to run their fiefdoms at will—administering their areas as they deem fit, maintaining their own militias, collecting revenue and dispensing their own brand of justice. Even in Kabul, Abdur Rasheed Dostum, an Uzbek leader in the north of the capital who has been part of every government for the past 20 years—including the communist regime—is a member of Karzai's government as well, and requires reining in.

President Karzai has managed to secure a U.S.-brokered agreement with the tribal chiefs and regional governors stating that the central government's authority will not be undermined and that all taxes and other revenues will be sent to Kabul. Unfortunately, Karzai operates with a limited force at his command and "rules" over a battered populace with divided loyalties. To date, reconstruction and resettlement efforts are minimal at best and internal law and order have yet to be achieved. Sadly, this is the second time in recent years that a regime change in Kabul has been followed by strife and uncertainty in the country.

Prof. M. M. Ali is a specialist on South Asia based in the Washington, DC area and a consultant with the United Nations Development Program.

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