March 1992, Page 9, 10, 48

To Tell the Truth

David Levy: Can He Win the Likud's Succession War?

By Leon T. Hadar

As Israel prepares for its June parliamentary elections, there are indications that their results might mirror the current political map, with Likud and Labor maintaining approximately their existing balance in the Knesset. That would perpetuate the present stalemate between the two political blocs, enabling the small parties, especially the religious-orthodox camp that is ideologically close to the Likud, to dictate the shape and orientation of the next Israeli government coalition.

The conventional wisdom now is that Israel either would be governed by a militant right-wing Likud-led coalition, not very different from the current one, or be led after the elections by another national unity government. The latter is an extremely likely scenario now that the hawkish Yitzhak Rabin has defeated the relatively moderate Shimon Peres in the Labor primaries.

In any case, Israeli and U.S. analysts are becoming increasingly skeptical of the chance of a political earthquake in the Jewish state that might bring a Labor-led peace camp to power. Even in the best-case scenario, Labor is not expected to gain more than three to five seats in the Knesset. In that situation it still would need the support of the religious parties and the backing of the Likud bloc for any major compromise on the peace front.

Certainly any willingness on the part of the Bush administration to approve loan guarantees to the Shamir government will not improve Labor prospects, particularly if they are tied to some complex "compromise" formula that enables Shamir to claim even a limited victory. Pundits therefore are shifting their attention to the potential successors of Yitzhak Shamir. Is there a possibility that after the election a younger and more pragmatic Likud leader might be more inclined to support the peace process and reach some kind of a reconciliation with the Palestinians?

At 77, Shamir is no spring chicken, although the Israeli prime minister and his aides like to brag about his excellent health. He takes long walks almost every day, and during a recent interview he impressed an Israeli columnist by dressing in shorts and a T-shirt and demonstrating his favorite set of weight-lifting exercises.

Most political observers agree, however, that notwithstanding these expressions of vitality, Shamir is about to close the political chapter of his life. They predict that within a year or two this veteran politician will hand over the Likud leadership position, including the prime ministership if Likud wins the elections, to a replacement. The latter would then be able to start early to prepare himself (no chances for a herself) for the next Knesset election campaign that will take place probably sometime in the mid-90s, pitting this new Likud leader against a member of the new generation of the Labor leadership.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the notion that Shamir is about to leave the political scene has ignited a fierce succession struggle in the Likud. It is dominated by several figures and party cliques, all of whom recognize the high stakes involved. The person who succeeds Shamir has a better-than-equal chance to occupy the prime minister's office in Jerusalem and have a major impact on the peace process.

Joining the Fight

Several Likud leaders have already announced their intention to join the fight. One contender is Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, who enjoys popular support among the rank and file of the party. He is portraying himself as Sharon-Churchill running against the appeaser Shamir-Chamberlain who, bowing to American and Arab pressure, is supposedly ready to sell out the Jewish people and give up "Judea and Samaria."

If Shamir agreed to accept even cosmetic concessions on the issue of West Bank settlements, Sharon could mobilize support from the most extreme elements inside and outside the Likud. But as hero/loser of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Sharon enjoys only limited influence on Likud's political machine and is disdained by the party's bosses. The latter are aware that his leadership would make likely the Likud's defeat in the general elections. In the very unlikely event that Sharon led the Likud to a general election victory, it could produce a major conflict with Washington.

A more serious candidate to replace Shamir is American-born Defense Minister Moshe ("Misha") Arens. Arens mastered the rules and techniques of the American public relations game during his tenure as an ambassador in Washington. He projects in U.S. television interviews a more moderate and reasonable image than does Shamir. Nevertheless, Arens shares Shamir's ideological commitment to "Greater Israel."

Shamir, therefore, seems to feel personally and politically comfortable with Arens, and might like to see the cold and calculating engineer (some observers describe him as "Israel's Dr. Strangelove") succeed him eventually, as the Likud leader. Very early this year Arens declared, for the first time, his intention to run for the position.

The Likud "Princes"

And then there are the Likud "princes." They consist of the relatively young leaders of the party, most of whom are the sons of the founders of the Herut wing of the Likud. They include Justice Minister Dan Meridor and Health Minister Ehud Olmert. American officials sometimes refer to both as "closet doves," suggesting that although they serve as close aides to Shamir, in private they tend to express more conciliatory positions on the Palestinian issue and are especially concerned over the political repercussions of Shamir's confrontation with the U.S.

