Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, March 2002, page 47

The Subcontinent

 

India-Pakistan Relations Take Downward Turn Following Dec. 13 Attack in New Delhi

 

By M.M. Ali

The uncertainties and modern-day irrelevance found in most of the Muslim world can be better understood when studied in their historical framework. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire may be attributed to the rise of Great Britain as an industrial and maritime power and the Ottomans’ inability to hold on to the vast empire they had built.

Following World War I, the Muslim bloc that existed at the beginning of the 20th century broke into bits and pieces, with kings and potentates foisted by imperial England on each segment of the new Muslim world—killing all prospects of democracy. The discovery of oil in several Muslim countries strengthened the hold of “royal families” there.

The next phase saw Muslim countries lose out to the West on the technology front. This further added to the entrenchment of monarchies and fiefdoms in many parts of the Islamic world. With minority governments in power, the region’s people lost faith in their leadership and gradually increased their reliance on religion. The current religiosity in the Islamic world largely can be attributed to this disillusionment with temporal institutions and individuals.

A similar pattern developed in South Asia as well. While India managed to develop democratic institutions only to usher in Hindu religious extremism (no different in its bigotry than other groups), Pakistan harmed its prospects for democracy through mismanagement, resulting in the hardening of religious sentiment in that country. This is the dilemma facing President Pervez Musharraf today. He has been called upon to rein in extremism in Pakistan and lead the country on a moderate path. An unfriendly India and the endemic Kashmir dispute make his task difficult. Nor is the stake limited to the region, as the nuclear subcontinent poses a threat to the entire world.

Accusing Islamabad of engineering the attack in New Delhi on the Indian parliament Dec. 13, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee massed his troops on his country’s border with Pakistan—despite the fact that no evidence has been produced to back India’s accusation. A cursory examination of the incident in Delhi shows that the reported attack by four or five armed men did not amount to much more than a skirmish in the gardens outside of the parliament house. The identities of the attackers, who were killed, also are not known.

Indeed, under the present circumstances—with a major U.S. military engagement under way in Afghanistan, right on Pakistan’s border—it makes no sense for Musharraf to provoke a crisis of this nature. This is hardly the time for Islamabad to divert its attention to another front. On the other hand, it is an ideal time for India to draw Islamabad into a military engagement, diverting it’s rival’s resources away from its commitment as a coalition partner with the U.S. and Britain. In addition, such a massing of troops and issuing of threats to Pakistan serves to boost the prospects of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party in February’s crucial Uttar Pradesh elections, since such a stance plays very well with India’s Hindu extremists.

Prior to the Dec. 13 incident Islamabad already had been attempting to decrease the influence of right-wing religious groups inside Pakistan. India’s massing of troops on the borders provided Musharraf an excuse to clamp down on organizations like the Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, the two outfits already declared sponsors of terrorism by Washington and which New Delhi accuses of being behind the attack on its parliament. It is absolutely impossible, however, for Musharraf to hand over their leaders to India.

In a nationally and internationally televised speech Jan. 21, the Pakistani president banned five militant Islamic organizations, including the two named above, ordered a crackdown on madrassas, the religious schools where many Taliban were trained and which have proliferated throughout Pakistan, and said the country would not tolerate groups that “carry out terrorism under the pretext of the Kashmir issue.”

Musharraf warned India, however, that “the armed troops of Pakistan are fully deployed and ready to face any challenge to the last drop of their blood.”

Vajpayee seems unaware of the risks involved in such a gambit. The whole affair potentially could escalate into a major conflagration between the subcontinent’s two nuclear powers. It suits much larger India to engage in a conventional warfare. On the other hand, a conventional war does not suit Pakistan. According to Western estimates, a nuclear war between India and Pakistan likely would kill close to three million people.

It was proper, then, for Washington and London to ask the two countries to reduce tensions. The crisis underlines the vulnerability of peace in the subcontinent, and demonstrates that the region can be rocked with instability in an instant. A small incident, of any nature, can spark off a major disaster if not handled with special care.

The developments of the past three months undoubtedly have affected the chances for an equitable resolution of the Kashmir dispute that has been the bone of contention between India and Pakistan for over 50 years. It was natural, therefore, for Musharraf not only to keep his armies on alert but to safeguard the interests of the Kashmiris as well. Understandably, Pakistan is placing its hopes on the United States to bring about a just resolution of the dispute.

Islamabad also must protect itself from any future Indian adventurism. As it is, India’s decision to deny use of its airspace to Pakistan’s airlines has caused severe strain on the already devastated Pakistani economy. And Delhi’s decision to downsize its diplomatic relations with Islamabad has resulted in considerable strain between the two countries.

India’s size does give it an advantage, as the West covets its millions of potential consumers. There is speculation as well that Washington would like to build up India in coming years as a counterbalance to China. Further, India is being put forth as a possible new permanent member of the U.N. Security Council—as long as it continues to play along with the West’s policies. Indeed, during his recent visit to India, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres voiced support for such an eventuality. The Jewish state undoubtedly would rest more easily knowing it had another veto-producing ally on the Security Council, in the unlikely event the U.S. should falter in that regard.

These are very high-stakes games that are likely to alter the politics of the entire Asian continent. Smaller countries like Pakistan that are allied with the U.S. will have to find ways of ensuring their own security without compromising their economic and political interests.

 

Afghanistan’s Crises

As of this writing, Taliban leader Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden continue to elude capture. Rumors abound that they have been killed by U.S. bombardment, escaped from Afghanistan, or are still in hiding somewhere in the country. Any of these scenarios may be true. Many al-Qaeda members have been killed in the Tora Bora caves, and more than 100 fighters captured by the coalition forces currently are imprisoned at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo, Cuba. It is clear that the U.S. is determined to cleanse Afghanistan of all terrorist elements. Consequently, its work is likely to continue for a while to come.

Kabul’s interim government headed by Hamid Karzai has the onerous responsibility of moving the country toward real peace. Afghanistan already has suffered for almost 20 years, reeling from one military engagement to another. The United Nations and World Bank have estimated that post-Taliban Afghanistan will need $1.7 billion in reconstruction funds in its first year alone. As a start, at a Jan. 21 meeting in Tokyo, the European Union, U.S., Japan, and Saudi Arabia pledged over $1 billion in donations.

Nor is there much Karzai’s administration can do on its own politically. It needs the full support of the U.S.-led coalition and an international peace keeping force in order to put Afghanistan on a steady course. Even with that support it may take months, if not years, before such a course is achieved, particularly in view of the internecine divisions and tribal rivalries that have divided Afghanistan throughout its history. Neighboring countries like Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan must be involved in formulating real peace in the region.

It is a tall order, but American will, patience and resources are likely to achieve such a long-range objective. Unless it is predicated on the resolution of the Kashmir dispute in the best interests of the Kashmiris, however, regional peace in South Asia will remain an unattainable dream.

Prof. M.M. Ali is a Washington, DC-based specialist on South Asia and a consultant for the United Nations Development Program.

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