Words To Remember: The December 1991 Bilateral Peace Talks in Washington: Day By Day
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February 1992, Page 18-21
Words To Remember
The December 1991 Bilateral Peace Talks in Washington: Day By Day
"We do hope for the sake of peace and for the sake of the Israeli people that they [the Israelis] will stop playing games, because we think peace is too serious to be played around with like this."
Palestinian delegation spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi, Dec. 3, 1991
"Look, there may be a public relations problem, but believe me, there's life after public relations."
Israeli Ambassador to the US Zalman Shoval, NBC "Today" interview, Dec. 3, 1991
"In completing the arrangements, the United States made a concession to the Israelis by barring photographers and reporters from the negotiating rooms until all the participants are in place, presumably to avoid a worldwide Arab publicity bonanza of pictures of empty Israeli chairs. . . The arrangements also contained a trio of victories for the Arabs. The US had refused to retreat under pressure from Jerusalem from the date Mr. Baker had specified, even though the effective opening of the talks will now take place next Monday, barring a last-minute change of heart by the Israelis, and the three bargaining sessions were set to run simultaneously, not consecutively, as the Israelis had asked. In addition, the State Department granted visa waivers to two Palestinians whose links to the Palestine Liberation Organization would otherwise have barred them."
Journalist R.W. Apple, The New York Times, Dec. 3, 1991
"Secretary of State James A. Baker III had chosen yesterday for resumption of the negotiations begun in Madrid in late October. But the day turned out to be less than historic, The Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian-Jordanian delegations arrived on time for meetings at State Department conference rooms, waited for a while for Israelis, and then left. . . Meanwhile [State Department spokeswoman Margaret] Tutwiler criticized Israel's establishment of a new military settlement in the West Bank on the eve of the Washington talks."
Journalist David Hoffman, The Washington Post, Dec. 5, 1991
"They are going to a room that they know in advance is going to be empty, but they have not picked up the phone in response to our phone calls. . . They're saying to the Americans, you impose, you dictate, we won't talk. They think they can use the United States as a bulldozer, as opposed to making the kinds of direct talks that are necessary for peace. I think the important thing is to stop relying on the United States. What do we need it for?"
Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister and delegation spokesman Benjamin Netanyahu, Dec. 4, 1991
"If the Israelis really have any intention of making peace, they should stop all settlements."
Bethlehem Mayor and Palestinian delegate Elias Freij, Dec. 4, 1991
"We feel that this is part of a pattern in which Israel is trying to sabotage the whole peace process and at the same time trying to dictate its own will on everybody who is participating in this process. . . We're going to stay as long as we need to finish our work."
Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi, Dec. 4, 1991
"The Israelis do not want the Americans in any way involved in the negotiations, and therefore constantly emphasize direct talks alone with Arabs. The Arabs, by contrast, want the Americans intimately involved at every stage to compensate for their weaknesses and to press the Israelis on their behalf."
Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Dec. 4, 1991
"The Israeli government does not seem to me as serious as it should be about such a vital issue. . . of peace and security."
Syrian delegation spokeswoman Bushra Kanafani, Dec. 4, 1991
"We are waiting for the others to come and we hope they will come. We did not accomplish anything because we could not talk to the wall."
Jordanian chief delegate Abdul Salam Majali, Dec. 4, 1991
"By appearing to be consumed with procedural wrangling, Shamir reinforces those who say his objections are designed to postpone discussing substantive issues. As a result, he makes his enemies look good."
Former AIPAC official Douglas Bloomfield, Washington Jewish Week, Dec. 5, 1991
"Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir deliberately went to the brink with the United States this week, prepared to face a short-term propaganda disaster for what he hopes and expects to be long-range benefits for Israel as the peace process unfolds."
Jewish Telegraph Agency journalist David Landau, The Jewish Week (NY), Dec. 6-12, 1991
"We must not mislead the Arabs. Our line is to work toward peace and maintain the land of Israel."
