Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, November 1987, pages 5-6

Update on Congress

Congress' Pro-Israel Agenda

By Dennis J. Wamsted

The Lavi's Cancellation (Continued)

Fallout from the Israeli government's cancellation of its Lavi jet fighter development program continues. In early October the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP), an Israeli-US panel charged with coordinating the massive US security assistance program for Israel, met informally in Washington. A key item on the group's agenda: the future direction the aid program should take, now that the controversial fighter development program is no longer draining money from Israel's seemingly guaranteed annual $3 billion stipend of combined US military and economic aid.

Several issues already have been resolved—all to the detriment of the US taxpayer. Earlier this fall, Secretary of State George Shultz wrote Israeli Finance Minister Moshe Nissim indicating the Reagan administration's willingness to allow Israel to spend an additional $100 million, or a total of $400 million, of its annual $1.8 billion military aid allotment on Israeli rather than US military products. The administration is also proposing to continue an existing program under which Israel is allowed to force US defense contractors to purchase up to $150 million a year in Israeli goods, thereby "offsetting" the cost of Israeli defense purchases—even though those purchases are largely financed with US aid money. A no-win situation for the US taxpayer; a no-lose situation for the Israeli government.

Other issues reportedly discussed at the October JSAP meeting include:

• An Israeli proposal to buy an additional 100 F-16 jet fighters from the General Dynamics Corp. The Israeli government is seeking an as-yet undefined larger role in the plane's production—Israel already produces the plane's wings and a number of other components—and is asking for an expedited delivery schedule.;

• An Israeli proposal to sell state-of-the-art electronic jamming equipment to the US for use in the Air Force's planned Advanced Tactical Fighter; and

• An Israeli proposal to use its US military aid monies to participate in the space-based Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). This proposal, which would represent a substantial concession to Israel since all other SDI participation is on an industry-government cost-sharing basis, is opposed by the US. One administration official predicted flatly, "I don't think (this proposal's) going to be accepted."

US Foreign Aid: Billions for Israel, Layoffs for the State Department

While the administration scrambles to assuage Israel's endless appetite for US aid, the State Department has announced plans to close two small US Embassies in Africa as well as up to 13 US Consulates around the world. Secretary Shultz announced these plans in a speech to department personnel in mid-September, stating that Congress' failure to appropriate sufficient funds for the department necessitated the draconian cutbacks. Congress has "brutalized the foreign affairs budget," Shultz reportedly told department staffers.

In addition to the planned embassy closures, the US missions in Equatorial Guinea and the Comoro Islands are slated for termination. Department officials also estimate that approximately 1,300 Foreign Service officials, primarily in the Washington, DC area, will have to be eliminated to comply with the congressional budget mandate. The department is also considering reducing the number of deputy assistant secretaries—a key first step up toward an ambassadorship—in each of State's 14 bureaus. At present there are between four and six such positions in each bureau. All this, but not one suggestion that aid to Israel—once again a staggering $3 billion in grant economic and military support—should be reduced somewhat to maintain the integrity of the Department of State.

Presidential Politics and the PLO

Largely because of congressional pressure, coordinated by Republican presidential candidates Rep. Jack Kemp (R-NY) and Sen. Robert Dole (R-KS), the State Department moved in mid-September to close the Palestine Information Office in Washington, DC. The office, an offshoot of the Palestine Liberation Organization's official observer mission at the United Nations, was established with US approval in 1978. Since then, the office has duly compiled with all laws, including registering with the Justice Department as a foreign agent, and it has been headed by Hasan Abdul Rahman who, ironically, is a US citizen.

The legislation sponsored by Dole and Kemp, which called for the closure of both the DC and New York offices, enjoyed strong congressional support. For example, 48 of Dole's colleagues had signed on as co-sponsors of the Senate bill, giving the proposal a strong chance of passage. Given this demonstrated support, some congressional observers say the State Department had little choice but to move against the Washington office, in hopes of forestalling the broader effort to close both offices.

Not surprisingly, Rep. Kemp praised the department's action, calling it a "strong signal to the rest of the world that America's war on terrorism is being waged strongly." "This is truly a victory in America's fight to help put an end to terrorist organizations and terrorist perpetrators," Kemp continued. "We must continue our war on terrorism until the PLO's New York Office is put out of business," the pro-Israel New Yorker concluded.

Although the Department of State denied it, the Washington Jewish Week reported that the State Department action was a "deal" in return for agreement by 40 US Jewish organizations to stop promoting probably unenforceable and certainly embarrassing legislation in Congress ordering closure of the PLO's observer mission in New York, which is accredited to the United Nations, not the United States. Whether or not Jewish leaders kept their part of the bargain, Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA) appended his bill to close both the New York and Washington PLO offices to the State Department's appropriations bill. Final action on the bill now goes to a Senate-House conference committee charged with ironing out the differences in the bills passed by the two bodies.

