August/September 1992, Page 37

Maghreb Mirror

In Algeria the Agenda is Violence, No New Ideas, and a War Economy

By Jamal Amiar

The assassination of Algerian President Mohammed Boudiaf last June 29, a first in North African history, came as a shock throughout the entire region, which is deeply affected by the political events unfolding in Algiers. Symptoms of political, economic and social instability in the region are not, however, confined to Algeria.

In Morocco, economic growth for 1992 is down three percent from 1991. In Tunisia, as in Algeria, Islamist activists are on trial before a military court. In Libya, in an unprecedented twist to Muammar Al-Qaddafi's longtime anti-Western stand, the normally compliant press is conducting, with anti-Arab undertones, a puzzling debate over the disadvantages to Libya of Qaddafi's anti-Western foreign policy.

Only a few years ago, in the late 1980s, the Maghreb seemed to be breaking a cycle of violence and confrontation with the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union, dedicated to regional cooperation. Morocco and Algeria were reconciling, Tunisia was undergoing a peaceful transition from a long-entrenched regime, Libya was cooperating with Maghreb Union efforts, and Mauritania was pointing toward freedom and democracy.

Today, disappointment outpaces hope. There has been no Maghreb Union summit meeting since last September. In Algeria, Boudiaf is dead, the dinar is down, inflation is up, and the entire Maghreb is nervous.

In fact, Algerian economic indicators mirror the country's dramatic political deterioration. In 1991, economic growth was down 2.5 percent. Over the past four years the Algerian dinar has lost 75 percent of its value, as inflation has been running at a 30 percent annual rate.

The figures lend credence to those who insist that Islamic extremism flourishes only where political corruption and economic and social conditions have become intolerable.

Algeria's political descent dates back at least to late 1988, when more than 500 people were killed in bloody street riots. Then-President Chadli Benjedid responded with a process of political reform. A new constitution was promulgated and, in the ensuing atmosphere of freedom, more than 40 political parties were organized.

In local elections held in June 1990, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), dedicated to creation of an Islamic republic in Algeria, won control of a majority of the country's municipal councils.

With multiparty parliamentary elections scheduled for the following year, the Algerian regime sought to modify the electoral laws in order to limit a predictable Islamist victory.

The FIS protested the changes, but went through the first-round voting and piled up majorities nevertheless. As a result, the military elements in the Algerian government postponed second-round run-off elections, which might have given the FIS the parliamentary power to amend the constitution, and deposed Chadli.

In May, the FIS called for a general strike. The army went out in the streets, new dead were counted and FIS leaders, among them Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhaj, were jailed. About 10,000 Islamic militants were sent to prison camps.

Only two weeks before his assassination, Mohammed Boudiaf had claimed in an interview with the French newsweekly Paris-Match that "public security has been re-established. . . we are going to succeed because we have no other choice."

The sad truth, however, is that since last March at least 100 police and military personnel have been assassinated, and there have been frequent bombings. Another five policemen were killed two days after the president's assassination.

Algeria's new president is Ali Kafi and the new prime minister is Belaid Abdeslam, both men of the old guard. Although both left the National Liberation Front (FLN) after the October 1988 riots, Belaid is the father of the Algerian industrialization policy which in great part led to the present fiasco.

Belaid Abdeslam has long complained of French and U.S. "domination" of Algeria. That could further discourage foreign investment needed to create jobs for some of the country's two million unemployed.

Now Belaid Abdeslam advocates the establishment of a war economy: cutting imports and subsidizing prices of locally produced goods while seeking to deal with Algeria's $25 billion debt. In 1991, Algeria spent 75 percent of its energy earnings servicing that debt.

For neighboring Morocco, with troubles enough of its own, Belaid Abdeslam's return to power means two things. One is the possibility of renewed Algerian support for the Polisaro Front in the Western Sahara dispute that consumes a high percentage of Morocco's budget. Second, Algeria's plans to cut imports would adversely affect Moroccan food and other exports to Algeria.

Where a few years ago Algeria's problems might have been welcomed by some of its North African neighbors, today their principal concern is to keep those problems from spreading.

Jamal Aimar is a U.S.-educated journalist based in Tangier, Morocco.

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