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Dec. 7, 1991
"We say that settlements should be a matter that is put on the table in negotiations. Prime Minister Shamir himself has said settlements should be on the table for negotiations. . . We've always seen our role as being a catalyst for peace. We've said that we would try to be the guiding force to see that the process begins in the first place and then continues. . . We want to serve as a driving force to the extent that we can, and to the extent that it would be productive. And we reserve the right, as indeed I think we should as co-sponsors, to submit bridging proposals from time to time if that would be helpful."
US Secretary of State James Baker III, CBS's "Face the Nation," Dec. 8, 1991
"Neither Israel nor the Arabs turned up in Madrid by accident. All went because pressures growing out of the end of the Cold War and the outcome of the Gulf war made it impossible to say no to the American invitation: The Syrians have lost their Soviet patrons and need a relationship with Washington; the Israelis are besieged with Soviet immigrants and more in need of American aid than ever; the Palestinians and Jordanians, isolated and impoverished because they supported Iraq, are grasping for a lifeboat. The central question is whether the external pressures and inducements are enough only to bring the parties to the table, or whether they will also prove sufficient to get them to sign agreements. If history is any guide, external pressure alone is necessary to produce Arab-Israeli agreements, but not sufficient. . . Syria's President, Hafez Al-Assad, knows that once he acknowledges that change is afoot in relations with Israel, the Syrian people will ask for a lot of other changes in their lives too. And Mr. Shamir is afraid that if he offers the Palestinians a softer version of occupation he will inadvertently create a domestic constituency for the territorial compromise he still opposes."
Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Dec. 8, 1991
"The bickering over the time and place of the meetings has been exploited by opponents of the process to argue that Washington's active involvement in virtually every stage of the negotiations could become 'counter-productive.' The Israeli government wishes to eliminate the United States from the actual talks with the Arabs as soon as possible. The Arabs, on the other hand, insist that they will stay on board only as long as they are sure of 'active and strong participation' by the United States."
Journalist Amir Taheri, Arab News, Jiddah, Dec. 8, 1991
"We are ready for progress. We are going to discuss all issues that can be placed on the table whether they are technical or substantive. . . Of course we would have preferred to hold the talks directly in the region. But since our neighbors have refused to do so, we have agreed to come here and at least begin this phase in the talks, hoping that this would bring about a breakthrough."
Israeli delegate Yossi Ben-Aharon, Dec. 8, 1991
"The clashes over where and when to meet ended quietly when both sides indicated over the weekend they would attend negotiations at the US State Department Dec. 10. It was still unclear how long the Israeli negotiators would stay in Washington for the three separate sets of negotiations with Syria, Lebanon and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. A senior Israeli official said they would be prepared to stay for two or three sessions. But he declined to define how long a session could last. . . Israel says it cannot keep its officials so far from home for long. More importantly, it wants to win Arab recognition by holding talks in Israel and Arab countries. The Arabs are determined to withhold such recognition until Israel agrees to start withdrawing from occupied territories it captured in the 1967 Middle East war."
Reuters, New York Herald Tribune, Dec. 9, 1991
"In the last few days, there have been forceful reminders that Israel intends to stick to its settler guns, a series of government actions that officials call justified but that opposition parties and other critics attack as deliberate provocations as the Washington talks near."
Journalist Clyde Haberman, The New York Times, Dec. 9, 1991
"The Jewish settlements will not be subject to any non-Israeli authority, nor will they be dependent on such an authority for anything."
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Dec. 9, 1991
"Israel wants to reduce US influence on the talks, because it believes the Arabs are following a strategy of refusing to bargain seriously while waiting for the United States to press Israel for concessions. . . The settlements also have the potential for creating a serious clash between the United States and Israel. President Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III have been outspoken advocates of a settlements freeze and have refused to rule out the possibility that they might tie such a freeze to support of Israel's upcoming request for $10 billion in loan guarantees to help absorb Jewish emigres from the Soviet Union. If the administration opts for such linkage, it will be almost impossible to avert a clash with Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's government."
