February 1992, Page 35

Special Report

Two States, One Holy Land: A Framework for Peace

By John V. Whitbeck

Now that the Middle East "peace process" has finally begun to materialize, minds must abruptly turn from matters of procedure to matters of substance. Until now, neither Americans nor Israelis nor Palestinians have publicly proposed any fresh ideas as to how, substantively, such a peace could be structured. If fresh ideas are not proposed soon, it is difficult to envisage how any talks could produce peace.

Contrary to common wisdom, sharing the Holy Land is not a zero-sum game, in which any development advantageous to one side must be disadvantageous to the other. One can envisage a society in which, by severing political and voting rights from economic and social rights in a negotiated settlement, both the legitimate national aspirations of Palestinians and the legitimate security interests of Israelis could be satisfied.

The non-negotiable minimum for both Israelis and Palestinians is their own self-determination as peoples and nations, that they can have a state of their own in the land that both love, including at least some share of Jerusalem, and that never again will anyone else govern them. This is not impossible. The Holy Land could be a single economic and social unit encompassing two sovereign states and one Holy City. Jerusalem could form an undivided part of both states, be the capital of both, and be run by an autonomous, elected municipal council.

All current residents of the Holy Land could be given the choice of Israeli or Palestinian citizenship, thus determining which state's elections they would vote in and which state's passport they would carry, and each state could have its own "law of return," conferring citizenship on persons not currently residing in the Holy Land.

Borders would have to be drawn on maps but would not have to exist on the ground. The free, non-discriminatory movement of people and products within the Holy Land could be a fundamental principle subject only to one major exception: to ensure that each state would always maintain its national character, the right of residence in each Holy Land state could be limited to that state's citizens, to citizens of the other state residing there on an agreed future date and to their descendants.

As an essential counterpart to the absence of border controls within the Holy Land, Israel could retain the right to participate in immigration controls at the frontiers of the Palestinian state, with any visitors restricted to the Palestinian state and found in Israel facing penalties. To ease Israeli security concerns, the Palestinian state could be fully demilitarized, with only local police and UN peacekeeping forces allowed to bear arms. The settlement agreement could be guaranteed by the UN and relevant states, with international tribunals to arbitrate disputes regarding compliance with its terms.

Contrary to common wisdom, sharing the Holy Land is not a zero-sum game.

The status of Jerusalem poses the toughest problem for any settlement plan, causing many to assume that no settlement acceptable to both sides can ever be reached. When the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 in 1947, it addressed the problem by suggesting an international status for Jerusalem, with neither the Jewish nor the Arab state to have sovereignty over the city. Yet joint undivided sovereignty, while rare, is not without precedent.

Chandigarh is the capital of two Indian states. Until German reunification, the western sectors of Berlin, under American, British and French sovereignty, were jointly administered by an autonomous, elected Senate. For more than 70 years, the Pacific state of Vanuatu (formerly the New Hebrides) was under the joint undivided sovereignty of Britain and France.

As a joint capital, Jerusalem could have Israeli government offices principally in its western sector, Palestinian government offices principally in its eatern sector and municipal offices in both. To the extent that either state wished to control persons or goods passing into it from the other state, this could be done at the points of exit from, rather than the points of entry to, Jerusalem. In a context of peace, particularly one coupled with economic union, the need for such controls would be minimal.

A capital city is both a municipality on the ground and a symbol in hearts and minds. Shared in this way, Jerusalem could be a symbol of reconciliation and hope for Jews, Muslims, Christians and the world as a whole.

Mutual Advantages

Such a framework would address in ways advantageous to both sides the three principal practical problems on the road to peace-Jerusalem (though joint sovereignty over an undivided city), settlers (through a separation of citizenship rights from residential rights in a regime of free access to the entire Holy Land for all citizens of both states, under which no one would be compelled to move), and borders (through a structure of relations between the two states so open that the precise placement of borders would no longer be such a contentious issue and the pre-1967 borders-subject only to the expanded borders of Jerusalem, under joint sovereignty-might well be acceptable to most Israelis, as they would certainly be to most Palestinians).

For Israelis, the threat of one day living in a state with a majority of Arab voters or an inescapable resemblance to pre-1990 South Africa would be replaced by the assurance of living in a democratic state with fewer Arab voters than today. The Israelis' security would be enhanced by assuaging, rather than continuing to aggravate, the Palestinians' grievances. By escaping from the role (so tragic in light of Jewish history) of oppressors and enforcers of injustice, Israel would save its soul and its dream.

For all Palestinians, human dignity would be restored. They would cease to be a people treated (and not only by Israelis) as pariahs uniquely unworthy of basic human rights. For those in exile, an internationally accepted Palestinian citizenship, a Palestinian passport and a right to return, if only to visit, would have enormous significance. And if the Palestinians themselves accepted a settlement, few, if any, Arab states would continue to reject Israel.

Every effort must now be made to ensure that all the human and material waste of the Gulf war really does produce peace in the Middle East and not just a lull in the hostilities. Israelis, Palestinians and the true friends of both must join the search for a compelling vision of a society so much better than the status quo that both Israelis and Palestinians are inspired to accept in their hearts and minds that peace is both desirable and attainable, that the Holy Land can be shared, that a winner-take-all approach produces only losers, that both Israelis and Palestinians must be winners or both will continue to be losers and that there is a common destination at which both peoples would be satisfied to arrive and to live together.

John V. Whitbeck is an international lawyer based in Paris.

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