Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November 2002, pages 8, 10

United Nations Report

 

Bush’s U.N. Speech Deemed Effective—Except by Bush

 

By Ian Williams

At this year’s opening of the General Assembly, there were two eloquent speeches in favor of multilateralism. The differences between them, however, became apparent within days. Kofi Annan meant what he said. As soon as Saddam Hussain agreed to allow in the inspectors, the U.S. president began acting like a kid whose ball had been confiscated, and again began to talk of unilateral action.

Annan’s speech was, in U.N. terms, very strong in its implied reprimand for unilateral positions, such as those until recently espoused by civilians Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and their cabal.

“I stand before you as a multilateralist—by precedent, by principle, by Charter and by duty,” said the U.N. secretary-general—and, by implication, admonished the U.S. “Every government that is committed to the rule of law at home, must also be committed to the rule of law abroad,” he said. Beyond issues of self-defense, he added, “when states decide to use force to deal with broader threats to international peace and security, there is no substitute for the unique legitimacy provided by the United Nations.”

Also addressed to the U.S. was the secretary-general’s placing of significant threats needing the world body’s attention. First was Israel and Palestine, where Annan called for an international peace conference and “on parallel on all fronts.”

On Iraq, Annan was tough in a way that was music to Washington’s ears: “If Iraq’s defiance continues, the Security Council must face its responsibilities.” He called for more help for the government there, and for attention to the nuclear danger between India and Pakistan.

Hardly a voice in the Assembly was raised in defense of Iraq itself, and most speakers were so relieved at President George W. Bush’s “Road to Baghdad” conversion to multilateralism and the United Nations that they applauded fervently. One U.N. official suggested that many delegates were relieved that the case would be resolved through due process rather than the international equivalent of a lynch mob.

Most diplomats had been so appalled at the damage posed to international law and order by Washington’s threatened unilateral action that they almost welcomed an attempt to achieve the same objective by multilateral means. It would appear that Colin Powell and the State Department, backed by major allies like Britain, had persuaded Bush that the U.N. was the way to go. Indeed, the contrast with the administration’s positions of a week or so earlier was so strong that when this writer asked a senior British official who was responsible for the brain transplant, he replied, “We’ve been working hard on it.”

Iraq’s best friend, Russia, while not endorsing military action, was far from opposing it too strenuously. “Security Council resolutions are binding,” Moscow’s ambassador stated. “Should Iraq refuse to cooperate with the Security Council, the Iraqi leadership will have to assume responsibility for all possible consequences.”

Even Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa was welcoming Washington’s involvement of the U.N., and joined a chorus of Arab governments calling upon Iraq to admit the inspectors.

It all seemed a far cry from the previous week, when the first inkling of the switch to the U.N. track was the withdrawal of Defense Secretary Rumsfeld’s op-ed for The Washington Post. Where before Bush was facing protests from most U.S. allies—except, of course, Israel—about the unilateral approach, his bravura performance at the U.N. General Assembly won the day with previously skeptical envoys.

Separately and collectively the president and Powell followed up with meetings with other Security Council members—and seemed to be succeeding. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov warned Iraq that should it “refuse to cooperate with the Security Council, the Iraqi leadership will have to assume responsibility for all possible consequences”—which Baghdad should read as “you’re on your own on this one.” Not only was Moscow envisioning oil contracts with a post-Saddam regime, but almost certainly was preparing to horse trade for a free hand to go after Chechen separatists in Georgia.

Equally, in a cynical move almost certainly designed as a sop to Beijing and protested by some human rights groups, Washington designated as a terrorist group a little-known Muslim separatist group in Eastern Turkestan. As a result, the Chinese were likely at most to abstain and the Russians may even have supported the resolution, leaving Syria as the lone nay on the Council.

There is no doubt that, taken on its own, the president’s speech was an effective indictment. It dwelt upon Iraq’s recidivist defiance of U.N. resolutions and the need to bring about compliance. The defiance of the U.N. resolutions is a clear-cut case, most observers felt. One U.N. official remarked, however, that the alleged links to terrorism were a bit like the LA Police Department’s treatment of O.J. Simpson, “trying to frame a guilty man. The case against Iraq is strong—but the U.S. does not have the best moral ground to make it.”

