Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2002, pages 20-21, 25

Two Views

 

Arab Summit Offers Israel Peace

As Arab Leaders in Beirut Adopt Peace, Israel Unleashes All-Out War on Palestinians

By Samaa Abu Sharar

The Saudi peace initiative adopted at the Arab Summit in Beirut was buried only hours after seeing the light. Israel’s response to the Saudi plan, approved at the Arab gathering on March 27 and 28 as the Arab Peace Initiative, was a re-invasion of most Palestinian cities in the West Bank and Gaza. Although it may appear that the unanimously adopted plan came a bit too late, the truth is that such a plan is the last thing Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wants. Rather than acknowledge it, he chose instead to send in his army and place the entire population, along with its leader, Yasser Arafat, under siege.

The 14th Arab Summit convened under a cloud of strong U.S. pressure on the one hand and significant differences among the various Arab states on the other. Absent from the gathering were 12 of the 22 Arab leaders, including such key players as Palestinian President Arafat, Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak and Jordan’s King Abdullah. The rulers of Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Iraq, Libya and Mauritania also were not in attendance.

Apart from Arafat, who was prevented from leaving Ramallah by the Israeli government, the reason for the absence of several other Arab leaders remained ambiguous. Mubarak reportedly stayed away to show support for the Palestinian leader, for example, while King Abdullah was said to be sick with the flu following his Latin American tour.

Many observers believe, however, that the Egyptian president and Jordanian king were pressured not to attend by Washington. According to this scenario, the Bush administration thereby hoped to undermine decisions adopted at the summit, and to avoid possible pressure on the only two Arab countries to have signed a peace treaty with Israel (Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994) to break ties with the Jewish state in response to the dramatic events taking place in the occupied territories.

Sources at the summit said pre-conference negotiations had failed to convince Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad to drop his call for Arab countries to sever relations with Israel, a stand he emphasized in his speech at the conference.

Some, on the other hand, believe Mubarak and Abdullah were embarrassed to attend, since their strong ties with the U.S. had failed to ensure the safe departure and return of Yasser Arafat to Ramallah.

Given the absence of so many Arab leaders, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon exerted every effort to make the summit a success. A serious diplomatic error on the part of the conference’s presidency, however, threatened to end the two-day gathering on the day it convened.

After Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, president of the summit, blocked Yasser Arafat’s scheduled televised speech from Ramallah, the Palestinian delegation stormed out of the conference in protest. Palestinian Authority (PA) Foreign Minister Farouk Al Kaddoumi accused Lahoud of deliberately having blocked the Palestinian leader’s speech. Lebanese officials, however, claimed they feared Israeli penetration into the satellite transmission during Arafat’s speech.

As a result, many felt Ariel Sharon had scored twice—first by preventing Arafat from leaving Ramallah, and second when Arafat’s speech failed to reach the world. Although he was unable to address the Arab summit, Arafat later did address the Arab nation via the Qatari satellite network, Al Jazeera.

Following the walkout, and amid rumors of a Saudi and Emirati withdrawal as well, several Arab delegations engaged in intensive negotiations to ensure the Palestinian contingent’s return to the summit. Since, after all, the summit had been convened to adopt the Saudi plan for ending the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, many observers felt the Palestinian departure would have undermined the resolution adopted at the high-level gathering.

After boycotting the evening session, however, the PA delegation agreed to return the next day, “so as not to jeopardize the summit,” according to Nabil Sha’ath, Palestinian minister of planning.

In clear contrast to the opening day’s mood, Arab leaders seemed much more cheerful during the summit’s closing session. With the Palestinian quandary out of the way, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah, author of the peace initiative, and Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim found time to embrace, to cheers from the crowd.

The gesture signified a breakthrough in relations between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, on the one hand, and Iraq on the other following Saddam Hussain’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

The reconciliation was no piece of cake, however. After long hours of negotiations, Iraq pledged in writing not to invade its neighbor Kuwait again. Additionally, both countries agreed to cooperate with the Red Crescent over missing persons from both sides.

Many observers believe Baghdad agreed to these two points, which it had rejected in previous summits, in a bid to secure full Arab support against a U.S. strike on Iraq. In this it succeeded, with the summit adopting a statement that any U.S. assault on Iraq would be considered an attack on all Arab countries.

Despite the unified stance on this issue, however, many political analysts saw the adoption of the Saudi peace plan as the summit’s crowning achievement. The unanimous declaration was the result of months of pre-summit consultations. Strongly backed by Syria, Lebanon took a firm stand on the issue of the right of return of Palestinian refugees, initially unaddressed in Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal.

