February 1992, Page 13, 14

From the Hebrew Press

Israeli Commentators Predict Talks' Failure Followed by Nuclear War

By Dr. Israel Shahak

Since May of 1991, some of the most knowledgeable Israeli military experts and commentators have been warning the Jewish public that the ongoing diplomatic process would fail and he followed by a war likely to break out in 1992. Since mid-September, such warnings have become more specific, naming "Iran and its allies" (Moshe Zak, Ma'ariv, Nov. 22) or Iran and Syria as Israel's enemies in the predicted war. On occasion, Pakistan and some other states have been mentioned in that capacity as well.

The current Israeli nuclear debate cannot be understood properly except in the context of such predictions. On Nov. 1, in an article headlined "There Will Be a War," Yigal Mosco summed up in Kol Ha'ir the opinion of some Israeli strategic experts as follows:

Anticipating the Failure of the Peace Process

"The almost certain failure of the Madrid conference might lead Israel into another war, harder than any of its previous wars. . . The probability of another war between Israel and the Arabs is no lower than the probability that the sun will shine tomorrow. . . All experts interviewed anticipate a failure of peace negotiations that may occur piecemeal or in a single dramatic stroke. In either case, however, that fiasco will spark a process leading to a war."

To be sure, the same experts provided a plethora of "scenarios" of possible Muslim coalitions attacking Israel. Some are like science fiction, others less so. In Israel, however, this is a traditional method of justifying Israeli "pre-emptive" aggressions.

On Nov. 15, the military correspondents of Hadashot, Alex Fishman, based an article on an interview with Minister of Defense Moshe Arens, who told Fishman that "everything should be done to prevent states like Iran from acquiring any nuclear expertise and technology." Fishman mentioned Pakistan in the same context. Arens noted Pakistan in the same context. Arens noted that "Muslim extremists with a [nuclear] bomb in their hand scare the US, but they scare Israel even more."

"In Madrid they all sat down quietly to speak a lot," Fishman wrote, "but behind the speeches there loomed a new threat: the nuclear threat blended with the growth of Muslim fundamentalism."

The same day the prestigious military correspondent of Yediot Ahronot, Ron Ben-Yishay, wrote that "as soon as Iran becomes capable of both producing the [nuclear] bomb by itself and installing it on surface-to-surface missiles, Israel will be under direct threat." He concludes that "since Syria is Iran's ally," it is "quite probable that when Iran has both capabilities it will conclude a treaty with Syria, providing the latter with a nuclear umbrella and the strategic balance intently desired in Damascus for a confrontation with Israel."

Even the Jerusalem Post printed an analysis on Nov. 21, in which Alon Pinkas noted that "Iran looms as a growing strategic threat for Israel." The aforementioned Ron Ben-Yishay also expressed in the Jerusalem Post on Oct. 4 his certainty that the peace process would fail. Asked "How long will it take to defeat the enemy in the next war?" he answered: "I should say a minimum of three to four weeks." In the Hebrew press, but not in the Jerusalem Post, Ben-Yishay also spoke of the war's "maximum" duration of up to eight weeks.

There is another important matter acknowledged by the nuclear debaters as relevant to their concerns. The Israelis feel that the Palestinian question alone cannot explain the recurrent altercations between the Bush administration and the government of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. They suspect that relations also have been spoiled by Bush's attempts to limit Israeli options in nuclear development, and perhaps in missile development as well. The Israeli government's reaction to President Bush's vague remark about the need to control the proliferation of "unconventional weapons of all types" was downright hysterical.

That reaction, according to Ha'aretz chief political commentator Uzi Benziman, was manifested for caution's sake not by Shamir or Arens, but by their "underlings." These, said Benziman, "poured out all of their wrath at Bush's plan without bothering to acquaint themselves with its details. . . Senior Likud Knesset members. . . and Labor ex-ministers such as Yitzhak Rabin, were unanimous in unconditionally rejecting the new Bush initiative, differing only in how their rejections should be phrased."

Benziman explains: "The fierceness with which the entire Israeli power elite reacted to new Bush ideas cannot come as a surprise. Bush hit our softest spot. When he proposes to freeze the proliferation of weaponry, he is interpreted as trying to deprive us of our soul, of the last asset we have. When he proposes prohibition of long-range ground-to-ground missiles he is perceived as threatening our very survival."

