Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, January/February 2002, page 24

Special Report

 

Post-Taliban Afghanistan

 

By M.M. Ali

Islam advocates moderation in every aspect of life. The Taliban (seekers of truth) took to extremism, something alien to the religion they preached. Promising to rid Afghanistan of internal strife and establish a clean administration, the band of youthful religious zealots initially had been welcomed as a relief from the tribal feuds and leadership fights tearing the country apart. Instead of bringing the hoped-for peace, however, they wasted five long years reducing the country to an almost medieval status, depriving the Afghan people of the most fundamental amenities of life that the 20th century could offer. Anything modern was forbidden.

Not for the first time, excesses were committed in the name of religion. The Taliban’s sole objective was to rid the country of its old leadership and establish a religious state whose contours they alone defined. As a result, the Taliban failed to gain international support. The three countries that recognized the Taliban—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—did so in the hope that, once Taliban rule was established, their administration would moderate and improve. Their initial extremism was viewed as a response to the turmoil that preceded them. In spite of several attempts by Pakistan, and monetary support from the two Gulf nations, however, nothing changed the Taliban.

Perhaps the Afghan people’s early unflinching support encouraged Taliban leader Mullah Omar and his lieutenants in their extremism. The Taliban, it must be remembered, were a group of die-hard zealots who had seen nothing but war and corruption. Most were raised and educated in madrassas (religious schools) offering an exclusively religious education. Their elders’ internecine battles undoubtedly contributed to the younger generation’s extremism. Untutored in statecraft or administration, the Taliban came to power ignorant of the basics of administration, relying on their own honesty and determined not to duplicate the misrule of their predecessors.

Intoxicated by their battlefield victories, the Taliban expelled the country’s former leaders. Women were not the only ones subjected to extremely restrictive laws and regulations—even men were forced to adhere to Taliban dictates. Their extremism caused the country to slide into virtual chaos, and productivity vanished. The country’s only cash crop was poppy, and revenues were dependent upon doles from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Clearly, Afghanistan was heading toward disaster. While there may be an element of truth to the accusation that American abandonment following the defeat of the Soviet Union contributed to the country’s plight, responsibility rests with the Afghan leadership, which never was able to reconcile to a joint administration. Whether it was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, Yusuf Sayaf, Ahmed Shah Masoud or Gen. Rasheed Dostam—all tried to undo the others at the expense of the country. The result was a constant state of civil war from which, it was hoped, the Taliban would provide deliverance. Sadly, they, too, proved to be a disaster of no ordinary magnitude, and the people of Afghanistan have paid an enormous price for the past two decades.

Afghanistan in turmoil became a haven for other madrassa-educated religious zealots, as well as for foreign elements—inspired by the upheaval in such Muslim troublespots as the Middle East, Bosnia, Chechnya and Kashmir—seeking to pursue their own agendas. It has now become evident that the country harbored militants from all over—and all in the name of Islam. This blind religious extremism apparently holds a universal appeal for disgruntled young men. Reports indicate that Taliban troops also included Pakistanis, Saudis, Chechens, at least one American, an Australian, and other foreigners.

With no vision of statesmanship and no defined objective, the Taliban kept the country on tenter hooks and in a perpetual state of crisis.

The Inevitable Confrontation

Despite several efforts on the part of Pakistan to avert a military confrontation between the U.S. and the Taliban, Mullah Omar refused to budge. The horrifying Sept. 11 attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon not only were a tragedy of megaproportions, but can only result in the total annihilation of the Taliban, who in their self-righteousness invoked the wrath of a mighty superpower.

It is unclear, however, how numerous the Taliban forces under attack are. When they initially advanced on Kabul from the south their numbers were estimated at about 20,000—and that may very well be the correct figure. With every adult male forced to wear a beard and dress alike, however, the whole place appeared to be full of Taliban. Just as not every northern Afghan is a member of the Northern Alliance militia, so not every Pashtun, the people from the south, is a Taliban.

The United States has promised to assist in the political and economic rebuilding of Afghanistan. Winter already has arrived, and thousands of Afghans are homeless and destitute. Humanitarian assistance is an urgent priority, as is the establishment of a broad-based government in Kabul. The Bonn conference succeeded in putting together an interim government to be headed by Hamid Karzai as prime minister. Karzai, a Pashtun, was deputy prime minister under Hekmatyar until the two had a falling out and Karzai left the country. That the interim arrangement has been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and is supported by Pakistan are encoraging signs. That Hekmatyar, now in Iran, and General Dostam have opposed the interim government is understandable, since their own political prospects will dwindle under the new scenario.

Perhaps the best chance for a stable government in Kabul lies in the traditional Loya Jirga, or council of tribal elders. For it to be effective, however, real peace must first be established. Also essential to a successful and lasting solution is the cooperation and support of neighboring countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, whose sentiments must be taken into account. The best approach may be for the United Nations, with the backing of the United States, Britain and Russia, to take the lead in creating such a political solution for Afghanistan.

 

Pakistani Concerns

Pakistan’s worries about Afghanistan and the region are far from over. It was no simple choice for Islamabad to side with the United States in going after Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda organization. In recent years religious extremism has spread in parts of Pakistan as well, and Gen. Pervez Musharraf, a known moderate, will have to rein in his own extremists. He faces the added burden of pulling an economically strapped country out of the doldrums.

Musharraf had little choice but to side with the U.S., however. Washington would have proceeded with or without Pakistan’s help. In the end he made a bold decision, one which is likely to be in the interests of Pakistan and of regional peace.

Although military operations in Afghanistan may end soon, that will not end the crisis for nuclear Pakistan. The coming weeks and months will be critical ones for Islamabad. The government will have to remove all elements of militancy from Pakistan’s religious groups. The country’s numerous madrassas providing religious instruction to thousands of mostly poor young men will have to be given a new orientation, with religious education supplemented with regular (secular) learning. This in itself is a massive undertaking that will require a sustained policy and a huge budget.

Perhaps the United States, in the interests of a stable Pakistan and a lasting regional peace in the region, will come to Musharraf’s assistance. For it is clear that Islamabad and Washington will have to work more closely than ever to establish a peaceful and economically progressive South Asia.

Prof. M.M. Ali, a Washington, DC-based specialist on South Asia, is a consultant with the United Nations Development Program.

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