March 1992, Page 14-16

Are Islamists or the Army the Greatest Threat to Algerian Democracy? -Three Views

"God Guard Islam from the Islamists"

By Aicha Lemsine

Algeria is a country where Islam is the religion of state. Its 25 million inhabitants are, like their neigbors in Morocco and Tunisia, Sunni Muslims following the Maliki rite-one of the most liberal and open in Islam.

Fundamentalism anywhere subsists on moral and material destitution.

Thirty years after the Algerian war of liberation from French colonization, daily life bore modernity's imprint. Hundreds of women had become teachers, engineers, architects, judges, members of Parliament and even Ministers. Now, however, religious parties threaten society with a return to the "abyss of the jahiliya," or pre-Islamic period.

Heartened by its huge success in the Dec. 26 first round of multi-party parliamentary elections, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a fundamentalist party founded in 1989, for the first time overtly proclaimed its plan to create an Islamic Algerian state through strict application of the shariah, Islamic law.

Sermons in the mosques extolled Sudan and Iran as the models. Sudden death awaited the pluralist democratic experiment initiated in February 1989 with the ratification of Algeria's new constitution.

Leaflets circulated by the FIS militants revealed, among other things, that the treatment awaiting women was a negation of every recognized human right:

1) Working women should return to their homes because, according to the FIS, "woman is not a producer of material goods but a producer of men, of that essential being, the Muslim."

2) Mixing between the sexes in the schools and universities, transport, and public places would be prohibited.

3) Women who must work ought to perform their duties in restricted feminine circles.

4) Polygamy, divorce by repudiation, stoning, and flogging for adultery would be instituted.

5) Wearing the hijab (head covering) would be compulsory. This signifies not only the loss of hard-won rights, but also that the fundamentalists are determined to obstruct every aspect of the integration of women into the process of national economic and social development.

Fundamentalism in Algeria is less a political trend than the consequence of years of disastrous state policies, which have resulted in economic, social and cultural destruction. Fundamentalism anywhere subsists on moral and material destitution. The National Liberation Front (FLN), the single party allowed to wield power since 1962, generated much of this destitution.

For more than 15 years, the Algerian regime wavered between state capitalism, scientific socialism and specific socialism attached to Arab and Islamic values. That irresolution has impacted negatively both on individuals and on the different social and economic classes. The immediate consequence is more than one million unemployed, almost seven and a half million illiterate citizens and, finally, the emergence of a corrupt and rapacious nomenklatura.

Seventy percent of Algeria's population is under 30 years old. Unemployed youths took to the streets in October 1988. After bloody riots throughout the whole country, the regime then in power accepted political pluralism. Scores of political parties were recognized by the government, among them a religious one, the FIS, which was illegal under a constitution banning parties based upon religion or ethnicity.

All this is background for FIS successes in local and regional elections in June 1990 and national elections in December 1991. Of the three million FIS voters, more than 60 percent are illiterate and two-thirds are under 30.

Of a thousand letters I received from people aged 20 to 40 in response to an opinion survey I undertook on Jan. 20 through the daily Le Soir d'Algerie, the prevailing motivations in their choice of the FIS can be summarized in two sentences: "They promised to grant jobs and housing. As they are men of religion we trust them, for we are sure they would not lie to us."

The FIS seems to receive a lot of money not only from Algerians but also from foreign donors in the Middle East and Iran. This enables the party to help people facing a very difficult situation.

Moreover, since its founding the FIS has, with impunity, used thousands of mosques to transmit its message through political sermons, raise huge amounts of money, and recruit more followers. Meanwhile the resources divided among some 50 other parties are restricted mostly to limited efforts conducted from modest quarters. Taking advantage of the political chaos, the FIS could assail the army, the laity, the media and women with impunity. Even two smaller Islamic parties, Hamas and Ennahda, did not escape the FIS onslaught.

Accession to power, whatever the cost, is the political faith of the FIS. Utilizing the democratic process to attain power, and then curbing any legal opposition is not the least of its inconsistencies. Nazi Germany, Communist Czechoslovakia and Khomeini's Iran all provide examples of such duplicity. Algeria would have gone from one FLN dictatorship to another.

Those who object to this characterization, and claim the political innocence of the religious parties, are ignorant of Algerian social and cultural realities, are sheer demagogues, or are people living outside of the country in comfortable surroundings and indulging in fantasies about the present and future of an Algeria they do not know. Some are males who believe polygamy, the hijab and other manifestations of contempt affect women only.

The Danger of Violence

Even more dangerous than the present economic predicament is the violence instigated by religious fanaticism. Groups of fundamentalists lead punitive expeditions into bars and discotheques, engage in hold-ups, and have even attacked the police and armed forces in search of weapons and ammunition.

The army tried to remain neutral, but intervened when stability and national unity were in jeopardy. Several days after President Chadli Benjedid's resignation, a five-man Council of State was appointed to fill the deficiencies of the constitution. For Algerian democracy there will be a further respite of almost two years, providing time to draft a new constitution, establish stricter rules for political parties, banning those with religious, regional and cultural agendas, and inoculate democracy against anarchy and intolerance.

