April 1989, Page 8

Special Report

The Shatt Al-Arab: Obstacle to Iran-Iraq Peace

By Emile S. Siman

The dispute over the Shatt Al-Arab waterway threatens once more to derail the peace talks between Iraq and Iran, and could ultimately end the truce between the two countries. However, as this historical account shows, the controversy involving this shallow, 127-mile-long strategic waterway has been the subject of treaties signed in 1843, 1937, and 1975, and continues to loom as an intractable problem.

The Shatt Al-Arab is composed of a small section of the confluence of the Iraqi Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which are also joined by the Karun river flowing from Iran. This zone of the Iran-Iraq frontier is of great economic and strategic significance to both countries. Although two of Iran's main oil terminals and cargo ports, Abadan and Khorramshahr, are situated on this waterway, the Shatt constitutes Iraq's only maritime outlet to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.

According to an 1843 agreement between the Ottoman and Persian governments, the Ottoman waters of the Shatt Al-Arab extended to the eastern bank of the river estuary, with the exception of the mouth of the Karun River and two islands which remained in Persian hands. Thus, in effect, Turkey controlled all the waters up to the east bank of the Shatt, but recognized Persian sovereignty over the ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr.

Beginning in 1914, a new element—oil—entered the picture, and after World War I, the Ottoman-controlled area west of the Shatt was transferred to Iraq. Both the search for oil and subsequent oil exploration involved the use of transportation on the Shatt and the Karun. This led Persia, as early as 1913, to demand that the middle of the Shatt be the boundary and to build a navy which would disregard Iraqi maritime directives.

Yet a 1937 treaty concluded between the two countries left the boundary where it had been demarcated in 1843. It was to follow the low-water mark on the north (Persian) bank, instead of the "thalweg" or middle of the river with the exception of the two ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr. The boundary off the port of Abadan was set up at the "thalweg" (line of greatest depth or fastest current in the river), and the 1937 treaty confirmed that the Shatt was "open to navigation by ships of all nations." Both countries pledged to establish a convention regarding pilotage and maritime installations.

Waterway's Importance Grows

Despite the decline in the economic use of port facilities on the Shatt, partly due to the relocation by Iran of the Abadan port facilities to harbors directly on the gulf and lack of dredging, and partly due to the growth in the size and capacity of oil tankers, the waterway continued to have strategic and economic significance for Iran. Iranian oil fields and the gigantic Deg Dam, as well as the vast refining and industrial complexes, all were within the reach of Iraqi artillery and air power. It was not until April 1969, however, that the border problem developed into a crisis that erupted and threatened with full-scale war. Baghdad then informed Tehran that since the Shatt was an integral part of Iraq, Iranian vessels should lower their flags before entering the river, and no Iranian navy personnel could be on board ships inside the Shatt. The Iraqis even threatened to use force to close the river to Iranian shipping if their directives went unheeded.

Tehran's response was swift: it declared the 1937 treaty "null and void," claiming that Baghdad had violated its provisions regarding joint administration and spending of dues collected from navigation. It argued that "changed circumstances" permitted it to abrogate the treaty unilaterally, and declared its adherence to the principle of "thalweg," in effect dividing the frontier river into two equal sections between the neighboring states.

Iran then moved for a showdown on April 22, 1969. It sent an Iranian vessel into the Shatt without lowering its flag. When the Iraqis failed to shoot at it, a precedent was established. As Iran continued the practice in the following months, Iraq announced that it would "not let itself be drawn into battle" with Iran. Baghdad, however, took stiff retaliatory measures against Iranians and their property in Iraq, as part of an escalating series of actions and reprisals which included Iranian arming of Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. The US, under Henry Kissinger, also played a role in the harassment by Iran, which became a heavy burden on Iraq and its armed forces.

On March 6, 1975, an agreement was concluded between the two antagonists in Algiers, which provided for the settlement of the long-standing border dispute. Iraq gave up the right to half the waterway to Iran, primarily out of concern with ending military pressure from Iran, which by then was engaged in an extraordinary buying spree to equip its military forces with highly sophisticated American weaponry.

Status Remains Unresolved

The issue of Shatt sovereignty was totally overshadowed by the bloody and costly eight-year war that erupted in 1980 when the waterway, cluttered with the hulks of sunken ships, became unnavigable. The Baghdad and Tehran regimes were concerned with defeating each other militarily, and on preserving their existence at a time of mounting human losses.

It is hard to predict what will happen next. Iraq insists on full control of the Shatt as a precondition for honoring the cease-fire, and for even discussing the repatriation of thousands of prisoners of war. Pending arbitration, an interim administration for the Shatt could be instituted that would not interfere with withdrawal of troops to "the internationally recognized borders, as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 598.

Iraq recently has expressed interest in constructing a parallel waterway to link the northern tip of the gulf, near the Kuwaiti island of Bubiyan, with the Iraqi port of Umm Kasr. This would idle the large port of Basra on the Shatt, and circumvent the tiny Fao Peninsula, which was occupied by Iranian troops for about two years. Baghdad has declared that such a project is economically justifiable, because clearing the Shatt of debris would also be a costly undertaking. Adoption of such a plan would also provide a face-saving formula for Iraq, which would no longer be depending upon the Shatt as its only outlet to the sea.

Emile S. Simon is a Washington, DC-based journalist who writes frequently on Middle East Affairs