WRMEA Archives 2000-2005 - 2003 June

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, June 2003, pages 8, 55

Special Report

 

Bush Administration Unfolds Israeli-Palestinian "Road Map"

 

By Nathan Jones

The idea of a "road map" for Israeli-Palestinian peace was not entirely an invention of President George W. Bush, but was in fact his response to a request by Jordan's King Abdullah in a White House conversation. After their official talk, according to another person in the room, King Abdullah said, "What we need is a road map." Bush then turned to Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East William Burns and said, "He wants a road map. Can we give him a road map?"

The need for quick action on Mideast peace was especially important to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, because of the British public's unhappiness with Bush and Blair's insistence on going to war with Iraq. Bush promised Blair that as soon as the invasion was over, the U.S. president would turn his attention to Israeli-Palestinian peace without further delay. The Bush administration repeatedly postponed the road map's presentation, however, finally setting as its condition the confirmation of a new Palestinian prime minister and cabinet.

That time has now come, but it is not yet clear how much of his own personal political capital Bush is willing to invest in the "road map." The road map was unveiled in a written declaration by an official White House spokesman—not, as is more common, in a televised Rose Garden announcement by the president himself.

As has been the case for much of his administration, Bush's Middle East advisers clearly are divided in their advice. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has suggested extending the war on Iraq right on into open confrontation with Syria. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, wanted to move quickly on the "road map" agenda before pursuing the new temptations of Rumsfeld, who perhaps was being egged on by Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz.

It is clear, however, that it is now Powell's time for the spotlight—and, whether they like it or not, the rest of the Bush team has fallen in line. This was made clear by National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice, who said bluntly that there would be opportunities for comments on the road map, but that it was not a matter of renegotiation.

The first phase of the seven-page, three-phase road map calls for Palestinians to dismantle terrorist organizations, confiscate illegal weapons and "arrest, disrupt, and restrain individuals and groups conducting and planning violent attacks on Israelis anywhere." In turn, the Israelis are expected simultaneously to stop attacks against Palestinian civilians, stop demolishing Palestinian homes, and "immediately dismantle" the over 70 Jewish settlement "outposts" built in the West Bank and Gaza since March 2001.

As the road map was unfurled, the initial differences between what Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wants and what the Palestinians want became clear. Sharon says the Palestinians must halt their attacks prior to, not simultaneously with, an Israeli withdrawal. This scenario is completely at variance with what is called for by the "Quartet" nations—the U.S., the European Union, Russia and the United Nations. According to the text of the road map, "in each phase, the parties are expected to perform their obligations in parallel, unless otherwise indicated."

Whether this first impediment will be allowed to stand depends on at what point Bush wants to intervene. This will be crucial to the unfolding of the later stages. Will the Quartet insist on working together as planned, or will Sharon begin changing the fine print even before the plan is enacted? The Palestinians' position is clear, according to Palestinian Foreign Minister Nabil Shaath: "There can be no talk about preconditions."

The urgency is apparent: the road map calls for the creation of "an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty" by December 2003. Its final goal is the founding of a "sovereign, independent, democratic and viable Palestine" by 2005. The first phase is supposed to last about six months, to be followed by another six-month phase in which a Palestinian state "with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty" is to be created. Then, in a third, two-year phase, the parties are supposed to resolve all their remaining disagreements.

Even if the road map continues on schedule, its final implementation will have to take place after the 2004 U.S. presidential elections. This means that the Israelis will have a last chance to delay the road map based on a possible change from a Republican to a Democratic administration in Washington. It is particularly important, therefore, that, given the vagaries of current events, Bush adhere to the schedule regardless of Sharon's distractions.

One thing is clear: it appears that Yasser Arafat and Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) are not going to let personal rivalries impede a solution to the Palestine problem. Arafat clearly is working hand-in-glove with Abu Mazen, which is appropriate, since the two have worked together over many productive years without serious rivalry of any kind. This is because Arafat has always been the public face of the PLO, while Abu Mazen has been the man who takes care of the details.

The one clear difference between the two has been their takes on whether to halt the current two-and-a-half-year-old intifada. Abu Mazen argues that the fighting has led Palestinians down a blind alley, with scores of Palestinian youth dying in vain. Apparently, Arafat has yielded to Abu Mazen in this regard.

If Bush continues on his present course of action, the Israeli government probably will split apart very quickly. Some of its members do not agree with the road map at all, and that will likely require new Israeli elections within a year at the latest.

This kind of delay will be very difficult for the Arab states, which are nearly all of one mind in moving forward as rapidly as possible. It will be clear, however, that Bush is keeping his promise to Blair, regardless of what the dissident members of the Bush administration may have to say. When Powell visits Israel for the second time in May, he is expected to press the Palestinians to disarm militant groups, and also to persuade the Israelis to ease the hardships of Palestinians living under military occupation.

In order for the road map to work, Bush will have to put pressure on Israel. That, however, runs counter to his own instincts and domestic political considerations. Bush's core supporters do not want to "beat up" on Israel as an election approaches. According to Richard Land, a usual Bush ally and head of the policy arm of the Southern Baptist Convention, it would be a "real problem" if it appeared that Bush was pressuring Israel.

On the other hand, Jerome Segal, president of the Jewish Peace Lobby, released a letter in late April signed by 100 rabbis encouraging the Bush administration to go even further and put forward a concrete peace proposal. Noted Palestinian negotiator Nabil Shaath, "It all depends on the United States—the will of the United States."

As always, in fact, it is a matter of the United States on one side and the Israel lobby on the other. If Washington refuses to budge on giving more money to Israel until the problem is resolved, it will be solved. If not, it will be just another case of broken promises to the Palestinians and many more years of "Middle East turmoil."

Nathan Jones is a free-lance writer specializing in Israeli and North American Jewish affairs.