In fact those sections of the president’s speech were clearly aimed at a domestic American audience, where it seems gloomily predictable that the merest mention of “terrorism” disarms whatever critical faculties lawmakers have.

Even so, there were some surprises. As a token of the administration’s new U.N.-friendly look, President Bush announced that the U.S. would be rejoining UNESCO, which Ronald Reagan had quit almost 20 years ago at the beginning of the Republican hate affair with the United Nations system.

Significantly, in the concentration on Iraq, there were some concessions to other parts of the “Axis of Evil”—a phrase not heard once in his speech. Bush cited Iraq’s 1980 aggression against Iran as an example of the nature of the Baghdad regime, and mentioned Iraq’s hosting of groups committing terrorism against Iran.

Bush did not mention, of course, the West’s role in supporting Iraq against Iran in that act of aggression, but then neither did he recall the U.S. refusal to join the League of Nations when contrasting the authority of the U.N. Security Council with that earlier body.

Reinforcing his previous commitment to a Palestinian state—although not mentioning its size—the president told the General Assembly that “America stands committed to an independent and democratic Palestine living side by side with Israel in peace and security. Like all other people, Palestinians deserve a government that serves their interests and listens to their voices. My nation will continue to encourage all parties to step up to their responsibilities as we seek a just and comprehensive settlement to the conflict.”

And there’s the rub. As Palestine Ambassador Nasser El Kidwa points out, there are 28 resolutions explicitly on the Palestine issue—and another 27 that have been vetoed—all of which have been defied by Israel. Only this summer, Israel denied entry to “inspectors,” the Security Council-mandated inquiry team they had initially invited into Jenin.

And that is one of the reasons why the president’s triumphal moment was so short-lived. The following week two things happened. One was a meeting of the Quartet—the U.S., Russia, the EU and the U.N.—which is supposed to get an international peace conference on the road to a final settlement of the Israel-Palestine issue. All the other parties to the meeting, including the invited Arab envoys, came away angry and frustrated at American indifference to the issue. Many were hoping that—even if only out of enlightened self-interest in consolidating regional support against Iraq—Washington would move on the issue. Instead the Americans stonewalled and slowed down the EU’s proposed timetable.

In addition, when Iraqi Foreign Minister Nabil Sabri handed over his letter “unconditionally” accepting the U.N. inspectors, President Bush, instead of claiming victory for his tough stand, immediately dropped his expedient and momentary multilateralism and tried to move the goal posts. It was a very short-sighted move, since previous experience suggests that, had Bush been patient, within a few weeks the Iraqi regime would have been back to its old tricks of hampering and harassing the inspectors.

At the press conference announcing the Quartet, therefore, Kofi Annan was reduced to acting as referee between Powell and Ivanov, sparring on the issue of whether or not a new resolution is needed. To emphasize the one-sidedness, Washington made no effective effort to restrain Ariel Sharon when he attacked Ramallah the same week.

In the end there almost certainly will be a new Security Council resolution, threatening Iraq with unspecified but major mayhem if the inspectors are in any way impeded. This is not as needlessly belligerent as it sounds. There is some truth in what British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said: “Iraq will only respond properly if it is written on their eyeballs what the consequences are.” If the U.S. president is threatening the consequences regardless of the response, however, it is hardly designed to secure cooperation.

In fact, Straw, Blair, Annan, and many others have been warning President Bush of the consequences of neglecting a peace settlement in the Middle East, and are disturbed at the exclusive focus on Iraq. By treating Saddam Hussain in isolation, Washington is weakening its case with the rest of the world—and certainly weakening the prospects of military cooperation in the region. It is also increasing the prospects of dire fallout for American friends in the region who have to explain why Sharon is rewarded and Saddam punished for equivalent behavior.

Ian Williams is a free-lance journalist based at the United Nations.

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