August/September 1992, Page 11, 12, 38

To Tell the Truth

Will Yitzhak Rabin Provide George Bush's October (1992) Surprise?

By Leon T. Hadar

The June 23 electoral earthquake in Israel shattered the Greater Israel alliance that has ruled the Jewish state for the past 15 years. Strong pressure from the Bush administration on the outgoing Likud government to cease building Jewish settlements in the occupied territories was a major factor in the fall of the nationalist-religious coalition and creation of the most dovish government in Israel's history. The choices this new government, and in particular its head, Yitzhak Rabin, will make in the coming months will determine to a large extent the future of the Arab-Israeli peace process.

Some analysts have portrayed the results of the Knesset (parliament) elections as nothing more than a minor tremor, triggered by voter reaction to the political corruption and economic mismanagement of the Likud government. Those factors played a role in the choices of many voters. But what turned the election into an "earthquake" was voter rejection of the Likud coalition's commitment to long-term annexation of the West Bank and Gaza to the Jewish state and voter support for the concept of trading land for peace.

Two Crucial Groups

Two demographic groups played a crucial role in this election. A majority of the more than 200,000 Russian-Jewish voters who, because of their anti-socialist pre-disposition, were perceived initially as potential pro-Likud supporters, ended up voting for the centrist-leftist parties. So did a quarter of the Sephardic Jews, who came to Israel from Middle East countries and who have been regarded in the past as a traditional Likud constituency.

Public opinion polls indicated that the determining factor in the choices made by both the Russians and the Sephardim was recognition that Likud's Greater Israel agenda has placed a higher priority on settling "Judea and Samaria" than in taking care of economic and social needs. These are housing and jobs in the case of the Russian immigrants, and renovation of the inner-city slums and development towns where most of the lower-middle-class Sephardim live. It was the decision by the Bush administration to deny the $10 billion in loan guarantees until Israel freezes settlements that helped to focus the attention of Israeli voters on the disastrous outcome of the Likud's annexationist policies.

Most polls indicate two-thirds of Israel's voters now back land-for-peace and the freezing of the settlement build-up in the territories, principles to which the new government that was sworn in on July 12 is committed. Moreover, the 12 Knesset members from the liberal Meretz party who have joined the Rabin government, the close to 20 doves on the Labor list, and the 5 members of the Arab lists (who have not entered into the coalition) together make an impressive bloc of 40 members in the 120-member Knesset who favor direct negotiations with the PLO and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.

This dovish one-third of the Knesset members also reflects public attitudes. Polls conducted in the last three years show that around a third of the Israeli public supports, under certain conditions, the idea of an independent Palestinian state and talks with the PLO.

American and Israeli hawks who were daydreaming about the possibility of a Labor-Likud national unity government-a formula that would have maintained the status quo-were disappointed. With the Greater Israel dogma rejected by Israeli voters, the Likud about to enter into a bloody succession struggle, and the religious-Orthodox bloc divided between the moderate Sephardi Orthodox Shas, which has joined the Labor coalition, and the other religious parties which have remained in opposition, the new Israeli government is in a good position to accelerate the peace talks and to mobilize public support for dramatic and courageous moves.

Ironically, some would argue that the major obstacle to such a development is the new prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin. He was elected Labor list leader by party activists in an open primary a few months before the Knesset elections. Even dovish Labor figures, who were critical of the ruthless measures Rabin, as defense minister in the Labor-Likud coalition government, had taken to suppress the intifada, decided to back him over Shimon Peres, who had led the Labor party to several defeats since 1977. Their reason was not that they agreed with Rabin, but that he would be able to defeat Shamir.

Some of these doves continue to argue, based on the Nixon-goes-to-China analogy, that only a tough figure like Rabin would be able to muster the needed public support for major Israeli concessions. To use another analogy, Rabin is perceived as an Israeli version of South Africa's President F.W. de Klerk, a member of the political and national security establishment willing to enter into the peace talks, take some diplomatic risks and confront the militant forces that will in all certainty try to sabotage his efforts.

For his part, Rabin has made clear that, unlike the Likud, he is placing a high priority on the peace talks. He has promised to conclude in six to nine months an agreement with a Palestinian delegation over an interim governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza, and to move later to negotiating peace with Jordan and Syria.

The new prime minister has indicated he is willing to consider "imaginative" long-term solutions to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, including a possible Israeli-Palestinian federation, and that he would apply the land-for-peace formula to the West Bank and Gaza. Journalists recall that before he was selected as prime minister in 1974 he said he "would not mind entering the West Bank with a passport."

More recently, he suggested that before signing an agreement with the Palestinians on the final status of the occupied territories, he would "pull a de Klerk." By that he meant he would ask the Israeli public through new elections or a national referendum for a clear mandate on any territorial concessions he would make.

Although Rabin has made a distinction between "political" and "security" settlements-saying he would discontinue the former while continuing with the latter-most Israeli analysts see that as nothing more than rhetoric. In reality, they expect Rabin, citing budgetary pressures, to divert almost all the resources set aside by the Likud for the West Bank settlements to domestic social and economic needs, including the absorption of the immigrants. Such a move will probably be part of a complex diplomatic trade-off involving a temporary halt to the intifada, the lifting of the Arab economic boycott against Israel and the release of part of the $10 billion loan guarantee.

The Skeptical View

Others doubt Rabin's sincerity and suggest his dramatic call to the Arabs during his inaugural speech to come forward and discuss peace was nothing more than a public relations ploy. They contend that the new prime minister still places Israel's military power at the center of its relations with its Arab neighbors. Rabin, according to this view, will try to perpetuate the status quo in the territories while seeking to improve the relationship with the U.S., in order to get the Bush administration to approve the requested loan guarantees.

