Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November 2002, page 31

Affairs of State

 

A Not-So-Diplomatic Exchange…

 

By Eugene Bird

Despite disclaimers from Secretary of State Colin Powell that there was “no daylight” between him and the Department of Defense, it was obvious that there had been—and that it will continue to widen as the countdown toward a U.S. attack on Iraq begins. In the weeks leading up to President George W. Bush’s successful speech at the United Nations Sept. 12, the largely behind-the-scenes struggle between the administration’s hawks and its advocates of international law was evident in leaks and plausible denials by sources close to both Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.

The secretary of state won only the first round, important as it was, to get the president to commit to a Security Council debate. Congress, however, already seems more than willing to vote for a limited preventive war to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussain.

Nor was U.S. policy on Iraq the only source of internecine conflict between the Departments of Defense and State. The Pentagon supporters of Israel First, Last and Always called an August meeting designed to embarrass Secretary of State Powell in his quest for coalition partners in the war on terrorism. That, at least, was the insider interpretation of the very confidential briefing called by Defense Policy Review Board head Richard Perle. At the briefing Laurent Murawiec, a (now former) analyst at the semi-official Rand Corporation, urged the U.S. to target Saudi Arabia after having its way with Iraq, citing the Kingdom’s supposed failure to fight terrorism (see Sept./Oct. Washington Report, p. 15).

The next day, of course, The Washington Post ran a full story about the very “confidential” briefing. An appalled Powell immediately picked up the phone at 9 a.m. and called Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal. The secretary of state informed his counterpart that the Defense Policy Review Board had been briefed by a private citizen, and that the White House and State Department had never discussed moving against Saudi Arabia’s oil fields.

Two can play the same game, however. Shortly after the Defense Policy Council briefing the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) suddenly went half-public with its own two-day conference of its own civilian specialists and academics on the subject of anti-Americanism.

Secretary Powell has been cautioning all year on the consequences of letting anti-U.S. sentiment grow without considering both why it exists and what to do about it. Some 30 experts, academics and think tank personalities from at least 10 countries met Sept. 5 and 6 at the Wye Plantation in Maryland to address the issue—not only as it is manifested in the Middle East, but in Asia, Latin America and Africa as well.

There have been no leaks—so far, at least—from the State Department conference. It is known, however, that the international experts sounded a common theme: that Washington must consult more with the rest of the world and take other countries’ concerns into account. The 30-odd State Department officers who attended the two-day gathering participated very little, leaving the discussion to the experts.

The Department’s use of outside experts in an obvious effort to influence the debate over Iraq and other foreign policy issues raises an interesting thought: Perhaps it would have been beneficial if the Pentagon’s hawkish cabal—including Richard Perle and his closest cohorts—had attended the Wye River briefing on anti-Americanism rather than contemplating invading Saudi Arabia. That might at least make for some interesting advice to the president!

Eugene Bird, a retired foreign service officer, is president of the Council for the National Interest and diplomatic correspondent for the Washington Report.

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A Blank Check—But to Whom?

“Do you have a view of the U.S. Constitution that says that Congress is just supposed to be a rubber stamp, sign the blank check and you guys fill in the world ‘Perle’ or ‘Powell’ and the dollar sign and take the check to the bank?” That was the question posed to Secretary of State Colin Powell by Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) of the House International Relations Committee.

Powell responded by saying that the president had consulted Congress and would “take it into account,” but also recognizes “that he has his own authority as president of the United States.”

The secretary of state testified before the House committee Sept. 18, the same day the president sent Congress a draft resolution granting him authorization to use whatever force he deems necessary to topple the Baghdad regime and bring it into conformity with U.N. resolutions. Richard Perle of the Defense Policy Review Board had testified before the committee earlier in the day.

The secretary of state undoubtedly was upset by Sherman’s question—suggesting as it did a vastly different scenario depending on whether Powell or Perle were in charge of the war with Iraq. This is now expected to go forward sometime early next year, as the military is signaling it would not be ready before February.

Powell submitted an unusually long six-page opening statement detailing Iraq’s violations. Except for its use of diplomatically softer language, his arguments were the same as those advanced by the Pentagon’s “chickenhawks.” Powell expressed hard-core support for the president and his determination to topple Saddam Hussain once and for all.

Most or all of the 42 committee members were present during various parts of Powell’s testimony. The secretary of state received high praise from the committee’s pro-Israel members, including its four Jewish congressmen, among them Tom Lantos (D-CA) and Benjamin Gilman (R-NY). More than half a dozen members, however, including Indiana Republican Brian Kerns, expressed strong reservations—even after hearing both Perle and Powell in one day.

Confronting Powell particularly harshly were the committee’s three African-American members—especially Cynthia McKinney (D-GA), who lost her bid for re-election in her mid-August primary contest.

The secretary responded to every question by citing Saddam Hussain’s many violations of U.N. resolutions and the threat to American interests and troops if he were to remain in power any longer. The critical questions were variations on a basis theme: Why now? Why not wait as we did with the Soviet Union, when we lived for half a century with the Soviet nuclear threat?

The administration may be giving priority to Baghdad in part because the president and the Likudniks in Washington believe there is more political benefit in tackling Saddam Hussain than in either chasing Osama bin Laden or facing up to the terrible chaos in Palestine created by continued Israeli intrusions into cities and continued punishing of the civilian population—not to mention Yasser Arafat. (Arnaud de Borchgrave, the very conservative columnist and correspondent who had just returned from Afghanistan, said the night before Powell testified, “All of this is being pushed only by the Likudniks in Washington.”)

The importance to Bush of having the strong support of the popular secretary of state cannot be overestimated. Powell is not a Likudnik. It is almost certain that Congress will approve a resolution similar to the president’s draft. What is not yet clear is what impact Colin Powell’s continued talks with the Quartet might have in bringing about a Security Council resolution that might complicate any unilateral U.S. action. Much of how the scenario plays out will depend on Powell.

Not surprisingly, the secretary of state ceded not an inch to the critics. He had an answer for everything—except Why not wait?—E.B.

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