Journalists John Goshko and Jackson Diehl, The Washington Post, Dec. 10, 1991
"The Israeli chief negotiator, Yossi Ben-Aharon, declined to commit Israel to any territorial concession on the Golan Heights, since the Israelis argue that while Resolution 242 calls on them to surrender territories occupied in the 1967 war, it does not specify 'all' the territories. . . Israeli reporters said Syrian spokesmen in Washington have also answered all of their questions, in contrast to the behavior of some of the Syrian spokesmen in Madrid, who would ignore Israeli journalists altogether."
Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Dec. 10, 1991
"The Palestinians find themselves for the first time confronting Israel across a negotiating table on formally equal terms, and with some reason to hope that the US will persuade Israel to concede real autonomy in the occupied territories, leading just possibly to actual withdrawal from most of them in five years. It is not much of a hope: the territories in question, even if one includes East Jerusalem (which Israel firmly refuses to do), constitute only 22 percent of pre-1948 Palestine. But the alternative is Israel's continued military and economic squeeze on Arab inhabitants. To secure even this quarter-loaf for the Palestinians, it is vital that President Bush retain the moral high ground vis-a-vis the Israeli government in the eyes of America. That is why he is asking the UN General Assembly to rescind the notorious resolution of 1975, which declared that Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination."
Journalist Edward Mortimer, Financial Times (London), Dec. 11, 1991
"There's no Syrian willingness as yet to engage in any substantive exchange on the components of peace. There is a continuation of the focusing on the dimension of territory."
Israeli delegation leader Yossi Ben-Aharon, Dec. 11, 1991
"I'm sorry I cannot report for you any progress. Rather, it's been a repetition of the same attitude by the Israelis as in Madrid, trying to talk about everything except for withdrawal from territories."
Syrian delegate Mowafaq Al-Allaf, Dec. 11, 1991
"The Israelis have been saying for years, 'The Palestinians don't want to talk to us or won't talk to us.' We are saying we want to talk to you directly because we are the core of the conflict in the region. . . We stated very clearly from the beginning that we accept UN Resolution 181, which established two states in the historic land of Palestine; and 242 and 338, which ends the state of belligerence here and also ends the state of occupation in the region."
Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi, Dec. 11, 1991
"The United States in recent days has played a very useful role by playing a minimal role."
Israeli delegation spokesman Benjamin Netanyahu, Dec. 12, 1991
"I'm sorry to say we are still in the same place. We exchanged proposals but still there is no agreement. We parted on the understanding that we would meet again."
Palestinian chief delegate Haidar Abdel-Shafi, Dec. 12, 1991
"Most of the time was spent with us hearing the Israeli interpretation of (UN Security Council Resolution) 242, an interpretation which we do not share at all. Unfortunately, there is still Israeli insistence on rejecting the principle of land for peace."
Syrian chief delegate Mowafaq Al-Allaf, Dec. 12, 1991
"Israel is drowning the Palestinian envoys in procedural questions in Washington, far from the basic matters which must be discussed. The Palestinian team should insist on an immediate halt to the settlements. If Israel continues, they should suspend the talks. Even Sadat broke off talks several times until Israel stopped settlements in the Sinai."
Rejectionist leader of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine Nayef Hawatmeh, Dec. 12, 1991
"Although all these talks are going on just a few floors below the offices of Secretary of State James A. Baker III, the United States is adopting-for now-a strictly hands-off posture in order to send messages to both sides. To the Israelis, the message is that this is a test of their argument that if the United States will just stay out of the talks, the Arabs will come to see that Washington cannot make peace for them, and that therefore there will be progress. US officials say that testing this argument will either produce results or lead to a deadlock that would lay the groundwork for a more active US role. To the Arabs, say US officials, the message is that the United States is not going to deliver Israeli concessions. It will intervene in the negotiations with proposals and pressure of its own, provided the Arabs first demonstrate that they are ready to offer the Israeli people peace."