Rabin's record during his three-year term as prime minister from 1974 to 1977 does not inspire optimism. He was a weak prime minister who, under pressure from the National Religious Party (NRP) and the Gush Emunim movement, presided over the build-up of new settlements, including "political" ones, meaning those in heavily populated areas of the territories.

After signing U.S.-brokered disengagement agreements with Egypt, he rejected the advice of then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to negotiate an agreement with King Hussein of Jordan. When the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat extended peace feelers, Rabin ignored them and it was left to his successor, Likud leader Menachem Begin, to sign the peace agreement with Egypt.

Moreover, some would argue, even if Rabin is sincere today in attempts to make peace, it is doubtful that he will stand up to opposition from the Jewish settlers in the West Bank and the Golan Heights, as well as from the still visible Likud forces. That party's superhawk, Ariel Sharon, could emerge as the leader of the "rejectionist camp" in Israel.

The settlers have threatened violent resistance to even a weak Palestinian self-government authority, and will certainly resist withdrawal from the West Bank.

Rabin is clearly no "do-gooder," and therefore is an unlikely candidate for an "Angel of Peace," empathizing with the Palestinian plight and sensitive to Palestinian concerns. However, Americans and Arabs who portray Rabin as nothing more than a Machiavellian "wolf in sheep's clothing," or "another Shamir," may be creating a self-fulfilling prophecy. Instead, as with de Klerk, a combination of international, regional and domestic factors may force Rabin to make the needed, difficult choices.

Factors for Change

First, the new prime minister has to deal with a Labor party and a cabinet with a strong dovish component, including Rabin's personal rival, Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who is emerging as the leader of this group and who still commands strong support in the party. In short, Rabin is not a "free agent," and will be pressured by the doves in his political camp to be more forthcoming, especially during the Palestinian-Israeli talks.

Secondly, while the Israeli national consensus cannot be characterized as dovish or peacenik, it certainly supports the peace process and opposes continued settlement build-up. The Israeli public recognizes that progress in the peace talks and improvement in ties with the U.S. could help Israel deal with its bankrupt economy and burning social problems. Rabin recognizes that there is no interest among the public in a re-run of Shamir's policies.

Thirdly, close aides to the new prime minister insist that he really has changed. Global changes, the Gulf war, and the renewed peace process have convinced him, they say, that Israel has a chance to come to terms with the Palestinians and the other Arabs, and, more important, that without a move toward peace, Israel may in the long run face an angry and frustrated Arab world with the conflict turning into an apocalyptic scenario of nuclear exchanges.

Rabin, they say, is neither the cautious and weak leader of the '70s nor the proponent of the status quo of the '80s. At the age of 70, and knowing full well that this is his last term in office, Rabin wants to be remembered as the leader who turned over to the next generation a more secure and peaceful nation, and he will not back away from a fight with those who stand in the way of that goal.

Finally, the "American connection" is very much at the center of Rabin's national security doctrine. Unlike the Likud leaders, he believes that Israel has to coordinate its diplomatic and defense policies with Washington, and not ruin its ties with the United States. Hence his harsh criticism of the way the Shamir government handled the relationship with Washington, and his promise to work with the Bush administration to advance the peace process.

Moreover, while serving during the Nixon era as Israel's U.S. ambassador, Rabin developed ties with top Republicans, including current National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and a sense of respect for the Realpolitik approach to foreign policy that has characterized Republican administrations from Nixon to Bush. On the other hand, Rabin has never hidden his disdain for the more "idealistic" nature of President Jimmy Carter's foreign policy, and that of the Democratic foreign policy establishment.

It is therefore predictable that Rabin's top priority will be to establish strong personal and political ties with the Bush administration. Bush and Rabin are both cautious, pragmatic, calculating, and lack the "vision thing." They come from elitist backgrounds and flourish on personal, secret diplomacy-type relationships. Rabin will probably try to establish direct personal ties with Bush, and therefore weaken the power of both Peres' foreign ministry and the Israel lobby.

While Rabin was expected on his August visit to the U.S. to meet with Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton, the new prime minister maintains in private discussions that he would prefer to see Bush re-elected and his experienced Middle Eastern team remain in office. Rabin has told his visitors from the United States that he is worried over Clinton's inexperience in foreign policy, and said that Clinton reminds him of the amateurish Carter.

He is also concerned that it will take Clinton a while to form a Middle Eastern policy. Bush, on the other hand, can keep the peace process alive even while campaigning.

Rabin's pro-Bush sympathies have placed him in opposition to many of the leaders of the organized American-Jewish community, who have denounced the president as "anti-Israeli" and who have urged Rabin to refrain from helping the Republic leader in his bid for re-election.

An "October Surprise" scenario, in which, say, Rabin, King Hussein, and a Palestinian leader shake hands on the White House lawn a few weeks before the presidential elections-combined with a release of part of the loan guarantee-haunts the pro-Israeli activists who dominate the Clinton team. They know that such a scenario would not square with the "Bush-is-anti-Israel" message they are trying to perpetuate in order to move the Jewish vote in Clinton's direction in key states like California and New Jersey.

Clinton's American Jewish messengers to Rabin have requested that he not play into Bush's hands by jumping aboard the American-driven peace process until after the November elections. They have promised that Clinton will give Israel a "better deal" if elected.

Clinton's feelers, it is reported, have been rejected by Rabin, who has made it clear that he will take advantage of any pre-election offer made by Bush which serves Israeli needs. He reasons that any American administration is likely to be more generous to Israel just before rather than just after a closely contested U.S. election.

Even in the uncertainties of "the new world order," some things never change.

Leon T. Hadar's book, Quagmire: America in the Middle East, has just been published.

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