Lebanon, which hosts around 380,000 Sunni Muslim Palestinian refugees, fears that allowing the refugees to settle permanently in the country would destabilize its fragile demographic structure. Thus, a clause was added affirming the “rejection of all forms of Palestinian settlement that conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.”

Another triumph of the Beirut declaration was the emphasis on a clear distinction between terrorism and resistance. This served to reiterate the Arab position that groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Brigades are resistance movements rather than terrorist groups, as they have been labeled by the U.S. The move was interpreted by many observers as a challenge to Washington.

The upbeat tone with which Arab leaders spoke after the summit quickly faded, however, following Israel’s invasion of Ramallah and other Palestinian cities.

Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al Faisal warned in a post-summit press conference that Israeli rejection of the Arab peace plan would push the region into more turmoil, and called on Israel to gamble on peace after gambling on war for the past 50 years.

Nonetheless, despite the fact that Arab leaders had few alternatives to offer should Israel’s prime minister reject the Arab plan, Ariel Sharon once again chose to gamble on war. Many in the region, in fact, believe Arab leaders have been unfortunate in their timing—choosing war over peace in time of peace, and peace over war in time of war.

Nor, they note—with the U.S. waging its open battle on terrorism and Israel claiming to follow suit in its aggression against the Palestinians—is there any better time for war than now. Millions of Arabs wonder if, following Israel’s rejection of their leaders’ historic overture, they will be content to remain handcuffed.

Samaa Abu Sharar is a free-lance journalist based in Beirut.

 

Arab League Summit Peace Offering Spurned by Israel and U.S.—What Next?

By Richard H. Curtiss

The Arab League summit meeting held in Beirut, Lebanon March 27-28 was buried in the news as a result of Ariel Sharon’s descent into savagery with his horrendous assault on Palestinians. Nevertheless, the summit was an extraordinary development, and will go down as one of the turning points of Middle East history.

The fact that all 22 members of the Arab League agreed to back the Saudi peace initiative without reservation was an historical landmark. For anyone who has followed Arab summit meetings, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s mastery was nothing short of a miracle. Even more astonishing was the manner in which the summit attendees dealt with other problems. The long-standing dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, which goes back to the Ottoman empire, has been solved, with Iraqi President Saddam Hussain and the rulers of Kuwait having adjudicated their differences and signed a treaty.

The peace initiative’s main points were resolved by the end of the second day, with the Arab League agreeing that, in return for rolling back to the 1967 lines, the League would recognize Israel with no reservations. Time and again, Crown Prince Abdullah reassured the doubters: In return for complete Israeli withdrawal there would be no ifs, ands or buts. In effect, if both sides agree, the Arab-Israeli wars that began in 1948 are over.

The crown prince’s moves were quite extraordinary. Instead of embarking on a long, drawn-out negotiation, conceding one point at a time, Prince Abdullah cut to the chase and opened with his final offer: recognizing the existence of Israel in return for the birth of a Palestinian state. This was relatively simple, because all that was needed was to take the 1967 borders and make them permanent. In short, the niggling over aquifers, rivers or water rights became details which, in the absence of goodwill or other problems, could be adjudicated by an honest broker agreeable to both sides and guaranteed by the entire international community.

Although there will of course be other details to work out, both the Palestinians and the Israelis can adapt if the settlement is generous. The “right of return,” long the sticking point, can be finessed. At this point tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees, particularly in Lebanon and Syria, will have the chance to resettle in other countries if they so choose. In fact, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians already have left to find new opportunities. Palestinian communities as far away as Chile and Canada may prefer to remain there if given generous settlements.

And what about the details that have proved to be stumbling blocks before? Clearly the holy places sacrosanct to Jews, Christians and Muslims can be dealt with. Again, if necessary, impartial arbitrators can be called upon.

Libyan leader Muammer Qaddafi signed on to Prince Abdullah’s plan without demurrer, presumably in the common interest. Nor are these obligations to be taken lightly: the summit decision has the force of law for all participants.

In short, Crown Prince Abdullah has done all the work for the Arab participants. It is now up to the Israeli government to reciprocate. Israeli governments, however, whether Labor or Likud, historically have been unwilling to give back almost anything they have taken by force.

There are, of course, exceptions. In 1956 U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower forced the Israelis to relinquish the Sinai—but they took it back again in 1967. Israel finally agreed to give up its claims to the peninsula in return for ironclad guarantees from the United States.

