Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, August/September 1997, pg. 51

United Nations Report

U.S. Votes Against Requiring Israel to Fund Rebuilding of Qana U.N. Camp

by Ian Williams

Everyone knows that the U.S. Congress resents every cent spent on the U.N. and on peacekeeping. So when U.S. diplomats fought bitterly to defeat a move that would have saved the U.N. some $1.7 million and the U.S. its one-third of that, you know there could only be one explanation. And you would be right. The U.S. and Israel were the two lone votes against the 127 for a General Assembly resolution that Israel should pay the costs of repairing the base and moving the Fijian peacekeepers at the UNIFIL compound at Qana in south Lebanon.

Just over a year ago, on April 18, 1996, the Israelis shelled the camp, killing more than 100 civilians. Despite some smoothing over in its final version, a U.N. investigation decided that the Israelis almost certainly had deliberately targeted the U.N. compound and the refugees sheltered there.

A separate vote on the relevant paragraphs produced 59 abstentions from people who did not want to upset the U.S., and from some who did not want to impede the peace process. However a majority of 66 felt that peace had been proceeding nowhere for some time, and wanted to remind the rest of the world what was done by those who keep complaining about "terrorism."

It must have been convincing, since only Russia abstained on the final resolution to lend some comfort to the lonely duo. Of course, Israel is no more likely than the U.S. to honor its debts. Israeli envoy David Peleg said that his country was neither morally nor legally bound to accept the assessment against it.

Lebanon's Hicham Hamdan made a more credible point, that the object of the resolution was "to bolster the credibility of international forces and underscore their importance." The purpose of the U.S. and Israel, he could have added, but forbore to, has been to underplay the importance of the U.N. wherever possible. It is a long time since the U.S. helped draft the U.N. Charter, and almost as long since Abba Eban, on behalf of Israel, promised that his country would abide by the U.N. Charter and accept all U.N. resolutions in return for being accepted as a U.N. member.

That message was reinforced when it was announced that Kieran Prendergast, the new chief of the U.N.'s department of political affairs, was not going to go to Jerusalem as decided by the special session of the General Assembly that was called to act on Israeli settlement-building activities after the U.S. had vetoed a resolution on it in the Security Council. Officially it was because Israel and the U.N. could not agree on the terms of reference, but Prendergast reported that the Israelis were quite prepared to let him come, as long as he did not report on any settlements other than Jabal Abu Ghneim, did not report any Israeli views other than those of the government, and that the secretary-general accepted that he was not coming under the auspices of the special session. Unsurprisingly, even the oft-compromising U.N. couldn't accept that.

As a result the special session will be convened on or around July 4, and Palestinian envoy Nasser El Kidwa anticipates calls for further action under U.N. Charter clauses VI and VII the ones invoked to enforce sanctions against Iraq.

Disputed Terms of Reference

Over in Iraq, the terms of reference seemed to be in dispute as well. The oil-for-food deal that allowed the Iraqis to sell $2 billion worth of oil in return for careful monitoring of the spending, was renewed, without the expected objections from the U.S. However, on the face of it quixotically, the Iraqis refused to pump the oil, leading to derisory comments from Western diplomats. Officials closer to the scene, however, insist that it makes sense, sort of. If they pump oil without agreed contracts for foods, the funds accumulate in a bank account where the various charges against Iraq, for compensation or for maintenance of the weapons inspection regime, could be paid earlier.

Somewhat more inexplicable, even for a diplomat of the standing of Iraqi Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, were the reports that Iraqi co-pilots fought for the controls of the inspections teams' helicopters to redirect them on their chosen route, leading to the assumption that they were trying to avoid discovery of potential weapons sites. That was followed by the Iraqis' point-blank refusal to allow the teams to inspect some sites strongly suspected of housing evidence.

Taking advantage of the Denver Summit of the Eight, some heavy pressure was applied on Russia, and in an unusual Saturday night Security Council meeting on June 21, members unanimously agreed to postpone the regular six-month review of sanctions as a shot across Baghdad's bow. The resolution also pledged that if the chairman of UNSCOM, the special commission to ferret out Iraqi weaponry, does not report complete access to sites, then sanctions will be imposed on the travel of high Iraqi officials "responsible for non-compliance."

This is a finely nuanced approach, since many members of the council are increasingly sensitive to the price being imposed on Iraqi civilians by the sanctions against their government. It is not as if ordinary Iraqis had recently had an opportunity to vote the Ba'athist regime out, after all.

Western diplomats assume that the Iraqis thought that they were on a roll, with several members of the council like France and Russia moving away from the immediate post-Gulf war consensus. They also assume that the gestures are meant to be a signal to Richard Butler, the Australian diplomat who is replacing the long-suffering Rolf Ekeus as chairman of the Special Commission.

Richard Butler does not so easily rush to judgment, however, and several people who work closely with the Iraqis think that they will begin with a charm offensive on him when he meets Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and travels to Baghdad over the next few weeks. Butler sees his job as "scientific and objective," to identify and supervise the destruction of Iraq's weaponry of mass destruction. "My hope is that the Iraqi authorities will see it that way and cooperate with me so that one day I can go to the Security Council and tell them that the job is done, and then they can take the necessary decisions, that flow from that," Butler said.

He refuses to be drawn out on how helpful or otherwise are suggestions from Madeleine Albright that whatever the Iraqis do, the sanctions stay until Saddam goes. However, no one can doubt Butler's sincerity. Last year, he almost single-handedly steered the Test Ban Treaty through the U.N. in the face of opposition from some influential countries. In fact, he told the Washington Report that he only took the job because he sees the disarmament of Iraq as a step on the road to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. His hard-headed pragmatism, combined with optimism and idealism, and leavened with outspokenness, will make him a worthy successor to Rolf Ekeus.

And in a similar tradition of hard-headed diplomacy, former Secretary of State James Baker, now U.N. envoy for the Western Sahara, scheduled the beginning of talks June 23 in New York. Living up to expectations so far, he assembled representatives from Morocco and POLISARIO, representing the Western Sahara, along with diplomats from Algeria and Mauritania. Baker has reported optimistically to the Security Council that he thinks that the parties may be prepared to offer concessions. He will need all of his optimism and his old-established skills at arm-twisting.