November/December 1993, Page 7-16

The Oslo Agreement: Eight Views

A U.S. Diplomat Supporter

"Gaza-Jericho First" Is Only the Beginning

By Roben V. Keeley

The term "Gaza-Jericho First," used to describe the Israeli-Palestinian agreement signed at the White House Sept. 13, does not adequately express the vast scope and significance of that agreement. Limited Palestinian autonomy and self-rule are to begin in those two parts of the occupied territories within three months of the signing of this "Declaration of Principles," following negotiation of an interim agreement that, among other things, will call for accelerated withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza and Jericho, to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of the interim agreement.

But the declaration looks well beyond that timetable. It provides for the election by the Palestinians, including those residing in Jerusalem, of a governing council "in order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles." These are to be "direct, free and general political elections" that "will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements."

The stated goal is for elections to be held no later than nine months after the entry into force of the declaration, or July 1994. And no later than the eve of those elections, Israeli military forces will be redeployed outside the areas populated by the Palestinians. The Palestinian police force to be created "will insure public order" during the elections, which will be held under international observation. After the inauguration of the Palestinian Council, the Israeli civil administration "will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn. "That means the end of the Israeli occupation for the Palestinians inhabiting these territories.

These procedures clearly contemplate the establishment of a Palestinian government whose jurisdiction "will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory." Although the council will not have jurisdiction over certain major matters—specifically Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis living in the territories—these issues are to be settled in the "permanent status" negotiations that are to begin in two years and conclude at the latest in five years, when the interim arrangements will expire. These negotiations will also deal with the Palestinian refugees, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and "other issues of common interest."

Those in Israel who strenuously oppose this deal negotiated by Prime Minister Rabin's Labor government are no doubt correct in stating that it will lead inexorably to the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. They are mistaken, however, in believing that there is any alternative solution to Israel's Palestinian problem. Israel will not be able to live in peace and security until the Palestinian people have exercised their right of self-determination, a right recognized by the international community as far back as the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan.

The deal reached between Rabin and Arafat will achieve that aim. The result may well be a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinian state, but only after the latter has been created and the Palestinians have chosen to join with Jordan in some sort of mutually beneficial union. The critics on the right in Israel who argue that a Palestinian state would be a "mortal danger" are contradicted by the realities of power relationships in the Middle East in this post-Cold War and post-Gulf war era. The challenge for both Israel and the international community will be to assist the Palestinian state to become a viable entity, not to check its military power, which is likely to be nil.

More remarkable than the agreement signed at the White House was the exchange of letters between Rabin and Arafat that constituted mutual recognition by Israel and the PLO. That was the indispensable precondition to the interim and final status negotiations to come. Yet anyone predicting such a development in the fall of 1993 would probably have faced derision even a month before it occurred.

The logic of it is evident, however. Labor Party leaders came to the realization that the only way to reach a workable peace agreement was to deal with their leading antagonist, the PLO, which for decades they had vilified as a "terrorist organization." An elementary principle of negotiation is that you must deal with your antagonist, and the other party must have the credibility with its constituency to deliver on any deal struck. Israel, after many months of negotiating with surrogates for the PLO, finally realized that direct dealings were the only path to peace.

This was the major concession that brought about this historic compromise, and it was made by Israel. The PLO has also made concessions, but they are minor by comparison. Yasser Arafat, in writing, has recognized Israel as a legitimate state with a right to live in peace and security, has renounced terrorism and other acts of violence, has accepted U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and has committed the Palestinians to try to obtain their rights through negotiations.

But the PLO chairman already had made all of these commitments in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in December 1988, and they were never subsequently repudiated. In the years since, he also has agreed by implication that Israel cannot be rolled back from its 1967 borders, and that what the Palestinians seek is a state in the West Bank and Gaza alone (22 percent of historical Palestine), certainly not the "liberation of Palestine."

There are really only two new elements in his most recent declarations: a promise to rescind the articles of the Palestinian Covenant that deny Israel's right to exist, and a promise to bring the intifada to an end. The former is mainly a paper exercise, and the latter will become irrelevant nine months from now, for if there are no Israeli troops patrolling in Palestinian population centers by then, no Palestinian kids will be throwing stones at them.

The single concession by the Israeli side in this exchange between Arafat and Rabin was what made the historic breakthrough possible: the government of Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and agreed to negotiate peace directly with it. Implicit in this simple statement is the recognition that the Palestinians are a distinct people, with rights, including the right of self-determination.

There is an amazing asymmetry between the amount of compromising each side has had to do and the relative power positions of the antagonists. The Israelis, with the most powerful military machine in the Middle East, unstinting backing of the world's only superpower, physical possession of all the territory in dispute, and without great public pressure at home to make peace if it risked the security of the state, have made the single concession that was hardly predictable. The Palestinians, divided and disputatious, led from exile, with the PLO losing popular support in the occupied territories to extremist rejectionist factions such as Hamas, bankrupt in the aftermath of the Gulf war, with no hope of challenging Israel militarily, and with a weakened political position even in the Arab world, could be expected to make concessions, so long as they were not as fundamental as abandoning their wish for their own state.

Perhaps the lesson is that the weaker party cannot make major concessions because that only makes it weaker, while the stronger party can afford to concede because it retains its relative strength even after the concession.

What seems to have won out on both sides was weariness with the unending and costly struggle and a desire for peace, not at any price, but at an acceptable price, along with a mutual recognition that this was probably the last chance for peace in the lifetimes of the leaders on both sides. And both sides were concerned that extremists, who prefer continued conflict to peace, were gaining ground.

With the Palestinian problem in the process of resolution, the peace treaties between Israel and its other Arab neighbors that have been under negotiation for the past 22 months should move forward rapidly. The result will be the de jure recognition of Israel by all the Arab states and its acceptance into the state system of the Middle East as a normal and unexceptional member.

Jordan and Israel have already agreed on the agenda for their peace negotiations. They have no major disputes, and progress was impeded solely by the impasse on the Palestinian track. As for Syria and Israel, the makings of a deal are present and are self-evident: full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights (perhaps in phases) and normal peaceful relations with Syria. These have been on the table for some time, but the antagonists have engaged in an Alphonse-Gaston charade of who would speak first. There may be a delay because of psychological overload in Israel. As for Lebanon, no territorial claims are at stake, only security issues, and with peace breaking out all over, the necessary arrangements should not be difficult to conclude.

An interesting question is why the U.S. was left on the sidelines while Norway refereed the secret talks that have made possible the resolution of this century-old conflict. One can only hazard a guess. Of all the principal players in the Middle East peace process, Washington is probably the leakiest.

Realizing how necessary it was to maintain secrecy, especially so as not to enable the extremist enemies of peace on both sides to sabotage the deal after premature disclosure, both the Israeli and Palestinian readerships apparently opted to leave Washington in the dark because Washington can't keep a secret.

For good reason, Washington has not been noted for its evenhandedness in dealing with the parties to this dispute. More than that, however, the PLO has justifiably been irritated that Washington has held it at arm's length and even terminated its earlier dialogue with the PLO on irrational grounds. As for the Israelis, they also bristle at pressure from Washington, which, though long a loyal patron, can behave in ways that appear patronizing.

Probably Rabin decided that if he was going to make concessions, he would make them on his own, not because someone told him it would be necessary. Ultimately, however, the important thing is not who gets the credit, but that peace is now in process.

Robert V. Keeley is president of the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC. A retired American career diplomat, he served as ambassador to Greece, Zimbabwe and Mauritius.