Journalist Thomas Friedman, The New York Times, Dec. 12, 1991
"When the Israeli and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegations emerged from almost three hours of talks, it was clear that the ultimate issue of who will control the West Bank and Gaza-which was supposed to be deferred until a much later stage of the Mideast peace process-would become an issue in every detail at every stage of the long road Israel and her adversaries have started down. . . Baker's proposal for a settlement freeze is meant as a confidence-building measure now, in exchange for suspension of the Arab economic boycott against Israel."
Journalist Larry Cohler, Washington Jewish Week, Dec. 12, 1991
"For us, procedural issues are substantive."
Israeli Foreign Ministry Director General Joseph Hadass, Dec. 12, 1991
"In order to achieve progress they should start at least committing themselves to the equation of land for peace, and the equation starts with land."
Syrian delegation spokeswoman Bushra Kanafani, Dec. 13, 1991
"The history of Mideast peacemaking shows that Arabs and Israelis have never achieved anything without powerful, persistent and toplevel US involvement. . . The United States is convinced that neither Arabs nor Israelis want to be blamed for a breakdown of the peace process. That applies especially to Israel, where Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir saw his popularity boosted by attending the Madrid talks and has to face an election within the next 11 months. But Palestinians too have an eager constituency to satisfy. Their participation in Madrid ignited a surge of enthusiasm in the occupied territories, where Arab youths handed out olive branches to Israeli soldiers. Palestinians are desperate for quick gains in the talks to lessen the heavy economic and political burdens of Israeli military occupation. Baker seems to be gambling now that both sides will have to compromise."
Alan Eisner, Reuters, Arab News, Jiddah, Dec. 13, 1991
"The Israeli spokesman, often with little substantive information to impart, has used every opportunity to reiterate his government's annoyance that the talks are being held in the full glare of publicity in Washington and not in the Middle East, where he said the presence of the press could be limited. . . Coining a phrase at the expense of President Woodrow Wilson, Mr. Netanyahu said that he preferred "open covenants, secretly arrived at."
Journalist Barbara Crossette, The New York Times, Dec. 13, 1991
"Israelis, Jordanians and the Palestinians have spent more than 20 hours in the corridors of the US State Department since Tuesday in a painfully slow attempt to agree on how to separate Palestinian issues from Israeli-Jordanian relations. The negotiations, though couched in highly technical language, could indirectly affect the future status of the Israeli-occupied territories, the powers of the Palestinian delegates and their complicated relationship with Jordan."
Reuters, Saudi Gazette, Dec. 14, 1991
"They want us to hold talks with an independent Palestinian delegation. The idea is that the Palestinians will have their own room and one day their own state. It's totally unacceptable to Israel."
Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Dec. 14, 1991
"One of the troubling problems, according to conference delegates, was that some of the sides were divided among themselves. . . The apparent continuing differences within the Israeli government (were) reflected in the Israeli delegation. The representatives of the Israeli Foreign Ministry appeared to be eager to move on to substance, and to ignore technical issues, such as whether the Palestinians should be called a 'delegation' or a 'subcommittee' or 'working group.' The political hard-liners resisted such concessions."
The German Press Agency (DPA), Dec. 14, 1991
"Syrian and Israeli diplomats conducted a dialogue of the deaf-restating diametrically opposed positions on the key issue between them, the Golan Heights. Israel captured the Golan Heights in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and contests the Syrian view that UN Resolution 242 requires Israel to withdraw from the plateau. Once that is done, the Syrians say, they are prepared to talk peace. The Israelis want to negotiate a peace agreement first and interpret 242 in a way that is at odds with most of the rest of the world, including the United States. Resolution 242 called for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 war, without identifying them."
Bern Debusmann, Reuters, Saudi Gazette, Dec. 14, 1991
"We agree to have two states in the area of the former British mandate in Palestine, one Jewish, meaning Israel, and the other Arab, meaning Jordan. We cannot have three states between the Mediterranean and the River Jordan."
