November 1989, Page 48, 49

Books

Yamani: The Inside Story

By Jeffrey Robinson

Reviewed by Sharon Boynton Kenny

Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani was minister of petroleum in Saudi Arabia for an unprecedented 24 years, from 1962 to 1986. During that period, he occupied center stage in the global economic arena, as the price of oil rose from $3 a barrel to $40, and then dropped precipitously to below $13 a barrel at the time of his dismissal in 1986.

Jeffrey Robinson does more than tell the story of Yamani's life as the Saudi Arabian oil minister. By weaving in a purported behind-the-scenes look at the inner workings of OPEC, the interplay of the many personalities that make up that diverse cartel, as well as speculation on the inner workings of the Saudi royal family, the reader is introduced to a variety of subplots that have an effect on the Yamani story. Robinson provides the reader with a long list of journalists, scholars, petroleum industry insiders, and various government agencies in the US and Great Britain whom he consulted in piecing together the parts of Yamani's life. The author also interviewed Yamani at length, although the book is depicted by Robinson as containing more information than Yamani wanted published.

The biography is loosely fashioned in chronological order, although the first chapter is an anecdotal one, based on the author's numerous interviews with Yamani. This chapter provides a feeling for Yamani's personality and his loyalty to his family and to King Faisal. The second chapter deals with the precipitous drop in world oil prices which began in 1985, culminating in the wrangling at OPEC meetings in 1985 and 1986. Yamani's somewhat public disagreement with King Faisal over the potential for raising world oil prices is discussed at length, as well as Yamani's subsequent dismissal. Robinson uses these two opening chapters as a point of departure and traces Yamani's rise to power, interspersed with brief historical tidbits on the founding of Saudi Arabia, background on the Saudi royal family and the relationship among the full sons of Ibn Saud, and the development of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia in concert with the growth of OPEC's power. While such digressions may detract from the main focus of the story, they serve as a background to the unitiated reader, and Robinson cleverly makes these subplots part of Yamani's story.

One of the major foci of the story, the events surrounding the oil embargo of 1973, and the events that precipitated it, are dealt with in the context of Saudi-US relations. Through a series of interviews with retired US government officials and oil industry executives, Robinson details the Saudi Arabian government's increasing frustration with the direction of US Mideast policy orchestrated by then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for a distracted President Nixon during 1973, and the US government's refusal to take seriously the Arab oil producing states' ability to enforce an effective oil embargo. During the October 1973 war, however, the OPEC states were able to take control of oil pricing from the producers, which Yamani always considered of equal consequence as the successful embargo.

The most interesting chapters deal with the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, and the effect the event had on Yamani, both personally and professionally. Robinson provides intimate details of the transition of power to Kind Khaled, and how the movement of the Sudayri Seven into the main positions of influence in the Kingdom has a correspondingly detrimental effect on Yamani's career. A detailed chapter on the kidnapping (by Venezuelan terrorist "Carlos") of Yamani and the other OPEC ministers during a December 1975 summit in Vienna is based almost exclusively on Robinson's interviews with Yamani. The terrifying ordeal as the kidnappers transported their victims from Vienna to Libya and sought asylum makes gripping reading.

Throughout the book Robinson appears to rely to a certain extent on unsubstantiated rumors and anecdotes, particularly in describing events after the death of King Khaled in 1982. The author notes Yamani's steadfast refusal to discuss his relationship with the royal family after the death of his mentor, King Faisal, or the events in 1986 surrounding his dismissal as oil minister. Most analysts familiar with Saudi Arabia agree that the workings of its government are highly secretive, and much of the information circulating in the West is speculative. Undeniably, there are differences among ruling members of the royal family, but these differences invariably are settled behind closed doors. Robinson's failure to name sources for his assertions about governmental corruption not only weakens an otherwise well-documented biography but will contribute to more speculative journalism about the Saudi Arabian government. There is also repitition among anecdotes which Robinson culled from many of Yamani's friends and associates.

Aside from these criticisms, this biography provides entertaining reading about a personality who was a media star during the economically turbulent 1970s. In fact, Robinson speculates that his media popularity may well have been Yamani's undoing within Saudi ruling circles. This is corroborated by a number of the named individuals whom Robinson interviewed for this story, but, naturally, it was not commented on by Yamani himself. Robinson provides the reader with a portrait of a man who, while claiming he was nothing more than a simple bedouin, became a deft politician and media personality indelibly associated in the public mind with the rise in OPEC economic power and Saudi Arabia's leading position in global oil production.

Sharon Boynton Kenny is a Ph.D. candidate in political science at George Washington University and lived in Saudi Arabia for many years.

The Domestic Battleground: Canada and the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Edited by David Taras and David H. Goldberg, McGill-Queens University Press, 1989. 247 pp. $29.95 Canada.