Four important articles, all written by noted commentators and all published in mid-October in Ha'aretz, summarize the determination to retain an Israeli nuclear arsenal. They are: "Territories Yes, Nuclear Power No," by A. Schweitzer (Oct. 14), "Against [Israeli] Nuclear Striptease," by Ze'ev Schiff (Oct. 15), "No Reason to Panic So Far," by Avner Taniv (Oct. 16), and "A Naked State in a Tank's Turret," by Shmuel Toledano (Oct. 18).

"Bush's administration will be forced to offer Israel the heavens and the earth."

Yaniv is a prominent Israeli academic dealing with nuclear politics, while Toledano is a distinguished former Mossad operative. The retired Toledano, however, became a moderate, advocating a "Peace in Stages."

Ze'ev Schiff, who admits speaking for the official Israeli viewpoint, says in his Ha'aretz article that "whoever believes that Israel will ever sign the [UN] Convention prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. . . is daydreaming. There are no misgivings in Israel about firmly rejecting this convention." He notes with satisfaction that US officials "have already backed down on their previous demands" under Israeli pressure and now merely ask Israel to consider signing that convention "at some time in the future," perhaps in 1995, when it is slated for renewal upon expiry, or even later. Meanwhile, Schiff reports, "at the presidential level there is no decision to exert any pressure on Israel in this matter."

A. Schweitzer observes that, under international law, Israeli settlement in the occupied territories is illegal, but Israeli possession of nuclear weapons is not. This is why, Schweitzer observes, "had Israel not indulged in provoking the US by settlement extravaganzas, it would find itself in the position to blackmail even Bush into a more sympathetic attitude towards its security needs."

But, continues Schweitzer, "even a president as irascible as Bush cannot really want to deprive Israel of its weapons and its means of deterrence. He may use disarmament issues as a means of pressure, but without really intending for Israel to yield." Schweitzer concludes that if Israel shows some consideration for US diplomacy, "we can safely take it for granted that the US will never create obstacles to Israel's building its deterrent [nuclear] power."

Avner Yaniv, in his Ha'aretz articles, uses history to buttress the same conclusions, "President Kennedy was no less determined to prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons than is Bush," Yaniv writes. "Both Kennedy and Johnson failed, however, to the point that in the end they found themselves, against their will, helping lay foundations for the subsequent close and amicable cooperation between the US and Israel."

In Yaniv's words, "Johnson just loved the Jewish state," yet his love did not prevent him from "criticizing Israel and pressing it hard. In the end, however, his administration was compelled by circumstances to help Israel meekly and generously to meet its security needs. "The Israeli method which proved itself so effective, he reports, was never to turn down American requests outright, but to impose conditions which the US could not possibly accept. That was the method Israel used "to earn time to complete the construction of Dimona. This is largely why endless haggling with the Americans can produce such beneficial results."

Haggie Endlessly With Bush

Accordingly Yaniv advises Israel to show some diplomatic finesse: instead of rejecting the Bush plan outright, haggle with him endlessly. Yaniv's advice ignores the reality of Yitzhak Shamir's ideology and character, which make the present Israeli prime minister unfit to imitate the methods of David Ben-Gurioni and Levi Eshkol, which were crowned with such success. Still, Yaniv tries his best. He predicts that if only his advice is heeded:

"Bush's administration will be forced to offer Israel the heavens and the earth-a complete suspension of all American weaponry sales to all Arab states, far-reaching treaty-backed guarantees to defend Israel, and concessions over the 'territories for peace' formula. All this must be offered to Israel in order to blackmail it for the smallest concessions allowing any conceivable nuclear inspection agency to begin to act."

Yaniv anticipates that as soon as the US even begins to negotiate such Israeli demands, it will "lose much of the clout it has acquired in recent years in its relations with Arab states" in exchange for minor Israeli concessions. This is why Yaniv's conclusions are optimistic. If only Israel follows the precedents of the past, its successes are assured, Yaniv concludes.

Toledano, as befits a fervent advocate of a peace plan, is the most moderate of the four writers. He alone advises Israel to reach a genuine peace with all of the states of the Middle East, and to make genuine concessions to Palestinians for the sake of peace.