Another member of this Likud aristocracy is propagandist Benjamin ("Bibi") Netanyahu. Although "Bibi" was chosen in a recent poll as the most popular Likud figure, his political base in the party is very narrow and that same base is likely to support Shamir's candidate, and Netanyahu's one political patron, Arens.

The most prominent "prince" is Benjamin ("Benny") Begin, only son of the Likud's king, Menachem Begin. Begin Jr. stated during the Madrid peace conference that he seriously hopes one day to step into his father's political shoes. Most "Beginists," however, believe that by entering the race Benny Begin, who is one of the Likud's most popular spokesmen, is trying more than anything else to challenge Sharon, whom he viciously dislikes. (Benny Begin blames Sharon's conduct during the 1982 Lebanon campaign for his father's political downfall.)

Begin is expected eventually to withdraw from the race and to commit his political troops to Arens, who is his ideological carbon-copy. Like Arens and Netanyahu, Begin believes Israel should not give up even one inch of the occupied territories. The three argue that Israel's main problem in its relationship with the U.S. lies in the public relations arena, and that Israel only needs more effective ways to "explain" its position to the American people.

Perhaps the most interesting Likud contender is Foreign Minister David Levy. The Moroccan-born foreign minister occupies the second spot on the Likud Knesset list, and also serves as deputy prime minister, replacing Shamir as the government head when the prime minister is ill or travels abroad. In many ways Levy is in a position similar to that of an American vice president. He is seen as having an important political base in the party and as the "natural successor" to the country's leader, unless someone comes along to challenge this status.

And, indeed, that someone is Arens. Backed by Shamir, the defense minister announced that he has decided to run for the second spot when the Likud list is drawn up and, if successful, to demote Levy to a lower position in the party's heirarchy. The Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot suggested that Arens' announcement amounted to the "opening shot in the Likud's world war."

The competition between the English-speaking Arens and the French- and Arabic-speaking Levy is, in fact, more than just a naked power struggle aimed at capturing turf and resources within the Likud. Levy is the most important political leader of the Sephardi Jews, who came to Israel from Arab countries, and the strongest dovish voice in the current Israeli cabinet. The outcome of the "world war" between the Likud's two camps has important ideological dimensions and could have a major impact on the peace process.

Levy's political biography reflects the important role the Sephardim, and in particular the large group of Moroccan-Jewish voters, have played in Israeli politics. After arriving in Israel in the early 1950s, Levy, like many of the new Sephardi immigrants, supported the socialist Mapai party and, in particular, its charismatic leader, David BenGurion. Levy actually approached Mapai's headquarters in his town of Beit Sh'an and expressed an interest in running for office on the party's ticket. However, the party's Ashkenazi (European) bosses were not interested and Levy decided instead to visit the rival Herut's office. That party's leaders accepted him with open arms.

Indeed, the patronizing attitude of the Eastern European leadership of Labor toward the young generation of Sephardi activists was one of the main reasons for the party's loss of power in 1977. The Likud and its leader, Menachem Begin, were able to attract to its ranks the dissatisfied lower middle class Sephardim and to exploit their antagonism toward Labor.

Moreover, the Sephardi voters were alienated from the secular and progressive agenda of Labor and were more comfortable with the Likud's simplistic nationalist and traditional attitudes. Since 1977, the Sephardi voting bloc has become the political backbone of the Likud, securing that party's hold on the prime minister's office.

Levy became the most prominent of the young Sephardi leaders groomed by the Likud, but the party's veteran Ashkenazi bosses never felt comfortable with him or his colleagues. First, there was the cultural gap. Most of the Sephardim came from a Middle Eastern background and never considered Israel to be a "European outpost" in a "primitive" region. More important, unlike the Likud's founding fathers and the young "princes," the Sephardim never seemed ideologically committed to party dogmas.

Leaders of the settlement movements, after all, were mainly Ashkenazi Jews, many of whom had emigrated from the United States. Very few Sephardim settled in "Judea and Samaria" and the main concerns of their politicians seemed to be economic and social, in particular the need to improve the conditions in Israeli development towns and slums inside the Green Line, where most Middle Eastern immigrants live.

