March 1995, pgs. 18-19

Will Iran Respond to Rising Internal Opposition with External Aggression?—Two Views

An Expansionist Iran Is the Bitter Legacy of Its Revolution

By Dr. Joseph A. Kechichian

It has been 16 years since the Revolution, seven years since the end of the Iran-Iraq war, and six years since Ayatollah Khomeini's death. In that time nothing seems to have changed, yet nothing is what it used to be in Iran. Revolutionary Guards continue to monitor public (and not so public) social behavior even as opposition to their tactics is on the rise. More and more Iranians are looking West, where they see less "Satan" and more consumer goods.

Khomeini's death in 1989 cast a shadow over the Revolution. Now its supporters, including President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, face the unpleasant realities of Iran's economic difficulties. But Rafsanjani knows that if he argues for moderation, he risks sharing the downfall of other "moderates" who thought that the Revolution could accommodate change and modification.

At present, it is the economy more than the Revolution that preoccupies most Iranians. Iran's bazaari community (the merchant class that turned against the shah in the late 1970s) no longer tolerates Tehran's centralized economic policies. Among factors eroding Iran's once-prosperous economy are inflation, a three-tiered exchange rate for the riyal, the rampant favoritism and corruption that inflation and artificial exchange rates create, a creeping foreign debt now estimated at more than $30 billion, and mediocre standards for industrial production.

Petroleum revenues estimated at $20 billion in 1993 are not large enough to meet the country's growing needs. Iran's population, which was approximately 55 million in 1994, continues to grow at an alarming 3.6 to 3.8 percent rate, placing a heavy burden on an economy whose GNP has fallen by more than 40 percent since 1979.

Despite this legacy of problems, when voters cast their ballots in June 1993 they reelected President Rafsanjani to a second four-year term.

Now, however, two government courses of action suggest that to distract attention from problems at home, Rafsanjani may be seeking a foreign confrontation or diversions. First is the re-equipment and reorganization of the military. Iran's half-million strong army of 1979 was considerably enlarged during the war with Iraq. Despite the one million casualties it caused, that war, by most accounts, provided the armed forces with valuable experience. The availability of substantial quantities of weapons from the former Soviet republics now permits Iran to replenish its military stocks at very reasonable prices.

A second Iranian effort also deeply concerns its neighbors. Iran's export of its version of Islamic revolution is perceived as a destabilizing influence by all regimes in the region, which also fear Iraq's secular Ba'thism. However, they see Iranian influence in Lebanon's disintegration, the forces undermining Palestinian-Israeli rapprochement, and manifestations of conflict between Islam and the West. There also is evidence that Iran is influencing events in the Sudan and in other African countries.

Do these manifestations indicate a calculated Iranian policy, reached after thorough deliberations, or do they reflect little more than opportunistic attempts to line up negotiating assets to "trade" in a campaign to become a major regional power?

Whatever their motivations, some results of these Iranian policies may be assessed. In the Arabian/Persian Gulf itself, Iran is challenging the United Arab Emirates by rekindling the border disputes over the Abu Musa and Tunb islands. It also is prodding Qatar to distance itself from Saudi Arabia. Nevertheless, because the United States currently enjoys significant military advantage in the region, any Iranian challenge to the conservative monarchies could draw a sharp response that could easily spell disaster for Tehran.

The economy pre-occupies most Iranians.

For this reason, Iran may launch more subtle challenges, such as the assassinations or attempted assassinations in Turkey, Egypt or Algeria in recent years that have been linked to Iranian groups or influence.

President Hosni Mubarak unequivocally asserts that Iran is behind anti-Western attacks in Egypt, and is linked to sinister designs in Sudan. For their part, prominent Turkish leaders accuse Iran of responsibility for raising tensions with Turkey. The ruling military regime in Algeria makes similar accusations, alleging that although the Islamic Salvation Front initially received financial support from Saudi Arabian sources, it now is funded by Tehran.

In Tunisia, the al-Nahda party also allegedly is financed by Tehran. In the Horn of Africa, Iran has been linked to armed groups in Somalia, Uganda, Kenya, Djibouti, Tanzania and Zanzibar. In Eritrea, 2,000 rebel fighters, many veterans of the Afghanistan campaign, are believed to be receiving support from Iran.

In short, Iranian aid is reaching paramilitary forces as well as positive elements such as schools and educational and social service centers in Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Algeria, Turkey and several African and Central Asian republics. These efforts clearly illustrate that Iran's ambitions are vast, notwithstanding its serious internal problems.

As it pursues its assertive policies throughout the Muslim world, however, Iran's poor economic performance threatens to impoverish the Revolution and diminish its challenges to its Gulf neighbors and its attempts to expand its sphere of influence in the Muslim world.

This much is certain. Since 1979, Iran's estimated 180,000 religious leaders have reshaped the Peacock Throne's legacy by entrenching themselves in Shi'i traditions and by recreating the country's influence structure. To achieve their objectives, Iran's mullahs purged elite groups throughout the 1980s, and weeded out opponents who contemplated "moderation." Even the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war played into the hands of, and was masterfully orchestrated by, the mullahs.

The war drained Iran and increased its international isolation, thus setting in motion internal changes that strengthened Iran's radical elements. Therefore, at this time there is little that can be done from outside to moderate Iran's regional policies, or restore it to a role of contributing to rather than destabilizing the security of the entire region.

Joseph A. Kechichian is an associate politcal scientist at RAND in Santa Monica, CA. Opinions and conclusions in this article are those of the author, and should not be attributed to RAND or any agency sponsoring its research.