Toledano warns, however, that "the leaders of Likud and [other] right-wing parties live in a world of delusions generated by their success in settling [the territories]. . . Whenever someone tries to elicit their views on the nuclear threat, they are quick to reassure the questioner that Israel will always be able to repeat its [1981] destruction of the Iraqi reactor, wherever in the Middle East the threat may be located. And they add that if any Arab state nevertheless succeeds in developing a nuclear option, it will in all probability merely mean a transition to the situation of mutual deterrence, analogous to that which existed for so long between the US and the USSR."

There can be no doubt that Toledano's portrayal of the mood and the views of the Likud leaders is accurate, if only because he has met them often in his futile efforts to enlist their support for his peace plan. There are clear indications that Israel is preparing itself for a threatened or actual use of its nuclear power, sooner rather than later.

A Horrifying Prospect

This horrifying prospect was seriously acccepted by prestigious Ha'aretz military correspondent Reuven Padatzur ("The End of the Nuclear Monopoly," Oct. 21). Padatzur believes that the newly developed "Hetz" ("Arrow") missile, favored by Defense Minister Moshe Arens as the answer to all Israeli military problems, will not suffice to counter nuclear threats, or even the threat of ballistic missiles such as the Iraqi Scud against Israel. Therefore, "Israel will apparently have to rely on a deterrent one level higher, that is nuclear, whereby a launching of a single missile of any kind toward Israel would be openly declared in advance to constitute a sufficient case for Israeli nuclear retaliation."

Such a doctrine of nuclear deterrence cannot preclude the possibility of a nuclear first strike by Israel. After all, who is going to determine afterward whether it was indeed retaliation to "launching of a single missile of any kind" or the other way around?

In a next war, policies relying on such formulas may actually be pursued. This may even explain why Israeli experts are so intent on assuring the public that a next war will be only conventional. As soon as it breaks out, however, Israel may openly warn Syria that its use of Scud missiles will be answered by nuclear retaliation.

In my opinion, this Israeli debate warrants an important conclusion. The Israeli establishment is remarkably self-confident both about its strength and about its relations with the US. Nothing proves it better than the published opinions of Israeli experts about President Bush.

Clearly, these Israeli experts operate under no constraint in expressing such opinions. Some of those experts, in fact, seriously entertain the idea of Israel waging psychological warfare against the US. A case in point is an article entitled "Suddenly America Reveals Our Dark Past," by the previously mentioned Ron Ben-Yishay in the Nov. 10 Yediot Ahronot. After angrily listing revelations about Israel which have recently surfaced in the US, such as the sales by Israel of missile spare parts to South Africa, which he qualifies as deliberate lies, he concludes:

"What is common to these stories is that they all portray Israel as a crafty dog biting the hand of Uncle Sam, who feeds him. Not only is Israel portrayed as consistently acting against the best interests of the US, but also as manipulating the administration behind the scenes into closing its eyes and tolerating Israel's dirty tricks. According to those stories, presidents of the US often found themselves making decisions against their better judgment and against the national security interest of the US."

Libel or Historical Truth?

In short, Ben-Yishay describes as libelous what Yaniv presents as historical truth, to be followed by Israel in the future as a precedent. Ben-Yishay attributes those "libels" "to psychological warfare which the [US] administration is waging" against Israel. And he asks, in seriousness, "What can Israel do in order to halt this psychological warfare being waged against it?" His recommendation is, in effect, that Israel wage psychological counter-warfare against the US, which he considers winnable if Israel not only refutes every "libel" in detail but also disseminates its own version of events, and "attacks the US back," although "not necessarily in an official or overt manner."

Certainly, Israel's nuclear power contributes mightily to this sense of self-confidence. The Israeli establishment is prepared to use its nuclear weapons and the other elements of its armed power, and it is preparing the Israeli public accordingly. The diplomatic "peace process" is deemed worth pursuing only in order to gain time.

Dr. Israel Shahak, a Holocaust survivor and retired professor of chemistry at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is chairman of the Israeli League of Human and Civil Rights. His monthly translations From the Hebrew Press are available to Washington Report readers for $25 a year.

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