Levy's relationship with Shamir and the other Likud veterans has mirrored this complex Ashkenazi-Sephardi antagonism. For a while, a division of labor developed between the two groups. Levy and the other Sephardim were responsible for soft-issue areas like the housing and welfare ministries, while Shamir, Arens and Sharon took care of the "serious" national security and foreign policy matters. Problems started when Levy suggested that, with his seniority and political base in the party, the time had come for him to join the big leagues.

Under pressure, Shamir granted Levy the foreign affairs portfolio, but remained personally responsible for the crucial U.S.-Israeli relationship. Shamir also nominated a political protege, Zalman Shoval, as ambassador to Washington, with the understanding that Shoval would report directly to Shamir and not to Levy.

Shamir sent Arens on secret missions to the United States and other countries without informing Levy, and forced Netanyahu on Levy as a deputy foreign minister responsible for maintaining ties with English-speaking audiences. In reality, "Bibi" Netanyahu served as Shamir's eyes and ears in the foreign ministry.

It took Levy only a short time to begin developing an independent, moderate approach, making him one of the main challengers within the Likud to Sharon's militant policies. It was Levy who advocated military restraint and diplomatic cooperation with the United States during the Gulf war, and who put pressure on Shamir to respond more positively to American peace efforts following Desert Storm.

According to Israeli press reports, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker told Levy he was "our main ally for peace in the Israeli cabinet," a report that irritated Shamir.

As U.S.-Israeli tensions have intensified, Shamir expressed concern that Bush would exploit Levy's more conciliatory approach in order to weaken Israel's tough stand. When the Madrid Conference was about to convene, Shamir exploded a political bombshell. The prime minister told his aides he was worried that the foreign minister was too much of a "weakling" to represent Israel effectively. Some Israeli analysts suggested that Shamir could not stand the idea of Levy becoming the star of the Madrid show. Levy, of the Israeli delegation, was told by the Likud leader that he could either join a delegation led by Shamir, or stay home from Madrid. Shamir's move represented a slap in the face of the Likud's Sephardi constituency, and reminded its members of the Labor party's arrogant attitude.

So Levy stayed home, but he used the opportunity to fire Netanyahu, whom he accused of "spying" for the prime minister, and to announce his plans to run for the prime minister's position.

At a time when many of the poor Sephardim are losing their jobs (the unemployment in some of the development towns is more than 20 percent), the Likud finds it more and more difficult to convince this constituency to divert precious resources to the settlements. The relationship between a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and economic prosperity in Israel is a point that more and more Sephardim, including Levy, are recognizing. The final stage in this political metamorphosis is the conclusion that the Greater Israel vision runs contrary to the long-term interests of the Sephardim.

Indeed, Ha'aretz correspondent Gideon Levy, who covered the recent Likud convention, reported that, to his surprise, he found many of the Sephardi activists he interviewed now are willing to give up most of the West Bank and Gaza in exchange for peace. Levy, notwithstanding his more moderate orientation, still is committed publicly to the notion that Israel should retain control of the occupied territories. But, as the confrontation with the Shamir-Arens wing moves into high gear, his disagreement with the dogmatic Likud approach might be accentuated.

Based on the balance of forces in the Likud's central committee, Levy's chances of winning his party's nomination as prime minister are slim. A coalition consisting of the Arens clique, the "princes" and the Sharon wing could theoretically leave Levy and his supporters isolated in the party. It is doubtful, however, that Arens and the moderate "princes" would want to tie their political future to the unpredictable and dangerous Sharon. It is more likely that, after the political bloodbath, Arens and Levy will reach an agreement that will solidify the latter's position in the Likud.

On one point almost everyone agrees: David Levy's political future looks bright, regardless of when he is elected. For years, the Middle Eastern Jews he represented were perceived as among the most anti-Arab elements in Israeli society and an obstacle on the road to peace.

Levy's own political evolution suggests that things are changing, and that he and the Jews who arrived from the surrounding Arab countries could in the long run become a bridge between Israel and its natural political and cultural environment. Arabic-speaking Levy, whose command of English seems limited to "OK" and "thank you," could be the first Israeli prime minister who would feel more comfortable appearing on Egyptian television than on ABC's "Nightline."

Leon T. Hadar's book focusing on U.S. policy in the Middle East will be published in April by the Cato Institute.

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