WRMEA Archives 1988-1993 - 1992 October

October 1992, Page 43, 44

The Subcontinent

Kashmir Keeps South Asia Hostage While Visitors to U.S. Seek Solution

By M.M. Ali

Four and a half decades, three Indo-Pakistan wars and numerous bilateral, trilateral and multilateral talks have failed to resolve the Kashmir dispute. The issue refuses to go away and once again threatens to engulf the subcontinent in a military conflict. This time, the presence of nuclear capability within the region portends much worse for its more than one billion people, who need to devote their attention to sheer economic survival.

Kashmir keeps alive the bitter memories of 1947, when the South Asian subcontinent was surgically partitioned on the basis of Muslim-majority and Hindu-majority areas. Millions of people were thrown out of their homes, and close to a million died in senseless carnage. So long as the problem remains unsolved it provides the vehicle by which misunderstandings, misgivings and hatreds are passed from one generation to the next.

Kashmir is more than an exotic piece of real estate in the lap of the Himalayas, where the rich and powerful for generations have sought refuge from the subcontinent's searing summer heat. It is a territory of 85,000 square miles with a population of more than 13 million people, a clear majority of whom are Muslims. Bordered by Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and China, it is only 50 miles away from newly independent Turkmenistan.

The state of Kashmir was ruled from 1846 to 1947 by Hindu maharajahs. The last of them sought military assistance from newly independent India through an "instrument of accession," to be a temporary measure until the people of Kashmir could decide their future. However, when the U.N. was able to bring about a cessation of the hostilities that had broken out between India and Pakistan, the 1948 cease-fire agreement left Kashmir divided.

The Alternatives

As Prof. Stephen Cohen observed in an article he presented to the State Department on Kashmir, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will take you there." In fact, many observers expect Kashmir to obtain some degree of independence, although that is not the road either India or Pakistan would choose. One way out of the problem would be to go back 40 years and implement the U.N. resolution that calls for the holding of a plebiscite whereby the Kashmiris would be asked to choose between India and Pakistan. That was the original provision. Pakistan still pushes for it. India disagrees, arguing that the premise on which the U.N. resolution was based has changed. Many Kashmiris would perhaps opt for neither occupying power, but total independence.

Hence the pre-eminent position that the United States has come to enjoy in world affairs today causes many countries to look to Washington for solutions. However, it appears that the administration of George Bush has its own list of priorities, and a partially obscured vision of the new world order. Kuwait and Bosnia, for example, do not rank equally in the eyes of current American decision-makers. The U.S. president moved without delay in the Gulf, but more slowly in Bosnia and Somalia. Nevertheless, diplomatic missions of India and Pakistan, advocacy groups in the United States, and visiting leaders and intellectuals from the subcontinent inexorably are moving the problem onto the agenda of the new world order.

Two of the Kashmiri leaders provided insights from opposite sides of the U.N. Line of Actual Control (the cease-fire line that separates the larger Indian-and smaller Pakistani-controlled parts of the disputed territory) during recent visits to Washington.

One was Abdul Rashid Kabuli, who is based in Srinagar, capital of Indian-controlled Kashmir. He is a former opposition leader in the Kashmiri state assembly and a former member of the Indian parliament. The other visitor to Washington was Shah Ghulam Qadir, a sitting member and current parliamentary secretary of the Azad Kashmir government in Muzzafarabad, on the Pakistan side of the line. Mr. Kabuli, who has worked with the Indian government to find a solution to the Kashmir dispute for a number of years, is now very much disillusioned with New Delhi. At the same time, he does not seem to have illusions about Islamabad. Mr. Shah, who belongs to the party of Azad Kashmir President Qayyum Khan, is very clear about his objective. He unequivocally states that given the right of self-determination, the Kashmiris will opt for Pakistan.

Asked to elaborate on his views, Kabuli drew graphic pictures on the atrocities being committed by the Indian army and Indian-backed paramilitary forces in the Kashmir valley, the heart of the state. He asserted that the Indian option that may once have existed now is gone. "The question," he said, "does not arise any more."