Evidence that the State Department literally had to reverse itself to deal with the Jewish leaders is apparent from the text of an earlier letter from Secretary of State George Shultz to Kemp, who sponsored similar legislation in 1986. Shultz wrote: "The continued existence of the PLO Information Office in Washington neither reflects nor requires the approval of the US government." As long as the office complies with relevant US laws, Shultz added, "it is entitled to operate under the protection provided by the First Amendment of the Constitution."

An unanswered question: What could the State Department or Congress do if the staff— who by law had to be either US citizens or resident aliens—of the Palestine Information Office regrouped as, say, the American-Palestine Public Affairs Committee? If the answer to this question is nothing, observers say, then what authority did the government originally have to close the office?

Congress and the Saudi Arms Sale

Notwithstanding the above, the much-discussed proposal to sell a package of arms to Saudi Arabia remains the ultimate example of Congress' reflexive support of Israel. In late September Sens. Alan Cranston (D-CA)—perhaps Israel's most outspoken Senate supporter—and Bob Packwood (R-OR) publicized a letter signed by 64 senators opposing any further arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Interestingly, Cranston and Packwood released the letter even though Congress had not been officially notified of the administration's intent to sell the arms to Saudi Arabia, and despite the fact that the package's actual composition had not yet been finalized. Still, in their letter Cranston and Packwood claimed a sale was "unwarranted" and would provoke "an unnecessary and unproductive confrontation" between the White House and Congress. "We feel constrained to oppose it vigorously," the senators wrote.

A similar letter was circulated in the House by Rep. Larry Smith (D-FL), perhaps Israel's most outspoken supporter in the House of Representatives. As with the Senate letter, Smith's "Dear Colleague" letter was circulated, signed by over half the chamber's members, and sent to the White House even before the administration had officially proposed the arm sale. Both letters complained about the Saudis' alleged unwillingness to participate in the Middle East peace process. Probably not coincidentally, Israeli Likud leader Yitzhak Shamir voiced similar concerns in a recent interview with the Wall Street Journal. "Until an Arab country is active in peace with Israel, it shouldn't get sophisticated US weapons," Shamir said.

The problem with these complaints, heard both in Israel and the US, is that it is actually Israelthat is unwilling to sit down at the negotiating table. Israel, led by Shamir's Likud supporters, categorically refuses to participate in an international peace conference on the Middle East, an idea that has been supported by both the Saudi and Jordanian governments, the Reagan administration, and Israeli Cabinet members Shimon Peres and Abba Eban, acting as individuals and in conflict with the Israeli government.

The Compromise

The pro-Israel congressional pressure tactics worked. In early October the sale's congressional opponents and the administration announced a "compromise" that looked suspiciously like a victory for the pro-Israel lobby and its congressional supporters. Under terms of this compromise, which was crafted by National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, the administration agreed to withdraw its proposal to sell 1,600 Maverick air-to-ground anti-tank missiles to Saudi Arabia. In return, the administration received assurances that the rest of its planned $1 billion sale to the Kingdom would not be opposed by Congress. The problem with this "compromise" is that, without the Mavericks, the sale is little more than an expensive spare parts transaction. As reported in last month's Washington Report, the sale, which was sent to Congress immediately after the "compromise" was announced, includes:

• As many as 12 "attrition" F-15C/D Eagle jet fighters, worth approximately $502 million;

• Field artillery vehicles and other equipment, valued at $62 million;

•Upgrades for the Saudis' aging M-60 tanks, worth an estimated $108 million; and

• Electronic countermeasure equipment, radar and computer software for the F-15 fighters already in the Royal Saudi Air Force, valued at $300 million.

Congressional approval of this sale seems certain, given the extent of the administration's compromise. What the future will bring remains highly uncertain. One issue that is likely to arise in the coming months is the Saudi government's interest in buying up to 200 American M1 Abrams main battle tanks, worth upward of $500 million. The Abrams proved its combat worthiness in recent tests against a number of competitors in the Saudi desert. Saudi interest in going forward with a sale would certainly evoke stiff congressional opposition. Unless the administration is able to use the rapidly-unfolding events in the Persian Gulf and Iran-Iraq war to change the mood of Congress, odds are that such a sale would not be proposed until after the 1988 elections.

Dennis J. Wamsted is a free-lance writer specializing in Congress and the Middle East.