Maghreb Mirror: Algerian Army and Islamists Are on a Collision Course
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March 1992, Page 13
Maghreb Mirror
Algerian Army and Islamists Are on a Collision Course
By Jamal Amiar
The power struggle between Algeria's army and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) that has simmered for the past two years boiled over when the military, in the name of preserving democracy, interrupted the democratic process on Jan. 11. Since the FIS was officially recognized and legalized more than two years ago, despite laws prohibiting political parties based upon religion or ethnicity, the two camps have been at odds over a wide range of issues.
The FIS never misses an opportunity to point out that under the one-party rule of the military-backed National Liberation Front (FLN), the country stagnated economically while the army thrived. The fact is that despite huge gas and oil revenues, Algeria is in a shambles that can only be compared to the economic chaos in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. Basic products are absent from grocery store shelves, unemployment is reaching the 2 million level, and the Algerian dinar has depreciated fourfold in the past two years.
The growth of the FIS, a populist religious party, is the result of the mismanagement the country has suffered under one-party FLN rule ever since the overthrow of French colonial rule in 1962. For this reason, the FIS represents a direct threat in the minds of the military and FLN ruling elite. Conversely, to the FIS the army symbolizes the bankruptcy of the country and also the repression of the Islamist movement, particularly during the bloody riots of October 1988.
These mutual suspicions have reached fever pitch during the past two years. Less than a year ago, the all-FLN parliament adopted an electoral law meant to marginalize the Islamic Front (see the May/June 1991 Washington Report). What followed was a prelude to the present violence. The Islamic Front called a general strike protesting the electoral law. The riots that followed were suppressed with a heavy death toll. FIS leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Belhaj were jailed, and the elections did not take place as scheduled last June.
Prime Minister Mouloud Hamrouche resigned. He was replaced by Sid Ahmed Ghozali, whose goal was to organize "clean and honest election." Ghozali did indeed change important sections of the contested electoral law. First-round elections were rescheduled for Dec. 26, 1991, with run-off elections scheduled for Jan. 16, 1992.
In the first round, the Islamic Front won 188 of the 430 contested seats. A Berber-based party, the Socialist Forces Front (FFS) won 25 seats and the once dominant FLN won only 16. It became certain that in the second-round voting on 242 still-contested seats the Islamic Front success would win a clear majority in parliament, and possibly obtain a two-thirds majority, enabling it to make constitutional changes that would favor its continuance in power.
The army's strong opposition to such a scenario was known. A number of leaders began feverish efforts to head off an almost inevitable confrontation. President Chadli Benjedid discussed with FIS leaders a formula to reconcile their separate interests, on grounds that if he remained president he could stop constitutional changes.
Under the deal he proposed, the FIS would forego its threat to organize presidential elections prior to the expiration of Chadli's term, scheduled to run through 1993. In exchange, Chadli would dismiss the military heirarchy, including Defense Minister Khalid Nezzar and Interior Minister Larbi Belkheir. The army veto of this scenario forced Chadli Benjedid's resignation on Jan. 11, creating an institutional and constitutional vaccum.
A Coup D'Etat "a l'Algerienne"
According to Algeria's constitution, if the president resigns he is to be replaced by the head of the parliament. But on the day Chadli resigned, the Algerian public was told for the first time that there was no president of the parliament because the parliament had been dissolved one week earlier.
Whenever the parliament actually was dissolved, the objective was obvious. The army did not want the head of the parliament, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, to replace Chadli because Belkhadem had close ties to the Islamic Front and to the president.
The army heirarchy next invited Mohammed Boudiaf, an Algerian officer and hero of the resistance to France who had been living in exile in Morocco, to return to Algiers to head a newly created "High State Committee" (HCE). Boudiaf, who had left Algeria in 1964 after trying to set up his own political party, accepted the invitation to return.
Boudiaf's return symbolized the depth of the crisis into which the Algerian political system had sunk. Asked if he knew the new head of state, one Algerian "man in the street" responded wryly, "Boudiaf? No, we do not know this name. So he must not be a thief." In fact, in a nation where 70 percent of the population is less than 30 years old, few Algerians could identify either Boudiaf or what he stood for.
They found out, however, when the new HCE halted the electoral process and arrested top Islamic Front leaders who were not already in jail, as well as many mosque prayer leaders and FIS activists.
The most violent initial protest broke out in Batna, 250 miles east of Algiers, where street battles continued for three days, from Feb. 4-6. At least 12 people were killed and 60 wounded. Since then, Algeria increasingly has resembled Iran in the last days of the Shah. Renewed demonstrations and bloody street battles have become routine in Batna, Algiers and Constantine as, each day, Islamic Front activists march through the streets to bury the dead of the day before.
After the killings in Batna, the Islamic Front called upon its followers not to respond in kind to security forces provocations. It also called upon the HCE to resume the democratic election process. But this strategy of "wait and see" must soon lead either to negotiations or to a visible, and probably violent, dead end. In Algeria, as the French learned a generation ago, there is no middle ground.
Jamal Amiar is a U.S.-educated radio journalist based in Tangier, Morocco.
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