He urged the United States to intervene to "help stop the genocide" and bring justice to a people who have been struggling for freedom over 40 years. He attached very little hope of a solution coming out of any Indo-Pakistan bilateral negotiations. "Unless the Kashmiris are directly involved in any negotiations," he said, "there can be no positive outcome of any conference or meeting."

Shah, on the other hand, held India alone responsible for the continued trouble inside Kashmir. He argued: "The last three years of uprising inside the Indian-held territory and the tremendous sacrifices made by the Kashmiris should convince New Delhi that stalling on the issue or using strong-arm tactics will not resolve anything." Pointing to the U.S. tendency to refer more recent international crises to the U.N., Shah also appealed to the United States to help implement the standing U.N. resolutions on Kashmir.

There have been several ideas and alternatives that have been examined from time to time, mostly by third-country individuals and groups that are primarily interested in reducing tension in the subcontinent and not so much in finding an equitable solution of the Kashmir question. Many of these second-best formulas have grown out of a long frustration resulting primarily from Indian intransigence.

These included four solutions: (a) U.N.-monitored elections on both sides of the Line of Actual Control to elect assemblies with the specific mandate to vote on the future of the state. No way is suggested to break the impasse if the two sides vote differently.

(b) Separate sectoral elections in the Jammu District, the Ladakh District and the Valley, with each unit separately offered a choice of joining India or Pakistan.

(c) The present Line of Actual Control to become a permanent boundary, with ways to be worked out to allow easy crossborder access to Kashmiris living on the two sides so that long-divided Kashmiri families could be reunited.

(d) A plebiscite in the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir, including the Pakistan-controlled Azad Kashmir, giving all Kashmiris the choice to opt for India or Pakistan or to remain independent in a reunited entity.

(e) Jammu and Ladakh to go with India, Azad Kashmir to be merged with Pakistan, and the Valley to be given an independent status with India, Pakistan and the superpowers guaranteeing its security.

There was a time when any suggestion of reneging on the 1948 U.N. promise of a plebiscite would draw violent reactions, particularly from Pakistan. More recently, unofficial but influential individuals in both India and Pakistan have been discussing behind closed doors various options to end the Kashmir stalemate in conformity with present realities.

Those realities are that India occupied 65 percent of Kashmir, Pakistan about 30 percent and China occupies the northern tip bordering Singkiang. Of the 65 percent under Indian military control, Jammu has a Hindu majority, Ladakh has Buddhists, and the rest is Muslim. The armed struggle going on in the Valley has cost Kashmiris several thousand lives in the last three years and made things difficult for India. The old Kashmiri leadership, consisting of the followers of the late Sheikh Abdullah, the Dogras and the Hindu Pandits, is out. A whole new generation of "freedom fighters" has taken to the streets. According to press reports, every other house is a fort and every other Kashmiri, young or old, man or woman, is a fighter.

At a time when India has to assemble a case for its huge requests for financial assistance, Kashmir has become a burden and an embarassment. Recent Indian reports indicate "an expense of Rs. 5 crore (close to $2 million) per day to police Srinagar alone." The cost to hold on to the rest of Kashmir is "absolutely astronomical."

Right-wing Indians assert that any concessions in Kashmir would trigger an explosion of similar demands from other parts of India, particularly Punjab and Assam. New Delhi, which until recently has been speaking in parables, has come out openly offering "greater autonomy" to Jammu and Kashmir within the constitutional framework of India. It is a concession that is not likely to create any excitement in Kashmiri or Pakistani circles, but a Jawaharlal Nehru or an Ali Bhutto could have picked up on the opening and used it to craft a bold solution. It is in this context that the appeals made by Abdul Rashid Kabuli and Shah Ghulam Qadir to the U.S. become relevant.

Perhaps Kashmir presents the United States a unique opportunity to be a catalyst in mediating a problem ripe for solution. Unfortunately, it is in an area in which Americans today have few vested interests, and which has no hold on Washington in the form of crucial exports or ethnic lobbies.

M.M. Ali is a professor at the University of the District of Columbia.