Israeli delegation spokesman Benjamin Netanyahu, Dec. 14, 1991
"Israel has. . . no territorial claims, nor any claims or designs over a single drop of Lebanese water. So it put the Lebanese delegation at ease. Here we have no basic conflict between Israel and Lebanon. Here the question is not 'land for peace'. . . For us there is another question. We've got to be honest to say that we shall be ready to redeploy our forces south of the border, providded that no Lebanese territory will be used against us like it used to be in the past. . . "
Israeli Delegate Yossi Haddas in interview with Barbara Ferguson, Saudi Gazette, Dec. 15, 1991
"The Israelis are pretending that the Palestinian people do not exist. They are ignoring what was agreed on in November last year."
Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, Dec. 15, 1991
"American sources are not prepared to apportion blame for the slow pace of the talks which, six weeks after Madrid began, have produced virtually no results. In private, however, US analysts give their view of each of the parties involved in the talks. The Israelis are described as 'divided among themselves,' while the Syrians are said to be 'too hesitant for their own good.' The Lebanese are said to be 'on the right track,' as are the Jordanians. The Palestinians get high marks as 'sincere and efficient.'"
Journalist Amir Taheri, Arab News, Dec. 15, 1991
"Since Oct. 30, when the talks had a ceremonial take-off in Madrid, Israel's disinterest in peace was clear. Indicative of Tel Aviv's approach was the accelerated pace of settlement-building. While attending the talks, to please the US on whom Israel depends for its very subsistence, it want to prod the Arabs into taking the first step to endanger the process. Shamir's latest pro-talks statement, just after his troops helped imported Jews fling out Arabs from their homes, is merely a charade which the Arabs have seen through. It is not yet too late for Israel to mend its ways. The Arabs genuinely desire peace. Their wait in Washington from Dec. 4 to 10 for the Israeli delegation to appear at the conference table is proof enough of their sincerity."
Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) Daily, Dec. 15, 1991
"Much credit goes to the Americans for starting the talks between the Arabs and Israelis in the peace parleys of Madrid on Oct. 30. Israel, however, is playing for time as the American elections are nearing and is coming up with issues to disrupt the next round of talks."
Journalist Nuray Bamanie, Saudi Gazette, Dec. 15, 1991
"This new team of Palestinian peacemakers-an array of academics, physicians, mayors and legal experts-is steeling itself for a drawn-out negotiating struggle with Israel. Whether speaking in hushed tones in the carpeted lounges of the Grand Hotel or rushing in and out of strategy meetings, they are the latest face of their people's drive for control over their lives."
Journalist Nora Boustany, The Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1991
"We have no foreign ministry, no embassy, we have never worked together so intensely and we come from a dozen places. We have a wheel-the PLO-but we are not allowed to use it."
Palestinian delegation adviser Dr. Rashid Khalidi, Dec. 17, 1991
"We know what [the Israelis] are like. We have learned that they keep going on and on, and we have to keep going too. The Israelis. . . want us to slow down and back off in frustration."
Palestinian delegation adviser Yazid Sayegh, Dec. 17, 1991
"During a week of wrangling over procedure, in which they insisted on talking to Israel independently of their Jordanian negotiating partners, the Palestinian appear to have staked out a harder line. Sources close to the delegation are especially dismayed because of the lost opportunity for a public relations victory offered by Israel's decision to boycott the originally scheduled date for the opening of the Washington talks. . . Right or wrong, the harder line position has tarnished the pragmatic image Palestinians cultivated in Madrid. . . One reason may be the absence from Washington of Faisal Husseini, the leading Palestinian figure in the West Bank, and the increased influence of Palestinians who live outside the occupied territories and who are close to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Mr. Husseini, who was an adviser to the Palestinian delegation in Madrid, reportedly opted to stay home to shore up faltering grass-roots support for the peace process. Persistent doubt at home that the peace process will produce Israeli concessions may, itself, be another factor behind the more rigid Palestinian posture in Washington."
