Davos Exchange May Damage Ankara’s Standing in Arab World as Well as Israel
| WRMEA Archives 2006-2010 - 2009 April |
Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, April 2009, pages 24-25
Talking Turkey
Davos Exchange May Damage Ankara’s Standing in Arab World as Well as Israel
By Jon Gorvett
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WHEN THE prime minister of one country says to the president of another, “You know well how to kill people,” many might think it’s fair to assume that relations between the two states had taken something of a nosedive.
Indeed, when this is followed up by accusations of hypocrisy, genocide and barbarism, flung like dinner plates about the diplomatic kitchen, one might be forgiven for thinking relations could scarcely get worse.
Yet many both in Turkey and in Israel are looking at recent heated exchanges between their two countries as signifying a lot less than they seem to. At the same time, however, they may have some unforeseen consequences for recent diplomatic moves by Ankara around the Middle East.
The current crisis between Turkey and Israel first publicly surfaced when Turkish Prime Minister Recip Tayyip Erdogan stormed off the stage at the World Economic Forum in Davos. This came after Israeli President Shimon Peres had defended Israel’s attack on Gaza, and Erdogan had not been given what he felt was enough time to respond by moderator David Ignatius of The Washington Post.
This was followed by an escalating series of insults, which by mid-February saw the commander of the Israeli army headquarters, Major General Avi Mizrahi, saying that Turkey should “look in the mirror” before criticizing Israeli actions in Gaza.
Mizrahi then referred to the 1915 massacres of Ottoman Armenians by Ottoman Turks and Kurds, a slaughter known to most of the non-Turkish world as the Armenian Genocide. This is perhaps the most taboo subject possible from Ankara’s perspective, signalling a major low point in relations. (Indeed, AIPAC and other elements of America’s Israel Lobby have worked hard to ensure the defeat of every congressional resolution referring to the Armenian Genocide.)
Erdogan’s walk out at Davos, meanwhile, has made him into something of a hero both in Turkey and the Arab world. Hamas praised his actions, and, on his return from Davos, thousands of supporters from his Justice and Development Party (AKP) turned out to greet him.
Yet, as Professor Iltar Turan, head of the International Relations Department at Istanbul’s Bilgi University, points out, “Street politics is not the driving force behind actual foreign policy. Like many, the prime minister is very sympathetic toward the plight of the Palestinians, but he also knows that policy cannot be indexed to the plight of Gaza. Since the walkout, we haven’t therefore seen any concrete changes in relations with Israel.”
These relations exist on many levels. Primarily, they have been military, with pilots from the Israeli air force regularly training at Turkish air bases. There have also been a number of significant arms deals between the two countries, including most recently the purchase by Turkey of Israeli drones. A great deal of Turkish weaponry, including tanks and planes, also gets refurbished in Israeli weapons plants.
This made the outburst by Major General Mizrahi particularly damaging, while also drawing a sharp rebuke from the Turkish General Staff. The two countries’ armed forces had been the strongest element of the relationship.
There are also more peaceful links, with much Israeli investment in Turkey and visa versa. Agriculture and tourism are particularly important Israeli interests in Turkey, while many Turkish construction companies are active in Israel.
At the same time, there has also been a degree of diplomatic cooperation between the two countries.
In 1998, when Abdullah Ocalan, the head of Turkey’s Kurdish nationalist PKK rebels, was living in neighboring Syria, a combination of military and diplomatic threats from Ankara, backed up by an implicit threat from Israel, forced Ocalan’s expulsion from Damascus. It is widely believed that Israeli intelligence, Mossad, helped out in Ocalan’s eventual capture.
Yet it also appears that Syria was the trigger behind the Davos walkout.
Since at least April 2008, Turkey has been mediating in talks between Syria and Israel over the future of the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel during the 1967 war.
“The prime minister and the Turkish government were generally interested in contributing to a new modus vivendi with Syria,” says Professor Turan. “So when Israel invaded Gaza, they really felt stabbed in the back by the Israelis.”
At the same time, there has been considerable pressure on Erdogan and the AKP leadership from its own grass roots and from the Turkish public to take a stronger stance against Israel. This was heightened by extensive press coverage in Turkey of the Gaza invasion.
Public anger was particularly significant as well in the run up to Turkish municipal elections, scheduled for March.
“These elections are something of a test case for the AKP, and Erdogan takes them very seriously,” says Sami Kohen, a respected columnist for the Turkish daily, Milliyet. “So he could use Davos as political leverage, or ammunition, and as a matter of fact, there were many who applauded his stance.”
The AKP was particularly interested in doing well in the southeast of the country. That is where Kurdish nationalist sentiment is strongest, with the AKP the only serious political challenge to the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP), which runs a number of key municipalities in the region. In the lead-up to the ballot, there were widespread allegations that the AKP was throwing major financial reserves into the region in an effort to win votes.
Yet at the same time as these domestic concerns, combined with frustration with Israel, were producing fireworks from Erdogan and others, Turkey’s president, Abdullah Gul, was also busy. In February, he visited King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia, and met with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
“Turkey has been trying for many years to boost its relations with the Arab world,” says Kohen. It has tried to become an honest broker as well, one able to talk to all sides, including Israel. This role may have taken a knock with the recent dispute, in terms of deteriorating relations with Tel Aviv—but also, paradoxically, in worrying the chief Arab states.
“Egypt has good relations with Israel, while Saudi Arabia is interested in peace in Palestine as its main concern is expanding Iranian influence,” says Turan. “If Turkey is seen to be too supportive of Hamas, Turkey’s neutral role is undermined. Gul’s visits were probably a damage limitation exercise.”
For now, relations between Turkey and Israel therefore look likely to be cool at best in the near future. Yet Ankara’s efforts to become a major player in the Middle East more generally may also have taken a knock, as it suffers the consequences of the region’s often tortuous political alignments.
Jon Gorvett is a free-lance journalist based in Istanbul.
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