While Israelis should be jubilant at the opportunity finally to make a lasting peace with all the Arab states, it is not going to be as easy as it sounds.

Although the Israeli government makes it impossible to ascertain how many of its citizens actually have left, Israelis have been quietly departing Israel in huge numbers. In addition to Americans who have returned to the U.S., many others who took Israeli citizenship now are returning to such unlikely countries as Germany, France, and England, as well as to South America. Unless a peace agreement finally is signed, it is unlikely that any of these emigrants will return to Israel.

American friends of Israel, meanwhile, are doing their best to create new diversions. These include such highly placed Bush administration officials as Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Chairman of the Pentagon’s Advisory Defense Policy Board Richard Perle, and Douglas J. Feith, under secretary of defense for policy.

In an almost frantic move to ignore the raging fire in Palestine, Vice President Richard Cheney was sent off on a fool’s errand. All 11 countries visited by the vice president were forewarned—and all said the same thing. First, deal with the Palestine problem and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s attempt to subjugate the Palestinians. Only then deal with the dispute between the U.S. and Iraq.

Cheney returned chastened. Wolfowitz, Perle, and Feith’s “war lobby” then propounded the fatuous theory that Arab leaders spoke differently about Iraq in private than in their public speeches. Even Cheney had to concede that this was a falsehood.

The contest for the soul of George W. Bush apparently still is being waged. The president’s instinct is to keep giving Sharon “one more chance.” But the “butcher of Beirut” knows only force, and has nothing else to offer Bush. Wrote Alan Sipress in The Washington Post, “Bush officials have shown every sign of being daunted by this challenge.” For example, on March 13 Bush publicly rebuked Sharon. Three days later, however, he reversed course and again blamed Yasser Arafat instead of Sharon.

At some point Bush must turn away from the violence and toward serious negotiations. Thanks to Crown Prince Abdullah’s initiative, moreover, never before has this been so simple to do. Unfortunately, however, President Bush has an almost irrational fear of the Israel lobby. His father’s attempt to try to blunt the lobby’s impact brought the 41st president only grief.

Nor is his son immune from fear of the religious right, with its electronic preachers such as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson. Their message is Armageddon, and that there is no hope for all but the “chosen” few who follow their teachings. In fact, George W. Bush fears these members of the religious right even more than he fears the Israel lobby and its astonishing ability to raise money. Right now, for instance, thousands of dollars are being spent on television and newspaper ads condemning Palestinian violence and expressing concern for Israelis who fear going out to eat. For the informed, the message makes little sense. But the Israel lobby hopes to repeat it so incessantly that it will turn fiction into truth.

On the other side, Vice President Richard Cheney apparently has misgivings about Chairman Arafat, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld seems to be at least a passive ally of the Israel lobby. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, while a 100 percent Bush loyalist, appears to have little initiative to speak up on her own.

Even though veteran State Department officials with vast experience must have deep misgivings over the reckless and heedless Sharon policies, it is hard to find out what the State Department loyalists are saying in private.

This leaves the star of the Bush administration, Secretary of State Colin Powell, putting forth a confusing message. Powell did precisely the right thing, for example, when every member of the U.N. Security Council called on Sharon to stop the bloodshed and withdraw from the occupied territory. Most Americans who follow events carefully thought Powell finally had spoken up. Almost immediately, however, Powell called upon Yasser Arafat to try harder for peace. By that time, however, Arafat was sitting in intermittent darkness with shells falling just yards away.

It is unclear how long President Bush can continue in his state of indecision. This writer believes that, having done three-quarters of the work to bring about a just solution to the Middle East problem, there still may be work to do.

It may be necessary for Arab League members to continue their efforts, and even to institute an effective and carefully targeted boycott. For example, Saudi Arabia already has told Washington that the Kingdom’s air base at al Kharj cannot be used for any U.S. offensive against Saddam Hussain. If this is not enough to get Bush’s attention, Saudi Arabia and its other Arab League allies may have to threaten to close down all U.S. military bases in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Oman.

The Bush administration then would find itself virtually blinded and unable to do anything about it. By such drastic means the Arabs can force Bush to pay attention. By such self-defeating measures as closing bases, however, everyone loses.

America’s loss, however, will be more painful than the Arabs’. It is a sad fact that the Bush administration, and before that the Clinton administration, have refused to bite the bullet. How simple it would be to cut off aid to Israel entirely until it gives back the lands it stole and accepts Prince Abdullah’s offer to make peace.

Richard H. Curtiss is the executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs.

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