Journalists George D. Moffett III and Jan Friedman, The Christian Science Monitor, Dec. 17, 1991
"At some point before an autonomy plan can be finalized, Israel will have to confront some limit on its settlement activity during the autonomy phase, and the Palestinians will have to commit to interim measures such as calling for an end to the intifada. But these issues are resolvable with goodwill and US mediation."
Pro-Israel activist and former Carter administration adviser Stuart Eizenstat, The New York Times, Dec. 17, 1991
"Palestinians and Jordanians made a last-minute request to the Israelis today that the United States be drawn into the talks to break many deadlocks, but the Israelis refused, saying the role of co-sponsors was over. . . Trying to put an upbeat interpretation on what Arabs say they regard as an exercise in futility, the leaders of Israeli negotiating teams told reporters this afternoon that the importance of the talks was that they were held at all. . . "
Journalist Barbara Crossette, The New York Times, Dec. 18, 1991
"We'd like to have the American people more aware of the facts. This is very important. This is basically an American initiative. It is within the natural interests of the United States as defined by the American administration. American public opinion is important. American Jewish public opinion is very important, and we would like the media here to present the facts to the American public."
Syrian delegation spokeswoman Bushra Kanafani, Dec. 17, 1991
"Israeli and Palestinian negotiators broke off their talks today failing to resolve a procedural dispute that for the past two weeks has kept them from discussing the issues that divide them. The two sides agreed to meet again Jan. 7. . . Syrian delegation leader Muwaffak Allaf said his group had suggested Jan. 7 for the resumption of their talks, but the Israelis, who have sought to space out the three negotiations, want to wait until after Jan. 13."
Associated Press, Dec. 18, 1991
"[Israel is] committed to the continuation of the talks. There is no question mark about that."
Israeli spokesman Ehud Gol, Dec. 18, 1991
"We are sorry that this has reached this snag, this impasse."
Palestinian team leader Haider Abdel-Shafi, Dec. 18, 1991
"I thought we went to the rock bottom of all the compromises we could make."
Jordanian-Palestinian delegation leader Abdul Salam Majali, Dec. 18, 1991
"We came to negotiate as equals. They came to delay and play tricks. . . The spirit at home says. . . we have not surrendered all these years in order to go to Washington to surrender to the Israelis. Either you negotiate on the basis of parity with a recognition of your national identity or you don't negotiate. . . Left to our own devices, the Palestinian people, as a people under occupation, and the Israelis, as an occupying power. . . will not be able to make peace."
Palestinian delegation spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi, Dec. 19, 1991
"Even though the 65 hours of discussion in Washington have accomplished little so far, the Mideast peace process isn't likely to collapse in the months ahead. That's because Arabs and Israelis don't want to risk alienating Washington right now. Israelis are alarmed that their sinking support in the US could hurt their chances of obtaining $10 billion in loan guarantees. The Bush administration will take up the request early next year, but the outcome is far from assured. A recent Wall Street Journal/NBC News poll found that US voters by 41 percent to 29 percent see Israel rather than the Arabs as the biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East. . . Arab delegations, for their part, are determined to keep the talks going so that any failure will be blamed on Israel."
Journalist Robert S. Greenberger, The Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1991
"Time was not wasted. People came to meet and talk to each other."
Chief Israeli negotiator Elyakin Rubenstein, Dec. 19, 1991
"I would like to make it clear: there was no progress. It was a criminal waste of time. . . We felt there was an unwillingness on the part of the United States to take an active role. All these promises were, in effect, not filled."
Palestinian delegation spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi, Dec. 20, 1991
"I was disappointed. I'm told some progress was made-but don't quiz me on what. I felt that a lot of time was spent talking of modalities and locations, and obviously we would have liked to see more progress. . . The United States will continue to have the same role, as a catalyst, not attempting to dictate solutions. We want to be an honest broker. It is going to be done at the negotiating table. And, thank God, it has started."
US President George Bush, Dec. 20, 1991
The New York Times, Dec 20, 1991
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