As masters of one of the richest developing nations, Algeria's new rulers should find a way to get Algerians working together on behalf of their country. To Algerian men and women, religion must be an instrument of justice and equal opportunity offered to both sexes, not a dogma reducing us to slavery and hampering our empancipation. Islam, the religion of all Algerians, has never meant the denial of democracy. Islam has never opposed nature, but always adapted to it. To quote an Algerian compatriot:

"We do not fear Islam We fear for it. God guard Islam From the Islamists."

Aicha Lemsine is an award-winning Algerian novelist whose work has been translated into five languages. She lives in Algiers, and her works have come to symbolize the fight for women's rights.

The People's Choice Will Prevail

By Aly R. Abuzaakouk

Algeria provides a good example of the struggle of the Muslim masses for the realization of their true identity.

For more than 130 years France tried to alter the identity of the Algerian people through its program of assimilation. Despite their concerted efforts at cultural assassination, the French were forced to leave the country after a bitter seven-year war that left 1.5 million Algerian martyrs.

During their long struggle for freedom, the Algerian people equipped themselves with the basic sources of their identity: the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. When freedom dawned in 1962, the Algerian masses celebrated in the streets by chanting, "Congratulations, O (Prophet) Muhammad! Algeria has come back to you!" This slogan reflected the real spirit of the Algerian revolution.

In the early 1960s, the Arab political environment was dominated by Nasserite socialist slogans. Algerian revolutionaries were swept up in this tide, and believed that the socialist model was the only available vehicle for combatting colonialism and achieving economic development.

The National Liberation Front (FLN), which was in the vanguard of this movement, took advantage of the pressing national needs of the post-colonial period and grew into a one-party, authoritarian structure that imposed its will on the people of Algeria. In its 30 years of unchallenged dictatorship, the FLN deteriorated into a corrupt and fossilized behemoth. FLN functionaries seemed to appropriate all powers and resources for themselves as a matter of right, because they had fought against the French, forgetting that the struggle belonged to each and every Algerian.

The socialist dictatorship failed to realize any of its economic or developmental goals. Instead it squandered the nation's resources, reducing Algeria to the status of a pawn in the hands of its creditors. The lack of economic progress and the absence of freedom gave birth to a grassroots Islamic trend fed by the bitterness and frustration of the emerging generation. There was a confrontation with the FLN-led government in October 1988 which was put down by the security forces with a loss of over 500 lives.

The Algerian ruling elite realized that their only hope lay in opening the political arena for other voices, ending the monopoly of the FLN, and allowing democratic institutions to take shape. As a result, several political organizations emerged.

In the 1989 provincial and municipal elections, the newly formed Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was the outright winner. This surprised and stunned secular Arab observers. The Western and Arab press did not take such a political development lightly, but its consternation later subsided when it was discovered that local authorities do not wield real power. Soon, however, the FIS sought a national role by demanding early parliamentary and presidential elections.

The FLN, stung by its defeat in the 1989 elections, sought to secure the field for itself in advance of national elections by amending the electoral code and redrawing constituencies to suit its requirements. Government decrees were designed to undermine FIS centers of popular support and ensure FLN rule under the guise of a renewed legality. The FIS had no recourse except to alert the people, who protested against these political machinations.

The government reacted to popular protest with force. As a result, scores of people were killed, FIS leaders Dr. Abbasi Madani and Ali Belhaj were arrested, and a state of emergency was declared in June 1991. The ruling elite felt the need to get out of the embarrassing corner into which it had painted itself, and formed a new government made up mainly of technocrats. It amended the electoral code and promised to hold elections before the end of 1991.

Given the choice, the Arab masses will opt for Islam.

Despite the handicaps imposed upon it, the FIS agreed to participate in the Dec. 26 polls, and emerged the overwhelming winner. The victory sent shock waves through North Africa, the Arab world and the West. It proved that, given the choice, the Arab masses will opt for Islam. The minority-imposed governments in the Arab world-whether tribal, hereditary, military or single-party-started a media campaign to undermine the Algerian people's choice. The Western media, except for a few brave voices, labelled the FIS as "anti-democratic." The FIS was branded a tyrant even before it was allowed to assume office. Some Arabic language newspapers even accused it of rigging the elections! The French press, fearing Algerian emancipation from francophone cultural hegemony, led the call for the Algerian army to move in to save (!) "freedom." No one questioned the efficacy of inviting the military to seize power for itself in the name of saving democracy!

The Western and Arab secular media have conveniently made Islam synonymous with authoritarianism. If democracy really means the will of the people, then no one else has the right to dictate terms.

The Right to Uphold Ideals

The Algerian army's coup, which violated both the constitution and the will of the Algerian people, should not be accepted by any genuine believer in democracy and freedom. This is an opportune moment in history for those who value democracy to call upon their respective governments to bring pressure against the Algerian junta to step aside and let the democratization process resume its course. Algerians should have the right to uphold ours. Although it may delay the process, in the end military intervention cannot strip power from the Algerian people.

Aly R. Abuzaakouk is a free-lance correspondent specializing in North African affairs. He was previously a lecturer in the Department of Communication at the University of Benghazi.