Reviewed by H.J. Skutel

Although more than 40 years have passed since Canada joined other Western nations in recognizing Israel, this is the first book devoted specifically to analyzing the domestic political factors which helped shape Canada's policy toward Israel and its Arab adversaries. By a fortunate coincidence, it was released shortly after Canada's Minister of External Affairs, Joe Clark, publicly endorsed on March 31, 1988, the principle of self-determination for the Palestinians and announced the lifting of all restrictions on official meetings with the PLO.

This reversal of policy, startling in itself, became doubly significant with Canada's assumption of a seat on the UN Security Council. The pioneering nature of the book and the now highly charged political atmosphere surrounding it has resulted in the book being subjected to particularly intense scrutiny. Indeed, the research of two of the book's contributors has been challenged by embarrassed external affairs officials and indignant Canadian Zionists.

The book is compromised of 12 essays by Canadians distinguished for their grasp of both the domestic political scene and Middle East affairs. Ranging in time from the 1940s to the current Palestinian uprising, the essays weigh the influence of the media, United Church of Canada, large corporations and Arab and Jewish lobby groups on the formulation of Canada's Middle East policy. All the papers are meticulously documented and presented in language devoid of polemical or partisan stridency. Several are strikingly informative.

For example, Canadian political observers are often at a loss to explain the extraordinary pro-Israel unity of the country's Jewish community. With the exception of a handful of dissidents, many of whom have suffered varying degrees of communal ostracism including loss of employment, the Canadian Jewish establishment almost invariably has defended every position taken by the Israeli government, no matter how absurd or contradictory. A partial explanation for this behavior is offered by co-editor David Taras, director of the Canadian Studies program at the University of Calgary. In an essay entitled "From Passivity to Politics," Taras discloses the cultural and historical roots of Jewish political activism in Canada, focusing in part on the evolution of the Canada-Israel Committee (CIC), Canada's counterpart to AIPAC.

Canadian Zionist Movement

The Zionist movement in Canada, unlike the US, was "never seriously challenged" by either "socialist secularism" or "assimilation-minded religious reform." Consequently, from its inception in 1899, political Zionism was able to "capture the imagination and allegiance" of large numbers of Canadian Jews who were overwhelmingly traditionalist and "emphatically Zionist in their folk aspirations."

Canadian Jewry, numbering 300,000 has, on several occasions, given more to Israel on a per capita basis than any other Jewish community in the world, according to Taras. Those familiar with Canadian Jewry's almost pathological protectiveness toward Israel can only smile incredulously when Taras quotes a CIC official as saying: "When I go to Ottawa, I don't argue for favors, but for what is in the best interests of Canadians." (In March 1988, Joe Clark was booed by CIC conventioneers when he berated Israel for human rights violations in the occupied territories. As he left the speaker's platform, the CIC delegates rose to their feet and began singing Hatikvah, Israel's national anthem.)

Most of the research in the book suggests that Jewish lobby groups have enjoyed only mixed success in influencing the government. For example, their efforts to get Ottawa to move the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem have been unrewarding to date. Nevertheless, as political science professors John Kirton and Peyton Lyon demonstrate in the most provocative study in the collection, the "perception" persists among scores of senior external affairs officials that Canada's Middle East policy is influenced more by the country's Jewish community than by the prime minister, cabinet, public opinion or the media.

Interestingly, although the Department of External Affairs (DEA) cooperated with Lyon on four previous surveys of departmental attitudes on various issues, in this instance telegrams were sent to all DEA employees advising them not to answer his questionnaire. When queried as to why the directive was sent, the "first concern" expressed by the responsible officials to Lyon was that "the Canadian Jewish community would be disturbed by the anticipated results." Subsequently, DEA officials cited the small number of responses upon which the study was based, and a spokesperson for the CIC described the authors' "accusations" as "nonsense."

Canadian-Arab Lobbying

Except for scattered references, there is little about the Canadian Arab role in political lobbying. The editors say they "were unable to entice any scholar who was in a position to write such an article to do so." What emerges, however, is that Canadian Arab lobbying efforts only became discernible in the 1980s and that, despite some triumphs, such activities have been impeded by religious and political factionalism within their community.

On balance, the impression obtained from the book is that Canada's Middle East policy already has become more even-handed, and will become more so in the future. The reason is not, as some would prefer to believe, primarily because of sympathy for the plight of the Palestinians. Rather, under the present Progressive Conservative government, Ottowa's foreign policy is increasingly trade-oriented.

Illustrative of this is the free trade agreement with the US and the merging of the Foreign Trade Service of the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce with Canada's DEA. Thus, suggest several contributors to the book, there is abiding concern in Ottawa that an ill-considered position on the Middle East might result in the exclusion of Canadian goods and expertise from the potentially vast markets of the Arab and Muslim worlds.

H.J. Skutel is a free-lance writer with a special interest in Zionism and Middle East affairs.