Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, May 2002, pages 54, 73

Talking Turkey

 

U.S.-Turkey “Strategic Relationship” Not All Good News for Ankara

By Jon Gorvett

When former President Bill Clinton swung by an earthquake-struck Istanbul at the end of 1999 to attend the summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, he famously declared that the U.S. and Turkey shared a “strategic partnership.” While this statement was broadly welcomed at the time, Turks since have had a closer look at both the ups and downs of such a relationship. Recently, both the highs and lows have come in quick succession—both, as it happens, largely as a result of the U.S.-led “war on terror.”

First the ups. Many commentators and politicians—along with much of the street coffeehouse and corner store—had no hesitation in ascribing the International Monetary Fund’s unexpected generosity in handing Turkey US$12 billion in loans back in February to Turkey’s “strategic partnership” with the U.S. After Sept. 11, Ankara had provided invaluable support, both diplomatically and militarily, for U.S. operations in Afghanistan.

The money was particularly welcome in a country which has seen over 1.5 million people lose their jobs since the February 2001 financial meltdown. The IMF cash also might have cushioned some of the blow of the revelation at the end of March this year that the economy had suffered even worse than expected from this economic catastrophe. The overall contraction in Turkey’s economic activity in 2001 was an average 9.4 percent. More worryingly, the recession deepened as the year went on, with GNP shrinking by 12.3 percent on the year during the last three months of 2001. Per capita income, meanwhile, dropped over the 12 months by some 27.2 percent—to U.S. $2,160. Although this figure needs to be taken with a high margin of error, given the size of the unregistered economy (perhaps as much as 50 percent of economic activity), nonetheless there can be little doubt that a major loss has been incurred.

Absent the large IMF loans, these results easily might have produced an Argentina-like meltdown—hardly something Washington and its allies would like to see in a friendly NATO country bordering Iraq and Iran, and with NATO airbases available for use in Afghanistan. How useful—or how much of an albatross—those loans prove to be in the longer term remains to be seen, but for now they do appear to be keeping the wolf from the door.

Now the downs. The war in Afghanistan has never been popular with ordinary Turks, nor with large numbers of parliamentarians. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit found himself courted by U.S. and British officials early on in the conflict urging Ankara to assume a high-profile role. As a pro-Western Muslim country with a secular system of government, Turkey in many respects is what much of the West would like the whole Muslim world to look like.

The country also has something of a soft spot for Central Asian adventures, with the rightist National Action Party (MHP), the second largest group in the ruling three-party coalition government, known for its sympathies with the ideology of “turanism.” Put simply, this belief holds that Turkic peoples across Central Asia, and even, in its more extreme form, into Western China, should all be united under one state—that state usually being Turkey. Having a higher profile in Central Asia thus has long been something of a dream for the nationalists.

When Kabul fell and the call went out for contingents to constitute a peacekeeping force, therefore, Turkey was one of the most vociferous hand wavers at the back of the hall, volunteering to help out.

As the old saying goes, however, be careful what you wish for. While a small contingent of 267 Turkish troops did fly in to join UK, German, French, Dutch and Italian troops in the 4,500-strong Kabul-based International Security and Aid Force (ISAF), it soon seemed in Ankara as if Turkey’s original offer to take command of the force might be a little precipitate.

ISAF had been charged with providing security for a six-month period after the collapse of the Taliban, during which time the interim Afghan government of Hamid Karzai, with the ISAF’s help, was supposed to train its own army and police force. From its inception ISAF had been under British command, but the mandate for UK leadership expired in April.

Initially, taking over command looked like a largely administrative procedure, and Ankara had been quick to volunteer. As the Afghan war showed no sign of being securely over by mid-March, however—with the U.S. and Northern Alliance‘s major Operation Anaconda offensive under way, and reports of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters still launching attacks on allied forces—not to mention the often fatal crowd trouble in Kabul itself—the prospect for Turkish involvement began to look less rosy.

Perhaps too, someone in Ankara did some financial number crunching and realized that sending the 1,000-odd extra troops required for ISAF headquarters would not be cheap. There were the additional questions of where air support would come from, and what ISAF’s mandate actually was. Was it there to keep the peace in Kabul only, or over the whole country? And how long would the other national contingents remain?

Turkey’s politicians and generals began to get a little edgy—and its columnists got downright panicky. The suspicion was widespread that Turkey was about to be handed control of a live grenade with the pin removed. Editorialized the pro-Islamist daily Yeni Safak, “the Westerners are now trying to escape from Afghanistan, which has been totally wrecked by the bombardment of the U.S. and its allies.”

“Turkey has some conditions and demands before taking on this task [control of ISAF],” Prime Minister Ecevit told reporters in early March. “The security organization [ISAF] is in Kabul for the time being,” he continued, “but this is not enough. Security should be maintained throughout the whole of Afghanistan.”

“We are also looking for an answer to the question of what NATO’s future role will be in Afghanistan,” Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem added a few days later—a good question, as ISAF itself seemed to be lacking any U.S. personnel. Those on the scene also seemed to be saying that training an Afghan army and police force would not be a short-term task, but might take years.

Turkey’s doubts met with a rapid response from British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who called Ecevit several times to press for Turkey to commit itself to take charge. British and French envoys, meanwhile, were dispatched to Ankara to try and allay Turkish fears. These efforts were to little avail, however, until the U.S. itself weighed in with a series of negotiations lasting over a week. Commentators speculated that while Ankara’s demands for funding to pay for its ISAF role would be fairly easily arranged, defining the exact parameters of ISAF’s role and future would not be so easy—perhaps because these had not been fully agreed among London, Washington and Paris either.

Finally, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney flew in. While this was a scheduled part of his Europe and Middle Eastern tour, it was also an opportune moment for some hard bargaining. Ultimately, Turkey agreed to take control—although an official statement did say that this depended on a successful resolution of “several outstanding issues.” These were not believed to be major.

Significantly, Cheney spent most of his time negotiating not with Prime Minister Ecevit, but with Chief of the General Staff General Kivrikoglu. There was widespread speculation that these discussions also had focused on possible Turkish participation in a future war against Iraq.

Which leaves many here feeling that Turkey may have to pay more than just financial interest on those generous IMF loans.

Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.

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