Both Sides Lose Without Quick Reconciliation

By Feroz Ahmed

The landslide election victory of the fundamentalist FIS, and the subsequent cancellation of free elections by the military, present Algerian democrats with a classic avoid-avoid conflict situation. Neither outcome is desirable. How this conflict is resolved will have a far-reaching impact on the entire Islamic world, including the newly independent former Soviet republics, as well as on Muslim relations with the West.

Militant Islamic parties have little tolerance for views that differ from their own.

FIS is part of the international phenomenon popularly known as Islamic fundamentalism. To understand FIS, it is important to understand this phenomenon. It is fundamentalist in the sense that it resorts to a literal interpretation of the Qur'an, and emphasizes adherence to a strict behavioral code rather than to the social and moral essence of Islamic teachings. More significant, however, is the fact that this movement taps the baser instincts and authoritarian tendencies in Muslim society which, in a Western context, would be identified with facism. It is not surprising, therefore, that the militant Islamic parties all over the Muslim world stress the punitive aspects of the Islamic code and have little tolerance for views that differ from their own.

The popularity of this movement in some countries can be seen as a Muslim response to a multitude of frustrations common to the Third World. These include the loss of identity due to centuries of Western domination, corruption of the ruling elites, gross social inequities, deepening economic crisis and spiraling unemployment rates. In the era of the decline of communism and anti-imperialist nationalism, the Islamic militant movement presents "the Islamic system" as an answer to these problems and to Western unfairness and callousness toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, as evidenced by pro-Israeli policies and the needless decimation of Iraq.

It should not be forgotten that resort to militant Islamic appeals also serves as a convenient route to power. Slogans of Islamic revolution often have little to do with belief in Islamic principles. In a sense, the militant Islamic movement represents a struggle by some marginalized groups to grab power from the established-often Westernized-ruling groups by exploiting religion. That is why even the fundamentalist and conservative Saudi Arabian government is threatened by the militants.

Judging from the practice of the "Islamic" regimes in Iran and Sudan, the theoretical underpinnings of the militant "Islamic" movement in general, and the pronouncements of the FIS itself, an FIS government in Algeria could have been expected to attempt to impose a totalitarian system, kill all future prospects for democracy, suppress all expressions of modern rationality and secular thought, and make the life of women a living hell.

Commentators in the American press, like Youssef Ibrahim of The New York Times or Jonathan Randal of The Washington Post, simply delude themselves by believing that Algerian fundamentalism will somehow be different from the Iranian version. There is no difference between Tweedledee and Tweedledum; and the leopard cannot change its spots. For the "soft" version of an Islamic shariah-affected country, witness Pakistan where gang rapes of women have become an instrument of political suppression, where women who complain of rape risk conviction of adultery or fornication, and where hangings are public.

Apologists for such "democratic" Islamic countries often hoodwink Western media and governments by citing the existence of elected civilian governments and multiparty systems. However, despite more than 50 years of experience in electoral politics and the population's basic democratic impulses, the rulers of Pakistan have made a farce of the electoral process and have assured the victory of the military-bureaucracy's quasi-fundamentalist front party.

Algeria, like the rest of the Arab world and Iran, has never really tested democracy. It would therefore be that much easier for the fundamentalist regime there to abort the process of democratization which began in 1988. The only force that stood in the way of establishing a theocratic totalitarianism was the military.

The cancellation of the elections by the Algerian military is by no means an undiluted blessing, however. It is not even certain that this action was unavoidable. It provides an excuse for dictatorial regimes in other Arab countries to cite a fundamentalist threat in order to thwart attempts at democratization.

For Algeria itself, the military's action is fraught with dangers. Even though the FIS margin of victory may be exaggerated due to the low turnout of secular voters, FIS won big even by the rules devised by the ruling party. Therefore, FIS enjoys popular legitimacy. To frustrate the FIS victory and to suppress it by force will only strengthen the resolve of its followers and further polarize Algerian society. If confrontation between the FIS and the armed forces becomes inevitable, then the unity of the army itself can no longer be guaranteed.

Dealing with Military Power

Islamic militants have dealt with military power in basically two ways: 1) by physical elimination of the top brass of the army following a revolution, as in Iran, or 2) by a coup d'etat by fundamentalist officers and an alliance between the armed forces and fundamentalist politicians, as in Sudan and Pakistan. The Algerian army's failure to restore the democratic process may lead to one or the other alternative, and ultimately benefit the fundamentalists.

While the army is still united and has legitimacy, and the secular forces can act as a counterweight, it would be prudent to open negotiations for reconciliation and power-sharing by which winners are not robbed of their election gains and the secular and modernist elements of the constitution are preserved. Horse-trading is not unknown in that part of the world. Nor will it infringe democratic norms, since Algeria has no democratic tradition and FIS does not intend to establish one. If the army can accomplish this, it might save both itself and Algeria, and set an example for the rest of the Arab world.

Feroz Ahmed is a senior research associate at Howard University's Institute for Urban Affairs and Research. He was editor of Pakistan Forum, which was banned by the regime of General Zia Ul Haq because of its pro-democracy and anti-fundamentalist views.

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